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Abstract 
This thesis offers a thought experiment on death and identity: can one solve 
interpretational problems in one cultural text through a Comparative Methodology with 
another cultural text? I make two claims: that cultures distinct in time or geography can 
have Shared Concerns regarding death and identity; and that using cultural texts with 
Shared Concerns helps solve interpretational problems within the framework of one of 
the cultural texts.  The methodology is designed to tease out existing, yet implicit, 
notions within cultural texts.  
I offer two test-cases for the Comparative Methodology.  Firstly, I put Plato’s Phaedo in 
dialogue with the Buddhist Milindapañha.  I analyse specific Shared Concerns between 
the texts before attempting to solve the problem of moral accountability in Phaedo.  I do 
so by using John Locke’s ideas on identity as a philosophical and terminological 
framework.  Secondly, I analyse Empedocles’ poem with the Indian Kaṭha Upaniṣad as 
an added test-case to the Comparative Methodology. Specifically, the philosophical 
concern for Empedocles regards identity and moral accountability in a possible form of 
liberation.  To what extent is the purification and possible liberation of the daimon 
morally conditioned, and does (self) understanding lead to a possible form of liberation? 
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CHAPTER 4: MILINDAPAÑHA AND PHAEDO ............................................................................... 139 
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................... 139 
4.1 BUDDHIST IDEAS WITHIN THE LOCKEAN FRAMEWORK.................................................................. 140 
4.1.1 Human Animal ....................................................................................................................... 140 
4.1.2 The Soul ................................................................................................................................. 146 
4.1.3 The Person ............................................................................................................................. 146 
4.1.4 Ancestral Relation – The Person ........................................................................................... 150 
A) Baby and Adult ...................................................................................................................... 151 
B) Flame and Lamp ................................................................................................................... 153 
C) Milk and Ghee ....................................................................................................................... 154 
4.1.5 Ancestral Relation - Forensic ................................................................................................ 156 
4.2 SOLVING MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN PHAEDO WITH MILINDAPAÑHA ............................................ 161 
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Introduction 
 Two certainties attend the scholarly comparison of ancient China and ancient 
 Greece.  First, those who pursue this study are participating in a venerable 
 intellectual endeavor that will persist.  Second, scholars who enter this daunting 
 field are almost certain to attract sharp criticism...Criticism of the work of others 
 in this field is always easy precisely because the pitfalls of comparative study 
 are so numerous and so difficult, perhaps impossible, to avoid.  Chief among 
 these pitfalls is the fact that all of us who make these comparisons stand 
 somewhere, belong to some cultural context, and where we stand can have a 
 profound affect on what we say about a different cultural context (Shankman & 
 Durrant, 2002:1-2).  
 I begin my introduction by drawing my reader to the quotation taken from 
Shankman and Durrant’s introduction to their exceptionally edited book on Early 
China/Ancient Greece: Thinking Through Comparisons (2002).  Although dealing with 
Sino-Hellenic comparative work, much the same ‘endeavor’ and ‘pitfalls’ exist in all 
comparative work; especially in the postmodern, postcolonial, and poststructural 
academic world.
1
  With such criticisms in mind I offer a tight consequentialist reason 
for my comparison built around two Claims: that Shared Concerns
2
 (Claim 1) between 
cultural texts
3
 can help offer solutions to problems (Claim 2) in, at least, one of those 
texts.   
 I offer two test cases for Claim 1 and 2.  In both cases the interpretational focus 
remains on individual ancient Greek cultural texts; firstly Plato’s Phaedo in dialogue 
with the Buddhist Milindapañha; secondly Empedocles’ poem with the Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad.  Far from essentialising,4 offering a comparative approach leads to new 
                                                 
1
 For an excellent introduction into comparative religion in a postmodern age, see A Magic Still Dwells 
edited by Patton and Ray (2000). 
2
 ‘Shared Concerns’ is a term I use from now on to denote the similar philosophical issues texts can share 
through their accounts of the nature of reality or the ontology they are trying to present.  The term is not 
used to denote similarities in answers or ontologies.  Indeed, two texts may share a concern with life after 
death but come to very distinct answers.  These texts may share similar concerns about death, but be 
dissimilar in their answers to those concerns.  Shared Concerns, therefore, is a dialogue concerning what 
individual texts say about specific issues.  Identifying and considering Shared Concerns is a means of 
establishing a dialogue.  The issues in this thesis are death, identity, purification and moral accountability.  
3
 Cultural texts is a term I use to emphasise my desire to keep a text within its cultural setting.  More 
particularly, I also wish my re-interpretations to be viewed within the framework of that culture.  Every 
text is cultural, but I am consciously highlighting that cultural framework.  The term refers to a text read 
within its cultural setting.  
4
 I denote this term to mean reducing or limiting a complex thing/culture to a necessary set of ideas. 
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readings in the ancient Greek cultural texts, allowing for ‘the concepts of multivocality 
and multiple interpretations that are essential to the comparative method’ along 
deconstructionalist postmodern lines (Doniger, 2000: 70).  At all times the focus is on 
examining individual texts aimed at re-interpreting the ancient Greek texts.     
 There are two aims to this introductory chapter.  1) The first is to introduce the 
project as a whole: stating the methodology, what is gained, why the specific texts were 
chosen, what the risks are, introducing current comparative philosophical scholarship, 
and a full chapter outline explaining the breakdown of each individual chapter.  2) The 
second aim is to provide a contextual background for Indian philosophical history.  This 
need only be brief, but provides readers without a working knowledge of Indian 
philosophical history a chance to acclimatise.   
Section 1 
1.1 The Comparative Methodology 
 The methodology is as follows: I offer Claim 1.  This is the claim that specific 
Shared Concerns exist. These Shared Concerns are then the basis for Claim 2, that 
examining different cultural texts together might provide a tool for problem-solving 
within the framework of these cultures.  Problem-solving is a specific term I employ to 
denote interpretational problems.  For example, in the chapter on Plato’s Phaedo I refer 
to the problem of moral accountability or the forensic problem; however, this problem 
does not refer to the first-order philosophical problem modern philosophers are still 
engaged with today, i.e. why should we be good.  Instead, the problem I refer to is the 
interpretational problem of Phaedo, i.e. how should Phaedo be interpreted regarding 
moral accountability.  The interpretational problem is a second-order philosophical 
problem concerning Plato’s interpretation.  The distinction is vital for the outcomes and 
claims in this thesis: I aim to solve interpretational problems in a way that is 
understandable within a Platonic or Empedoclean framework.   
11 
 
 Where concerns are shared across cultures, trans-cultural dialogue may help to 
solve problems encountered in one or other of the cultures, even if those cultures are 
geographically, temporally, and thematically distant.  I call this the Methodological 
Hypothesis,
5
 and I deploy it in two ways.  The first proposed test-case is Plato’s Phaedo 
and the Buddhist Milindapañha.  Despite being geographically, temporally, and 
thematically distanced, Phaedo and Milindapañha have Shared Concerns (Claim 1).  
Chapter 1 analyses these Shared Concerns.  Without first undertaking Claim 1 in 
Chapter 1, I cannot provide reason to use two distinct cultures together to problem 
solve—the two cultures may be too diverse in time, or disparate in themes. 
 Once I have shown Claim 1 to be true, that Phaedo and Milindapañha have 
Shared Concerns, I move onto the application of the Comparative Methodology.  The 
comparative study of Phaedo and Milindapañha in Chapters 2-4 is a test of Claim 1, 
and validates them through Claim 2.  I do so by putting Plato’s Phaedo in to dialogue 
with John Locke’s Essay on Human Diversity,6 and then, Milindapañha.  The logical 
sequence is: (i) there is a problem in Phaedo; (ii) this problem is not fully solved by 
dialogue with Locke; (iii) the problem can be solved by dialogue with Milindapañha.  
Therefore, Claim 2 solves an interpretational problem concerning identity through 
moral accountability in Plato’s Phaedo.  
 Once Claim 1—that different cultural texts have Shared Concerns—is 
established in Chapter 1; and Claim 2—that different cultures used together offer a 
problem-solving tool—is completed in Chapters 2-4, then I test the usefulness of my 
methodology by once more implementing both Claims in Chapters 5-7.  Chapters 5-7 
are a confirmatory application of the methodology providing a second validation.  The 
                                                 
5
 The Methodological Hypothesis refers to the implementation of the Comparative Methodology, i.e. the 
working through of Claim 1 and 2. The method of Claim 1 and 2 is referred to as the Comparative 
Methodology. The Comparative Methodology refers to both a comparison and a contrast as I am not 
suggesting that texts can, or should, be synthesised. 
6
 For why Locke is included in this comparative study see Why Locke (1.5). 
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examination of Empedocles’ poem through the Kaṭha Upaniṣad is the result of, and the 
test control of, my original two Claims—that two cultures with shared concerns can be 
used together to problem solve in one of the cultural texts. Chapter 5 and 6 intend on 
highlighting the Shared Concern in both texts of identity and moral accountability. 
Chapter 7 then offers a conclusion—through the established methodology of different 
cultural texts used together—to the problem of identity in Empedocles’ writing.    
 I therefore defend two Claims through two applications of the Comparative 
Methodology: Claim 1, that cultures distinct in time or geography can have Shared 
Concerns regarding death and identity; and Claim 2, that using cultural texts with 
Shared Concerns helps solve interpretational problems within the framework of one of 
the cultural texts.  By combining Claim 1 and 2 I demonstrate a methodology that has 
worked twice with separate cultural texts, Plato and Empedocles.  Furthermore, the 
Comparative Methodology could, in future studies, be used with different cultural texts.  
In the thesis I demonstrate that where two or more cultures are shown to have Shared 
Concerns, these texts can then be used to problem solve.  As a result there are two 
conclusions: firstly, that the study of different cultural texts is of value for 
understanding Shared Concerns (Claim 1); and secondly, that through Shared Concerns 
one can use a cultural text to solve interpretational problems in another cultural text 
(Claim 2).   
 Although not defended as part of my two Claims in this thesis there should also 
be an ‘intrinsic intellectual interest’ in comparative studies, ‘in particular to show how 
such studies enrich and deepen our understanding of the Classical world’ (Tanner, 
2009: 90).
7
  Indeed, comparative studies can ‘broaden our sensibilities’ (Tanner, 2009: 
94).  This helps limit the ‘insularity of Classics’ (Tanner, 2009: 89) and any ‘intellectual 
insularity’ (Tanner, 2009: 105).  Tanner in his article on Sino-Hellenic work excellently 
                                                 
7
 My own emphasis. 
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describes different methodologies, of which some ‘lack the scrupulous attention to 
social context’ or ‘the analytical rigour’; however, he believes ‘such criticism misses the 
point’.  And it is Tanner’s conclusion that ‘our understanding of the range of texts 
explored [even without rigorous attention to social context or analytical rigour] is 
greatly enriched by reading them against each other, and our cultural sympathies and 
sensitivities correspondingly expanded’ (2009: 102).  Therefore, even when a 
comparison lacks ‘analytical bite’ there can still exist strengths (Tanner, 2009: 99).      
1.2 Why Phaedo & Empedocles?  
 The thesis compares philosophical beliefs in Greece and India regarding death 
and identity.  The primary theme of interest of this thesis is death and related issues of 
identity.  Plato and Empedocles have been chosen, as opposed to Pythagoreanism or 
early Orphism, since their extant philosophical texts discussing death and identity can 
be used directly with the Indian textual evidence.  By focusing on texts, one is able to 
examine concrete Shared Concerns and highlight interpretative problems within each 
text.  Therefore, despite the comparative methodological approach, the emphasis 
remains ancient Greek philosophy specifically—the second-order philosophical 
problem of interpretation, not the first-order philosophical problem more common in 
analytical philosophy.   One culture will be used to illuminate another culture through 
the direct analysis of a culture’s philosophical texts.   
 Empedocles is chosen as an early Greek Presocratic thinker on these themes 
because there is extant textual evidence, but also due to that textual evidence requiring 
further interpretation.  Empedocles discusses themes of purification and moral 
accountability.  I will demonstrate how distinguishing between a human compound and 
a daimon through the Kaṭha Upaniṣad example of self as a rider in a chariot is a re-
interpretation.  Furthermore, I explore the respective approaches to liberation in Kaṭha 
14 
 
Upaniṣad and Empedocles: how important is moral accountability in Empedocles 
compared to the discovery of ontological truths?   
1.3 Why India?  
 India is an excellent comparative ‘tool’ as there is a complex Indian 
philosophical tradition concerning death and identity and how these relate to 
purification and moral accountability.  The Indian evidence relates to the religions of the 
Ganges Valley from the Vedic religion through the Upaniṣads and finally arriving, 
chronologically, at Buddhism.    Reading Plato with prior knowledge of Buddhism, one 
recognises similarities despite the differences.  The next step is to ask oneself whether 
these similarities are useful, and, if so, how one can implement a method that generates 
a new interpretation.  Using two cultures in my comparative method helps elucidate 
Shared Concerns (Claim 1) and problem solve (Claim 2).  Sorabji explains why India is 
used for comparison (2006: 278):  
 there is great value in looking at another culture to which the question of a 
 continuous self has been much more central, the culture of India.   
Sorabji is predominantly focused on Plato.  Kahn stated that the ‘time has come to 
reconsider, in the light of modern research and with more rigorous techniques of 
comparison’ Empedoclean transmigration alongside the only civilisation that had 
‘reached a level of intellectual development comparable to that of early Greece’, that of 
India (1971: 35).  I combine Sorabji’s and Kahn’s statements as a premise for my 
Comparative Methodology.   
 For example, comparing Plato to the Buddhist not-Self theory, anattā, is a 
methodological tool to understand what Plato thought about death, identity, and moral 
accountability.  Plato and anattā cannot be synthesised; indeed, Plato clearly had a view 
of an eternal soul, the very idea anattā argues against.  But both theories pertain to the 
mis-association of self, and the usefulness of purification to help alleviate that ignorance 
of self.  Buddhism concludes that there is no soul; Plato argues that there is an eternal 
15 
 
soul.  The conclusions are starkly different, yet both see moral accountability as a 
fundamental idea.  And by examining the Platonic problem of moral accountability 
through anattā–where there is moral accountability without an eternally stable reference 
point—we are able to understand Plato’s ideas better.   
 Ancient thinkers can be philosophical without being Philosophers.  The 
distinction is important.  The discipline of Philosophy did not exist in the ancient world.  
The closest one can come in the ancient world to a specific field of thought with its own 
parameters are the schools of Plato and Aristotle.  However, even the Academy and 
Lyceum were engaged in a much wider study of knowledge than modern Philosophy 
Departments.  Furthermore, what constitutes Philosophy has not always included 
‘Eastern’ thought.  Tanner describes how the Chinese ‘canonical texts (jing) of the 
traditional masters...only came to be classified as ‘philosophy’ in the early twentieth 
century’ (2009: 94).  I view each text as philosophical, instead of Philosophical.  I 
problem solve within the interpretational framework of that cultural text.   
1.4 A Thought Experiment   
 Both Greek and Indian traditions stretch across a wide range of time and space 
within their own cultures.  Additionally, Greece and India are separated by a vast 
geographical land mass of the Near East.
8
  However, divergent geographical locations 
and chronological dating difficulties do not invalidate this project.  For at the heart of 
this project is a thought experiment.  Even without discussing influence, the comparison 
of Empedocles and Plato with Upaniṣadic and Buddhist texts is ‘instructive’.  Kahn 
observes how (1971: 35): 
 Even if no historical link can be established, the parallel between the two 
 religious patterns would certainly be instructive.   
                                                 
8
 An interesting historical or sociological aside for a future project is why India and Greece share certain 
beliefs whilst Persia seemingly does not?   
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This thesis is a thought experiment making no claims of historical influence or a 
dissemination of ideas.
9
  I require no argument pertaining to influence or contact. 
 Contained within the thought experiment lies a question, simple yet complex: 
can one solve interpretational problems in one cultural text through the Comparative 
Methodology with another cultural text that has specific Shared Concerns?  When faced 
with problems in ancient Greek philosophy relating to death and identity, is it possible 
that another culture, that of India, asked similar questions?  And then can the latter be 
used to help explain the former?  Through my method I am not attempting to synthesise 
two distinct philosophical cultures.  Santayana believes that a synthesis can ‘only be 
reached by blurring or emptying both systems in what was clear and distinct in their 
results’ (Dewey, Radhakrishnan, & Santayana, 1951: 5).  One need not agree with 
Santayana that every synthesis require an ‘emptying’, but there is a danger that one can 
make any two philosophies have Shared Concerns if one selects and omits evidence 
carefully enough.  However, in this project differences are not to be explained away or 
omitted.  Throughout, differences are drawn out and discussed.  For often it is the 
differences within a broadly similar idea that help expound the key message within that 
idea.  Indeed, differences I present are purposeful within my comparative method.     
 The methodology is designed to tease out existing, yet implicit, notions within 
Empedocles and Plato.  As such, my new interpretations could in principle have been 
reached without a comparative method—for otherwise my conclusions would be a 
grave mis-reading of the original Greek evidence; but up to this point they have not 
been.  Furthermore, this thesis offers something greater than Greek conclusions: it 
hopes to offer an exploration into the nature of ancient philosophical thought.  By using 
two cultures side-by-side one’s understanding of the ancient world is greater than 
                                                 
9
 One hopes that education can reach a point where cultural blocks do not exist (Dewey, Radhakrishnan, 
& Santayana, 1951: 3). 
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through a single reading alone.  The exploration across space and time is not only 
intrinsically valuable as an exploration of human knowledge, but is also a journey that 
improves our understanding through problem-solving.  Therefore, I do not claim my 
Comparative Methodology is the only way to solve these problems; but the thesis 
should be judged against its Claims, i.e. that considering Shared Concerns (Claim 1) 
between two cultural texts, despite being geographically, temporally, and culturally 
distanced, offers a method to solve specific problems in one of the cultural texts (Claim 
2).   
1.5 Why Locke? 
 Locke’s Essay on Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter XXVII, is used to 
secure the precision of language within the re-interpretation of the ancient philosophical 
discussion.  There are positive and negative outcomes to how I make use of Locke’s 
ideas.  To take the positives first, Locke helps distinguish between kinds of substances.  
Locke demarcates difference between humans, persons, and souls.  Although 
philosophers still disagree on whether Person is a different kind from Human Being, 
because my focus remains on the second- order philosophical interpretations of the 
ancient texts and not the first-order puzzle of Personhood, I use Locke’s distinction to 
frame Plato’s evidence.  This means I provide evidence for Plato’s concept of human 
animals and persons in Phaedo.  This enables me to highlight the locus of moral 
responsibility for Plato.  For Locke, the person is the locus of moral responsibility.  
According to the Phaedo, the person is the soul and, by extension, the bearer of moral 
responsibility.  Locke’s distinction between kinds is paramount to solving 
interpretational problems in Plato’s Phaedo.    
 Unfortunately, Locke also has certain disadvantages, the most pertinent being 
his dissonance within a thesis specifically tailored to thought in the ancient world and 
its interpretation.  Locke is a XVII century English philosopher remote in time, place, 
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and style from the contextual grounding of ancient philosophy.  For example, Locke’s 
concept of soul and judgement is heavily Christianised, a culture completely 
disconnected from the two ancient cultures I have chosen.  It must also be noted that 
Locke, although useful linguistically, does not solve the interpretational problem found 
in Plato’s Phaedo.  Therefore, philosophically Locke is also limited. 
 However, the positives are more important than the negatives.  The 
philosophical precision of Locke’s kinds is crucial in my demarcating of moral 
responsibility in Plato’s Phaedo.  So much so that I chose to make Locke’s concepts 
central to the over-all framework of the discussion.  This adds a third dimension to the 
Comparative Methodology, one where a third cultural text is used as a framework to 
give direction and philosophical precision to the main discussion.  In order to show that 
Locke’s inclusion does not devalue the Indian material Part Two does not make use of 
the same Lockean framework.  Instead I focus directly on Empedocles and Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad, without the need for philosophical ‘stabilisers’.      
1.6 What is gained? 
 Firstly, Claim 1: the value of examining Shared Concerns within the framework 
of later problem-solving. Secondly, Claim 2: the interpretational conclusions of 
problem-solving. Claim 2 leads to a new interpretation of Plato and Empedocles 
concerning death and identity with an emphasis on moral accountability.  Overall, two 
new findings are presented (Chapter 4 and 7).   
 In Part One the philosophical problem relating to death and identity is the 
relationship between identity and moral accountability in Plato’s Phaedo.  I argue that 
the work of John Locke and the Milindapañha can be used to solve the problem in a 
way that is understandable within a Platonic framework.  
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 Part Two offers a second case study to support Claim 2.  Here the same 
philosophical problem concerning the relationship between identity and moral 
accountability across death is considered in the Presocratic Greek philosopher 
Empedocles and the Indian Kaṭha Upaniṣad.  The particular aspect of this problem in 
this section is that of identity in Empedocles’ poem, and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad is used to 
solve it, in a way that makes sense within the Empedoclean framework of thought. 
 The conclusions are not the same for Plato and Empedocles, therefore, the 
methods are slightly different for both philosophers.  Taking Plato first, the contrast 
between desire for corporeality and purification is explored in Chapter 1.  Using 
Milindapañha’s concepts of desire and purification I conclude that Plato views human 
desire as the root cause of continual re-embodiment and human un-satisfactoriness for 
the soul, but that purification is realised through a cutting off, allowing an ascent.  I then 
take the Platonic exploration further, asking whether the problem of Platonic moral 
accountability can be solved by using Locke’s distinction between a human animal and 
the forensic person. I conclude that, although Locke’s distinction is useful, it does not 
solve the Platonic problem.  Therefore, I use the Milindapañha to help show how moral 
accountability can be solved without the need for a stable reference point.  For 
Empedocles, I focus on the purification or liberation of a daimon and how/if moral 
accountability relates to this process.  Furthermore, I pose the question whether our 
ontological understanding of daimons and nature helps to improve our situation.          
1.7 Why Death and Identity? 
 The two subjects are interrelated and treated in this study as one.  With regards 
to death one sees a curiosity about philosophical cosmologies and metaphysical 
arguments often related to a larger religious soteriology.  Furthermore, death leads to 
questions of purification, which in turn lead some to question who they are and why 
they should be concerned about their fate after death.  For example, Empedocles 
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highlights the Cosmic Cycle and the salvation of the daimon.  In Plato one sees the 
emergence of a metaphysical soul within a complex and diverse cosmological system.  
The same is true of the Indian philosophies: the Upaniṣads present a belief in a 
metaphysical Self/soul,
10
 whereas, Buddhism famously posits the absence of a 
metaphysical Self, but still holds to a cosmology concentrated around moral 
accountability.   
 Death is the gateway to a much larger philosophical question regarding identity: 
how can I survive death and should I be concerned about my death?  All four 
philosophies attempt to answer, in some way, the question of what it means to survive 
their death.  When asking that question one needs to examine the how, the I, the death, 
and why the I should be concerned to survive death.
11
     
1.8 What are the risks? 
 There are six main risks.  These lie mainly in the interpretation of the Indian 
evidence, but are not exclusive to them.  Firstly (i), approaching this study without a 
university education in Indian philosophical history or tradition is problematic, but not 
insurmountable.  Furthermore (ii), the thesis has no supervisor who is an expert in 
Indian philosophy; although, the thesis is indebted to the scholars who have helped 
along the way.   
 But one advantage my relative lack of training in Indian history provides is a 
fresh perspective, one removed from formal or traditional teachings and interpretations.  
The possibility to read early Indian texts without later commentary influencing one’s 
interpretation is suggested by the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy volume 2 
(Craig, 1998: 2): 
                                                 
10
 The capitalised ‘Self’ refers to a metaphysical entity, contrasted with the empirical de-capitalised ‘self’. 
11
 Important topics are desire, purification/liberation, identity, and moral accountability. 
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 It would be difficult, if not strictly impossible, to read the Upaniṣads  
 uninfluenced by the centuries of later commentary and interpretation.
12
 
Later Indian commentaries and interpretations are important and can shed light not only 
on a given text but also the cultural interpretation of the time.  However, commentaries 
can have vested interests, for example, being associated with specific schools of 
interpretation.  These commentaries are from later writers associated with a specific 
school of thought, as the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy alludes to.  Particular 
schools will be examined in more detail later, but for now it suffices to say that schools 
were in competition with one another.  Therefore, an unbiased critical reading would 
seem extremely hard to achieve. 
 The third risk (iii) is that this thesis relies on my own interpretation of Indian 
philosophy, albeit, with scholarly backing, and this interpretation is through translation.  
But through the use of translations I can work within two fields.  To work in 
comparison requires one to yield to the greater knowledge of scholars in their specific 
research field.
13
  My thesis is by no means alone in this endeavour: Obeyesekere in his 
2002 book Imagining Karma examines Greek and Indian philosophy noting how ‘I have 
to rely exclusively on translations’ (xxii).   
 Although still working predominantly from translations of the Greek language, I 
have a much firmer depth of knowledge regarding the philosophical and cultural 
tradition at large, as well as the language.  That is why the thesis is tailored toward a re-
interpretation of Greek philosophy, while the Indian sources remain a methodological 
‘tool’.  Even if working predominantly in translation is still stigmatised, the positives do 
outweigh the negatives.   
                                                 
12
 This claim seems false for the lay reader. 
13
 Shankman and Durrant describe the difference between ‘amateur’ and ‘professionals’ and the possible 
need for the ‘enthusiast’ (2002: 7).   
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 There are, however, restrictions to working in this way.  Sorabji, in his 2006 
book Self, distinguished between objections and uncertainties: Sorabji expressed some 
‘uncertainties about the reductionist views in Buddhism, making confessions of 
uncertainty, not objections, since I depend on the translations and interpretations of 
others’ (2006: 285).  The same is true for this thesis.   
 Using translations has both positive and negative outcomes.  A negative is that 
one is fully reliant on the availability and the scholarly integrity of philosophical 
translations.  If improperly translated, philosophical terms can take different meanings 
and can blur the overall philosophical significance.  To minimise the risk of working in 
translation one relies on sources that are both well documented and acknowledged as 
well translated.  The aim is to limit any misinterpretation on my part of key translated 
words.  The texts used have multiple and extremely high quality translations.  A 
positive is that the translations are beyond any feasible level that I could learn to master 
in three years.  Using multiple translations of the Indian texts carefully and with a 
skilled application ensures readings that are clear and succinct.   
 A fourth risk (iv), associated with the Classical side, has less to do with the 
implementation of the methodology and more to do with the reception of the overall 
project.  As Tanner suggests, ‘Classicists have long been wary of comparisons’.  Two 
reasons for this point are the ‘incomparability’ of ‘the Classical’ and the ‘limited 
illumination’ of comparisons; although Tanner mentions when even done well 
comparisons have failed to be influential (2009: 89).  There are heavily entrenched 
views regarding Greece’s place in the history of culture and society, both in the ancient 
past and the present.  Therefore, any project that seeks to question Greece’s exclusive 
position in the ancient world, in the sense of contextualising Greek thought, may be met 
with misunderstanding.   
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   A core belief is that the ancient world is ‘open’;14 or, as Tanner describes it, the 
‘opening up of Classical studies (2009: 105).  The ancient world should be taught and 
viewed contextually, instead of compartmentalising and inward facing scholarly 
traditions.  In this way comparative philosophy helps (Tanner, 2009: 96): 
 The goal of comparative philosophy is not some transcendental truth, but the 
 more pragmatic one of being able to develop a conversation between traditions, 
 and for that conversation to be able to go on, establishing and mediating 
 similarities and differences, against a shared ground of commitment to the 
 conversation and developing mutual understanding.  
For this reason, Greek philosophers are compared to contemporary thinkers in the 
Indian tradition.
15
  The aim of comparative philosophy is ‘the general examination of 
the ways in which human beings of all races and cultures reflect upon their actions and 
act upon their reflections’ (Masson-Oursel, 1951: 6).  And this thesis hopes to help with 
this examination through Indian texts.   
 Risk five (v) is de-valuing the Indian culture. The great wealth of Indian 
philosophy is important regardless of Greek philosophy, or, indeed, my project.  
However, as a Classicist my main focus, but not all, is on the interpretation of the Greek 
philosophical tradition.  In this regard alone, the thesis compares Greek philosophy to 
Indian philosophy, not the other way round.  I do not wish to be misconstrued as a 
Western European thinker desecrating or belittling Indian philosophical or religious 
truths still important to people to this day.  I am not distorting ‘the core philosophical 
import of such texts by ignoring the original problem-context to which they were 
addressed in the development of their indigenous traditions’ (Tanner, 2009: 95).  One 
must, however, be conscious of one’s own pre-conceptions.  There is a mode of thought 
that one can only interpret a culture through one’s own culture (Tanner, 2009: 96).  But 
                                                 
14
 ‘Open’ refers to the civilisations surrounding Greece throughout the ancient world.  Greece did not 
exist in splendid isolation, removed from the developments of the outside world.  Classical Greece was 
extremely young compared to its neighbours, Egypt and Mesopotamia. 
15
 John Locke is used as an exception to provide clarity of expression and thought on the complex issue of 
identity and forensic responsibility. 
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for the purposes of this thesis, I can only expound being aware of one’s own prejudices 
and cultural norms.  
 Indian philosophy is important regardless of other cultural thinkers, and it 
certainly does not require any statement from this writer.  Unfortunately, a thesis 
without this disclaimer is open to misinterpretation.  The point is simply that the thesis 
does not grade cultural thinkers or philosophers.  This writer’s expertise lies in the 
Classical tradition and that alone is why the emphasis remains on Classics.  
Nevertheless, since a ‘comparison must do justice to every item compared’ (Liat, 1951: 
13), I do believe that the methodology can be reversed and Greek thought could be used 
as a ‘tool’ to help the Indian scholarly tradition.   
 A further sixth risk (vi) is the devaluing of the tradition in another way.  This is 
due to the difference between philosophy and religion.  This distinction may be 
arbitrary, especially in the ancient world; however, it is important for my thesis’ 
reception.  Religion is one fundamental difference between the Indian philosophers and 
their Greek contemporaries.  According to Radhakrishnan, the West asks ‘what is it all 
about’, while the East asks ‘what must I do to be saved’ (Dewey, Radhakrishnan, & 
Santayana, 1951: 4).  Much of ancient Indian philosophy has come through the ages as 
part of the Indian Hindu and Buddhist religious traditions.  That means that certain texts 
and philosophical beliefs have religious meaning to people today.  The philosophy of 
the east is a ‘living heritage in the hands of living men’ (Liat, 1951: 11).  Therefore, my 
interpretations and methodology mean no disrespect to people who hold religious 
beliefs in these texts.  Whether Greek or Indian, the emphasis is always on the textual 
evidence and not the religious significance. 
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1.9 Previous Comparative Scholarship on Plato and Empedocles 
 What can one learn about a culture through the examination of another culture?  
I base my project on Sorabji’s premise that ‘there is great value in looking at another 
culture to which the question of a continuous self has been much more central, the 
culture of India’ (2006: 278).  The thesis implements the premise with regards to 
Empedocles and Plato’s Phaedo.  Plato and Empedocles have both garnered attention 
from comparative scholarly work, with Plato receiving more attention.   Scholars have 
previously compared Plato’s works with different Indian texts or concepts.  For 
example, West in his book Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient states about 
Empedocles’ comparison (1971: 235):  
 Only one oriental comparison must be made.  According to Empedocles (B 62, 
 63) the sexes were produced by division of ‘whole-natured’ creatures, who were 
 themselves evolved from earlier forms of life.  According to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka 
 Upanishad, 1.4.1-3, the universe began as the Self in human form.   
But, given the diversity and breadth of Indian philosophy it seems strange to conclude 
that only one Upaniṣad comparison is relevant.  By taking Sorabji’s premise, and 
applying it to Empedocles, Empedocles’ philosophy can be re-interpreted.  This process 
leads not to ‘one oriental comparison’, or a list of comparisons, but to a fuller 
understanding of Empedocles.     
 I will examine the scholarly output on Plato first before moving onto discuss the 
work on Empedocles.  Comparative studies of the Phaedo have been undertaken.  
Cohen compares Phaedo to The Tibetan Book of the Dead, concluding that Socrates is 
akin to a guru, and that Plato’s fourth proof for the immortality of the soul is as 
dependent on ‘religious faith’ as on philosophical enquiry (1976: 318, 321).  More 
recently, Gold compared the Phaedo with the Indian tradition of Yoga.  The main point 
of Gold’s comparative study was an emphasis on Platonic liberation, which Gold 
claimed had been previously neglected (1996: 17).  Gold made interesting parallels 
between the connection in both traditions—Plato and Yoga—of liberation with 
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illumination, and ignorance with bondage (1996: 19).  Interestingly, Gold stated that the 
Buddhist inter-play between self and not-self is found in the Allegory of the Cave 
(1996: 20).  Unfortunately he fails to show why the Buddhist not-self theory had any 
Platonic reverberation, since there is no elaboration beyond a footnote stating how 
prisoners in the Cave cannot see themselves or one another, and, therefore, lack self-
awareness (1996: 30). 
 Dillon, in his Dialogues with Death, focuses on comparing Plato’s Phaedo with 
the Buddhist Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (2000).  Both ancient texts deal with the death of 
an influential teacher—Socrates and the Buddha.  The aim of Dillon’s work, in his own 
words, is ‘not to claim any direct influence of one teacher on the other, but rather to 
explore the affinity that seems to exist between them’ (2000: 526).16  Dillon, like Gold, 
analyses the importance in both traditions of liberation and purification in relation to 
desire as the cause of imprisonment and suffering within reincarnation (2000: 539).  He 
states that a theory of reincarnation requires continued identity between incarnations, 
unlike the anattā theory (2000: 542).  Dillon concludes that Plato has a doctrine of ‘self-
ness’ that is opposite to anattā (2000: 543).  Where Dillon uses the Mahāparinibbāna 
Sutta, I use the Milindapañha.  The Milindapañha deals specifically with the question 
of identity, allowing a fruitful comparison.   
 In his first comparative work, The Rebirth Eschatology & Its Transformations, 
Obeyesekere outlined several rebirth theories from different cultures, both un-ethicized 
and ethicized.  Obeyesekere considers the ‘highly developed and ethicized rebirth 
theories from the Greeks of the sixth century B.C. and after’, namely Pythagoreanism 
and Orphism (1980: 150).  He concluded that the Greeks had theories of ethical 
compensation like karma and had salvation from what he termed the ‘samsaric process’ 
                                                 
16
 The same emphasis on ‘affinity’—through shared concerns—instead of ‘influence’ is fundamental to 
my thesis. 
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(rebirth) (1980: 152).  In his later work, Imagining Karma (2002), Obeyesekere is much 
more ambitious.  Obeyesekere portrays a unified Platonic eschatology spanning the 
Timaeus, Republic, Phaedrus, and Phaedo.  Although a bold endeavour, one must be 
apprehensive about the danger of assimilation.  To attempt a single unified Platonic 
eschatological theory from diverse and complex dialogues risks missing key 
interpretative meanings within individual texts.  One cannot help but recall the words of 
Julia Annas in Plato’s Myths of Judgement stressing how important it is ‘to relate the 
content of each myth to the argument of the dialogue in which it occurs’ (1982: 119), 
and resist ‘a tendency to assimilate myths that look superficially alike’, which Annas 
claims ‘the eschatological myths have been’ (1982: 120).   
 Obeyesekere analyses the Phaedo mostly alongside the Republic’s Myth of Er, 
concluding that both accounts have otherworldly rewards and punishments but lack an 
ethical rebirth.  Obeyesekere believes the choice of life a soul makes in the Myth of Er 
is an ‘unfree’ habit; he concludes that Plato’s vision of a soul after death lacks an ethical 
rebirth; whereas India has the notion of karma (2002: 271).  Obeyesekere then compares 
the Platonic eschatology to early Buddhist eschatology, concluding that Plato should 
have introduced ‘a more profound idea of rebirth ethics’ because ‘Plato’s doctrine of 
free choice is not altogether satisfactory because it is in actuality an unfree reality’ 
(2002: 274).
17
   
 The final comparative scholar, and one who will feature prominently in Chapters 
2-4, is Sorabji.  Sorabji provides a comparative approach that focuses on self identity.  
He concludes that for Plato soul is ‘true self’, and that ‘true self’ is reason or intellect 
(2006: 34).  Furthermore, Sorabji suggests that reincarnation takes different forms 
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 It must be pointed out that Buddhist ethical rebirth deals with action and consequential essence, 
whereas in Plato there is an ethical doer, i.e. the soul.  Furthermore, once the soul is punished or rewarded 
the ethical scales have been balanced, but what is left is not a clean slate to start completely again.  
Instead, there is a soul with a conscious intellect on a continuous causal line.     
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according to ‘a continuing soul, or a continuing stream’ (2006: 302).  But are those two 
mutually exclusive?  It seems that soul is endowed with a fixed identity, hence the term 
‘reincarnation’, whereas, the stream metaphor highlights the changeable process.  Yet, 
Sorabji questions whether anything reincarnated into a new environment, ‘class, culture, 
or race’ can retain the same ‘mental and physical characteristics’ (2006: 303).  
Therefore, Sorabji concludes that a fixed identity across reincarnations appears illogical.  
Sorabji is correct to question continued identity across reincarnations.  In Chapter 2 I 
examine Sorabji’s question further, and provide an explicit answer and relevant 
evidence in Chapter 4.    
  Therefore, comparing Plato’s Phaedo with a Buddhist text is not a new method.  
But Obeyesekere and the other comparative scholars do not examine the relationship of 
soul and identity within the Platonic problem of moral accountability.  Sorabji is an 
exception since he looks at ‘true self’.  But still there is a need to re-address Plato’s 
concept of identity in a comparative fashion.  For although each scholar mentioned 
discusses comparatively the nature of the eschatological system, each fails in their own 
way to analyse and characterise the forensic identity of the soul.  How can identity 
change over time within a purification/liberation eschatology?  And where does one 
locate moral accountability if identity changes over time?  In this thesis, the central 
proposition of forensic identity is challenged through the philosophy of death.  
Therefore, I am primarily examining the individual entity that relates to the eschatology 
and only contextually the eschatology itself. 
 The comparative work on Empedocles, as stated before, has been limited 
compared to Plato.  Obeyesekere examines Empedocles in his book Imagining Karma.  
Empedocles is compared to Pythagoras and to the Buddha, as someone with a ‘mythic 
persona’ (2002: 215).  Examining Empedocles ‘from an Indological perspective’ (2002: 
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217), Obeyesekere concludes that ‘Empedocles is a god among men, one who has 
achieved salvation or a god status while living in the world’, what ‘contemporaries in 
India’ might call ‘a jīvan mukta’ (2002: 217).   Therefore, what was ‘unique about 
Empedocles and early Pythagoreans was not their rebirth theories but their doctrines of 
salvation’ (Obeyesekere, 2002: 218).  Obeyesekere suspects Indian ‘influence’, but does 
not give explicit details or explain why such ‘influence’ may be useful (2002: 218).  
Instead, Obeyesekere provides his own account of Empedocles’ philosophy and what he 
calls ‘esoteric knowledge’ (2002: 218).  One comparison worthy of note is 
Obeyesekere’s treatment of Empedocles’ daimon as ‘more like the fluid Buddhist 
concept of “the rebirth-seeking entity”,’ rather than a soul with Platonic implications 
(2002: 222).
18
     
1.10 Chapter Outline 
 The thesis is divided into two parts.  Part One on Phaedo and Milindapañha 
(Chapters1-4); and Part Two on Empedocles and Kaṭha Upaniṣad (Chapters 5-7).  In 
Part One I discuss Plato’s Phaedo and Milindapañha, and in Part Two I discuss 
Empedocles and Kaṭha Upaniṣad.  Each part is structured according to the specific 
needs of studying each text.  The Platonic part is divided into four chapters. In Chapter 
1 I focus on the Shared Concerns (Claim 1) of desire and purification.  Chapters 2, 3, 
and 4 follow with a detailed discussion on Plato’s forensic problem (Chapter 2), firstly 
using Locke’s distinction between human and person for Plato (Chapter 3), and 
culminating in the Milindapañha’s problem-solving of Claim 2 (Chapter 4).   
 In Plato I explore two aspects: 1) the nature of desire for the corporeal and 
purification in Phaedo when analysed alongside Milindapañha (Chapter 1); and 2) the 
concept of identity, specifically concerning moral accountability (Chapters 2-4). In 
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 Although Obeyesekere’s point may be a valid one, this thesis will show Shared Concerns between 
Empedocles and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and use them to problem solve. Buddhist imagery or philosophical 
ideas are not included in the Empedocles’ chapters.    
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Chapter 2 I elucidate a problem expressed by Annas and Inwood, amongst others, that 
the moral accountability of soul in Phaedo is blurred.   
 I do this in two stages.  Firstly I turn to Locke’s thought on identity.  Can the 
problems of moral accountability in Phaedo be solved through Locke’s distinction 
between the human animal and the forensic person?  I conclude that, although the 
distinction between human and person is helpful, Locke’s focus on memory is too 
narrow for Phaedo.  I, therefore, move on to using the Milindapañha as a text that can 
solve the problem of moral accountability in Phaedo. This is done through the use of an 
ancestral relation that Milindapañha offers not only examples of, but also a credible 
morally accountable system in practice.   
 Part Two on Empedocles has a three-chapter structure: the Indian text is 
introduced in the opening chapter (5); followed by an examination of the philosophical 
problems within Empedocles (6); and finally the problem-solving chapter ends the 
section (7).  Claim 1 is implemented separately in Chapters 5 and 6, whilst Claim 2 is 
focused on in Chapter 7.  Chapter 5 is an introduction to the Kaṭha Upaniṣad intended 
to be less critical in nature due to the framework of the project as a whole.  Therefore, it 
acts as an overview to key themes and concepts within the text.  The passages selected 
within the introductory Kaṭha Upaniṣad chapter are the same passages that will later be 
used in a comparative fashion.  Longer quotations are included within the introductory 
chapter, with a fuller review of the text.  This is to allow shorter quotations and 
reference in Chapter 7.
19
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 I attempt to give my Classicist readership as much familiarity with complex Indian philosophy and the 
specific text as the thesis parameters allow.  Unfortunately, due to the vast nature of Indian scholarship 
and the sheer breadth of the Indian philosophical tradition, much must be left out.  For those already 
familiar with Indian scholarship, it is still worth examining the key passages in Chapter 5, as it is here that 
the comparative passages have a fuller exposition. 
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 The chapters relating explicitly to the Greek texts, Chapters 2 and 6, focus on 
the examination of critical problems within Phaedo and Empedocles.  The critical 
nature of the Empedoclean chapter (6) stands in contrast with the introductory nature of 
the Indian chapter (5).  Chapters 2 and 6 analyse the validity of specific Greek textual 
arguments in conjunction with the scholarly interpretation of those arguments.  My aim 
is to raise critical objections—my own and by scholars—in Chapters 2 and 6 that I will 
offer potential solutions for through an Indian comparison in Chapters 4 and 7: the 
problematic interpretative impasse (Chapters 2 and 6) are potentially solved via Indian 
texts (Chapters 4 and 7).  The focus of the thesis remains on the final objective of 
Claims 1 and 2: the identification of Shared Concerns on death and identity in the Greek 
and Indian texts, and their potential to help solve interpretational problems in the Greek 
texts.     
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Section 2 
2.1 Contextualising – A very brief Indian philosophical history 
 Immediately a disclaimer must be issued concerning the sheer inadequacy of the 
following Indian contextualising.  Detailed books have been written on the subject of 
Indian philosophical history and space for a thorough examination of all Indian 
philosophical development is not afforded here.
20
  Therefore, what follows is a critical 
overview of the main progressions of Indian philosophy, intended to help contextualise 
readers unfamiliar with Indian philosophy.   
 At this point it might seem prudent to present a list of key terms.  Yet even an 
arbitrary list of key terms is harder than one realises at first for three reasons.  Firstly, 
Indian philosophical terms developed through religious practices and beliefs. Secondly, 
religious and philosophical terms developed through time, meaning different things at 
different times.  And thirdly, terms mean different things to different religious groups at 
the same time, both philosophically and religiously.  Therefore, terms need to be 
explained as they appear within the contextualising process.  In this developmental way 
one is able to explain the different meanings within specific contexts.  
 Before examining the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and the Milindapañha, it is important to 
firmly ground the texts into their social context.  Every text is rooted in the social and 
cultural society to which gave it birth.  But dating specific texts and ideas is 
problematic.  India lacks an historiographical tradition (Dillon, 2000: 525).  Akira 
points out that a compilation of definitive history has been seen as impossible (1990: 
xvi).  Therefore, placing texts within a specific time is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible.  As Dasgupta points out, ‘it is hardly possible to attempt a history of Indian 
philosophy in the manner in which the histories of European philosophy have been 
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 For a fuller and more detailed study I refer my reader to those books in the bibliography specifically 
focused on Indian philosophical history.   
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written’ (1922: 62).  India held ‘so many divergent systems at so early a period’ and had 
no concrete historical record (ibid.).
21
  Indian philosophy is ‘a mighty ocean which is 
difficult to navigate’ that spans over 3000 years (Frauwallner, 1973: 3).  But I must 
attempt to ground and understand my Indian texts within their specific cultural origins, 
if my comparison with Greek texts is to be successful.    
 The nature of the Indian philosophical tradition is quite different from the 
European, or indeed, the Greek.  The great thinkers of India wrote commentaries on 
commentaries regarding individual systems of thought; unlike European thinkers who 
offered ‘independent speculation’ (Dasgupta, 1922: 62-64).  The way the commentaries 
work is problematic, on which two things must be said.  Firstly, commentaries are of a 
much later date than the works that they comment on.  This is not too problematic, 
except for the second point that commentaries purport to provide textual interpretations 
of the original texts, but with strong interpretational links to specific philosophical 
schools existing at a much later date.  Therefore, interpreters have an agenda.   
 The initial important point is chronological history.  The most basic outline of 
the development of Indian thought, relevant for my thesis, is represented in 
chronological sequence like this: 
1) Vedic Religion (middle 2nd to 1st Millennium BCE, written in Sanskrit): 
a) Saṃhita: early ritual verses/secret doctrines: Ṛg Veda, Sāma Veda, Yajur 
Veda, Atharva Veda; 
b) Brāhmaṇas: prose explaining sacred significance of sacrificial rituals; 
c) Āraṇyakas: ‘forest treatise’ for recluses unable to instigate ritual sacrifice; 
2) Early Upaniṣads (c.800-300 BCE): prose and verse characterised by abstraction 
(Phillips, 1998a: vol 2. 2), and a move from ritual to contemplation.  Possibly 
the earliest text is the Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad.  The Kaṭha Upaniṣad is found 
in the early Upaniṣads; 
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 A very rough estimated time period is late 2
nd
 Millennium early 1
st
 Millennium BCE.  Contextually, the 
correlating Greek history is the fall of the Mycenaean Age leading into the ‘Dark’ Age, before what is 
termed Classical Greece. 
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3) Śramaṇa movement: a reaction against Vedic/Brahmanist culture from the c.6th 
century BCE:  
a) Jainism: founded by Mahavira (599-527BCE), texts written in Prakrit; 
b) Buddhism: founded by Siddhartha Gautama (480-400BCE).  The Tipiṭaka 
(three baskets) is a key text, written in Pali.  The later Milindapañha is a 
famous Buddhist text.  
2.2 Vedas 
 The beginning of my contextualisation is the Brahmanist religion of the Vedas 
(1-2 above).  There are four main types of texts that make-up the Vedas: Saṃhitā or 
collection of verses; Brāhmaṇas; Āraṇyakas or ‘forest treatises’; and the Upaniṣads 
(Dasgupta, 1922: 12).  Each is a development of thought.  The Upaniṣads will be 
examined in the most detail as they hold interesting philosophical meaning.   
 The Saṃhita is compiled from four collections of verses: Ṛg-Veda; Sāma-Veda; 
Yajur-Veda; and Atharva-Veda.  Each collection of verses has its own intended recipient 
and purpose: Yajur-Veda is a collection of utterances; Ṛg-Veda is a collection of hymns; 
Sāma-Veda is a collection of melodies (Frauwellner, 1973: 27); and Atharva-Veda a 
collection of spells and incantations (Dasgupta, 1922: 13).  All refer to ritual sacrifice.  
The Ṛg-Veda is most likely the oldest (pre-1st Millennium) (Dasgupta, 1922: 12).  
However, it may have been written down as late as c.600 BCE (Wolpert, 2006: vol 1. 
xlvii). 
 The Vedic texts signify the beginning of Indian literature and philosophy 
(Frauwellner, 1973: 27).  It is the Vedic religion that underpins Indian philosophical 
advancement in the 1
st
 millennium B.C.E; they are the traditional base.  The Vedas 
dominated religious life with elaborate sacrificial rituals that were at the heart of the 
Vedic religion (Kalupahana, 1976: 5).  The Vedic religion was based on the secret 
knowledge held by the priestly class (Kalupahana, 1976: 5).  The secret doctrine was 
Brahman, the Absolute and supremely real (Phillips, 1998a: vol 2. 1).  The official 
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priestly cast, Brahmans, were intermediaries between man and god.  Therefore, it was 
exclusive knowledge, not inclusive.  The exclusivity regarding sacred knowledge 
translated into power.  This resulted in a symbiotic relationship between the ruling elite 
class and the Brahmans.  The elite needed religious priests for sacrifices and the priests 
needed the ruling elite; neither could hold absolute control over Indian society.  
 The beginning of the Vedic tradition is oral, preserving whole masses of 
literature orally (Frauwellner, 1973: 19).  Oral tradition, especially when dealing with 
sacrificial rituals like the Vedas, is often extremely consistent.  However, one limitation 
to the oral tradition regards continuation and preservation.  Consistent preservation 
requires an uninterrupted tradition, for a break in the tradition means the oral 
transmission no longer takes place (Frauwellner, 1973: 20).  In this regard, it is 
impossible to calculate how much Indian thought has been lost to us from the early 
period (pre-1
st
 Millennium BCE), for it is only the Vedic tradition that survived.  
Although one has little way of knowing what other philosophical traditions existed at 
the time of the Vedas, it is clear that other traditions did exist.   
 The Vedas are the start of Indian philosophy, but it is not ‘a consistent collection 
of philosophical writing’ (Frauwellner, 1973: 27).  The Vedic ritual texts are the seed 
from which Indian philosophy slowly develops.  Importantly, one can trace 
development and growth within the Indian tradition.  But the main focus of Vedic 
religion, until the Upaniṣads, was the ritual sacrifice.22  The Vedas, as secret doctrines, 
were believed to have been ‘revealed at some unknown remote period’ at the start of 
each creation of the universe (Dasgupta, 1922: 10).  The Vedas became the authority to 
which new philosophical and religious systems attempted to conform (Dasgupta, 1922: 
11).  The development of thought was directly tied with the ongoing Vedic religion.  
                                                 
22
 There is a further debate within Indian scholarship regarding who wrote the Upaniṣadic teachings.  A 
suggestion is that the Upaniṣads were the result of the ruling elite breaking away from Brahmanical 
control and presenting their own form of soteriology.  The issue is undecided. 
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 The Brāhmaṇa texts were created to explain the symbolism of the sacrifice 
(Frauwellner, 1973:29).  The importance of the sacrificial ritual in society drove a 
development in Indian thought.  The success of sacrificial ritual hinged on the exact 
performance of the ritual, down to the smallest pronunciation of words (Frauwellner, 
1973: 28).  As Dasgupta explains, the Brāhmaṇas are ‘full of dogmatic assertions, 
fanciful symbolism and speculations of an unbounded imagination in the field of 
sacrificial details’ (1922: 13).  Therefore, both the Saṃhita and Brāhmaṇa collections 
were subordinate to the elaborate sacrificial ritual (Dasgupta, 1922: 13).        
 There was a development from sacrificial centred religion, characterised by the 
Vedic texts of the Saṃhitā and the Brāhmaṇas, towards critical insight and 
philosophical investigation.  The philosophical investigation began to be formulated in 
the Āraṇyakas.  The Āraṇyakas were ‘forest treatises’, or ‘wilderness’ treatises, 
designed for old men who had retired into the forest from worldly life.  As a result of 
this withdrawal, the old men were unable to perform the elaborate sacrifices required of 
them.  Therefore, the Āraṇyakas were a meditation on certain symbols (Dasgupta, 1922: 
14).  These symbols were directly related to the ritual sacrifices.  The external sacrifices 
were turned into internal reflections on sacrificial symbols.  The daily life of these men 
becomes a sacrifice in a deeper sense (Frauwallner, 1973: 29).  A development away 
from ritualistic shackles paves the way for the texts of Upaniṣads (Dasgupta, 1922: 14).  
The development culminated in the Upaniṣads.   
2.3 Upaniṣads 
 The early extant Upaniṣads were created between c.800-300BCE (Phillips, 
1998a: vol 2. 2).  However, dating cannot be more precise than a few centuries.  The 
two earliest prose texts are Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya (Olivelle, 1998: xxxvi).  
Bṛhadāraṇyaka can be given a tentative date of c.800 BCE, and can be said to usher in a 
new period of Indian thought, characterised by abstraction (Phillips, 1998a: vol 2. 2).  
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The next three prose Upaniṣads are the Taittirīya, Aitareya, and Kauṣītaki, and once 
again these are pre-Buddhist (Olivelle, 1998: xxxvi-xxxvii).
23
  The oldest verse 
Upaniṣad is the Kena, followed by the Kaṭha, and by the remaining three verse 
Upaniṣads Īśā, Svetasvatara, and Muṇḍaka (Olivelle, 1998: xxxvii).  All of the verse 
Upaniṣads are post-Buddhist in the last few centuries BCE (Olivelle, 1998: xxxvii).  
Geographically, the culture that the Upaniṣads originally came out of is located in the 
region of northern India from the upper Indus valley to the lower Ganges; this is the 
centre of ancient Brahmanism (Olivelle, 1998: xxxvii). 
 Although Upaniṣads are still described as ‘predominantly mystical texts’ 
(Phillips, 1998a: vol 2. 2), they are the philosophically valuable parts of the broader 
Vedic corpus (Frauwellner, 1973: 30).  The Upaniṣads are often characterised as a 
break from the ritualism of the early Vedic literature (Phillips, 1998a: vol 2. 2).  
Moreover, the Upaniṣads ‘denote a subjective and contemplative turn away from 
ritualism and priestcraft to ontological musings about the nature of reality and the place 
of humans within it’ (Prabhu, 2006: vol 4. 199).  However ‘subjective’ or 
‘contemplative’ the Upaniṣads may be, they are still ‘variations on central [Vedic] 
views’ (Phillips, 1998a: vol 2. 2).  That being said, the Upaniṣads are a collection of 
different texts that are not necessarily all analogous.  It is ‘futile to try to discover a 
single doctrine or philosophy in them [Upaniṣads]’ (Olivelle, 1998: 4).  Even within the 
earliest Upaniṣads there is no consistent world view (Phillips, 1998a: vol 2. 1).  
However, the early Upaniṣads are fundamentally a ‘search for the reality underlying the 
flux of things’ (Radhakrishnan, 1953: 48).  There exists a consensus regarding the 
importance of mystical knowledge; but not of what that knowledge is (Phillips, 1998a: 
vol 2. 1).  The most important development, therefore, is that the ‘interest shifts from 
                                                 
23
 I take the dates of the Buddha to be 480-400 BCE.  But Olivelle dates the Buddha at 375-355 BCE 
(1998: xxxvi). 
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the objective (Vedic) to the subjective (Upaniṣads)’ (Radhakrishnan, 1953: 49).  This 
subjective knowledge has an esoteric tone, and the ideal vehicle for passing knowledge 
is from teacher to worthy student (Prabhu, 2006: vol 4. 199).   
 The subjective knowledge, pre-Buddhist, of Indian religious life was equated 
with ‘seeking for Self’ (Harvey, 1995: 21).  The Self to be sought was Brahman, the 
One true reality, to which all life was linked.  One must realise the True Self (ātman) 
behind the outward projection of the senses.  The ātman and Brahman are intrinsically 
linked; Brahman relates to the macrocosmic universe, and ātman to the microcosmic 
individual.  The Upaniṣadic thinkers sought an immortal, eternal, but self-conscious 
‘self’; a ‘true self’ that is ātman (Kalupahana, 1976: 10).  Salvation came through the 
realisation of the ‘individual self’ with the ‘Universal Self’ (Kalupahana, 1976: 14).  
Essentially, this process culminated in the realisation of ātman with Brahman.  As a 
result, change and impermanence are seen as illusionary (ibid.).  The Upaniṣadic ‘self’, 
therefore, seems to satisfy humanity’s deep-seated craving for permanent happiness 
through self-preservation (Kalupahana, 1976: 38).  Yet at the same time Kalupahana’s 
idea of self-preservation provides an interesting paradox; that your individual ‘self’ is 
preserved through a realisation that it is actually a part of the ‘Universal self’. 
 This overview gives an impression of doctrinal unity, which—as I have already 
stated—is misleading.  Therefore, the previous paragraph does not portray the nuances 
and doctrinal disputes.  The Upaniṣads—in later development (CE)— became known as 
Vedānta, with a central position regarding the speculation on Brahman and the relation 
of self to the world (Phillips, 1998a: vol 2. 1).  The Vedānta school is characterised by a 
further schism into two opposing theories of Upaniṣadic interpretation.  On the one 
hand, there is the Advaita school of non-dualism; and on the other, there is the Vedāntic 
or Indian theists.  What sets the two schools apart is their interpretation of how 
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Brahman relates to the world (Phillips, 1998a: vol 2. 2).  These Vedānta schools 
‘systematized the thought of early Upaniṣads’ into the psychological monism of the 
Advaita Vedānta school which relates Brahman as self; and the theistic Vedānta school 
which interprets Brahman as a creator God in a real universe (Phillips, 1998a: vol 2. 3).  
In the history of Indian thought these interpretations are hugely important.  Though the 
concepts of monism and dualism do not directly relate to this thesis, one cannot help 
thinking that the complex discussions on the nature of reality in Indian thought may 
shed light on intricate thinkers such as Parmenides or even Plato.  That is, however, a 
tantalising aside from this project.   
 For the Advaita school of non-dualist, Brahman manifests the world ‘out of 
God’s own substance, as a spider’s web is spun out of its own body’ (Phillips, 1998a: 
vol 2. 2).  The emphasis is on Brahman as a unity and a non-dual self-awareness (ibid.).  
Saṅkara, the most famous commentator for the Advaitin school, wrote in the early 8th 
century CE (Phillips, 1998b: vol 9. 591).  In contrast, for the Vedānta theists there is a 
‘stratified view of reality’ (Phillips, 1998a: vol 2. 3).  The emphasis is on the love 
between the creator God and the individual human soul (Phillips, 1998a: vol 2. 4).  The 
theistic tradition is characterised in later texts, such as Bhagavad Gītā (c.200 BCE), and 
in later Indian commentators, such as Rāmānuja (11th c CE), who examined the 
relationship between God and the soul.  The theistic tradition is specifically in 
opposition to the Advaita assertion that Brahman and the self are a unity (Phillips, 
1998a: vol 2. 4).    
 The ‘dispute [between Advaita and theists] is irresolvable in the Upaniṣads 
themselves’ (Phillips, 1998a: vol 2. 2).  Furthermore, the dispute is a clear example of 
how traditional interpretations can be used to promote a specific reading or 
interpretation over that of a rival claim.  Vedānta is not simply a philosophical school, it 
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is a religious practice based on the Upaniṣad texts.  As a religious practice, any 
interpretation has soteriological repercussions.  Contradicting schools of Vedānta are 
able to exist as the ‘Early Upaniṣads do not speak with a single voice’ (Phillips, 1998b: 
vol 9. 589).  Nevertheless, ‘Classical Vedānta is one of the greatest systems of Indian 
philosophy’ (ibid.).  With regards to the competing schools of Vedānta, it is clear that a 
contradiction exists within the early Upaniṣads.  The contradiction, in its most basic 
form, can be expressed as follows: the need to reconcile an all-encompassing Brahman 
with the empirical reality of diversity, change, and individuality. 
2.4 Śramaṇa Movement 
 Śramaṇa was a reaction in the 6th Century BCE against Brahmanist culture 
(Sick, 2007: 261).  The reaction was mostly against two concepts: (i) the highly 
ritualised Vedic religion; and (ii) Upaniṣadic ideas of self.  Individuals that were part of 
the Śramaṇa movement were commonly known as ‘forest dwellers’, being religious 
wanderers (Harvey, 1995: 1).  These ‘forest dwellers’ renounced Brahmanical society 
and the highly scripted ritualism of the Vedas.  The Śramaṇa movement was an ascetic 
tradition, and yogic concentration was a central practice.  The aim of yogic 
concentration is the gradual elimination of sense impressions and any defiling impulses.  
It is a process of mental development (Kalupahana, 1976: 6-7).  India had a ‘highly 
developed mythopoetic worldview’ and the philosophical Śramaṇa movements 
challenged that worldview (Dillon, 2000: 525/6).  Further evidence of a schism in 
society is the language used to produce these new Śramaṇa philosophies.  The texts of 
the Vedic religion and the Upaniṣads were written in Sanskrit, the philosophies of the 
Śramaṇa movement were not.  For example, Buddhist texts were written in Pali, and 
Jain texts were written in Prakrit (Harvey, 1995: 11).  On a practical level, the use of 
different languages leads to complications with terms: nirvāṇa is Sanskrit and nibbāna 
is Pali.  Also ātman is Sanskrit and attā is Pali; both mean ‘self’.  The term anattā in 
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Buddhism is Pali, meaning no-self; in Sanskrit the same term is anātman.  Another 
example of the double spelling of complex terms is the Sanskrit karma and the Pali 
kamma.  Where appropriate the most commonly held word is used, be that Sanskrit or 
Pali.  For example, anattā is the Buddhist term, and is Pali; however, karma is more 
commonly used than Kamma, and is Sanskrit.    
 Within the Śramaṇa movement there were different modes of thought; I will 
highlight two: Jainism and Buddhism.  Mahavira (599-527BCE) was the founder of 
Jainism (Long, 2009: 34).  Jainism held a deterministic theory of moral behaviour; 
karma.  This meant man was responsible for his own actions and behaviour, and was 
unable to avoid the consequences of an action.  Therefore, one must prevent the 
accumulation of karma by a process of non-action.  Karma, in Jainism, is an inexorable 
law, beyond the power of control; an unalterable external force (Kalupahana, 1976: 46).  
Long compares karma to Newton’s Third Law of Motion: ‘For every action there is an 
equal and opposite reaction’ (2009: 1).  Jainism also posited the existence of a 
permanent ‘soul’ (jiva) that was comparable to ātman (Kalupahana, 1976:13-14).  The 
jiva is individually one’s own life principle (Harvey, 1995: 1).  It is ‘the defiled 
condition of the soul [that] leads to its continuous rebirth in various states of 
embodiment’ (Jaini, 1979: 107).  ‘Karmic dust’ attaches itself to the soul through desire 
(raga) and hatred (dvesa) leading to defilement and rebirth (Jaini, 1979: 112).  Karma 
in Jainism is deterministic; one is unable to avoid the consequences of an action 
(Kalupahana, 1976: 13).  Indeed, Kalupahana describes a man as ‘a victim of his own 
actions’ (ibid.).  Yet ‘victim’ is the wrong word; the individual would at the same time 
be the perpetrator and the victim of an action. The accused aggressor, karma, in this 
instance is wholly justified in a response to the ‘victim’.  Karma requires moral 
responsibility, and responsibility undercuts any sense of injustice or ‘victimisation’.   
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2.5 The Buddha and Buddhism 
 Siddhartha Gautama is the man born to be Buddha.  However, dating the 
Buddha is contentious.  This is unfortunate given the importance placed on the life of 
the Buddha as a watershed moment in Indian philosophical history, with Upaniṣads 
commonly referred to as being either pre or post Buddha.  The estimated time is 
somewhere around the 6
th
 and 5
th
 centuries BCE (Cousins, 1998: vol 2. 51).  The 
standard date was placed more in the 6
th
 century as 566-486 BCE or c.563-483BCE 
(Sorabji, 2006: 279).  But now the date is more commonly held to be in the 5
th
 century 
at 480-400 BCE.  The latter date would make the Buddha a contemporary of Socrates 
(Cousins, 1998: vol 2. 52).  Olivelle has begun dating the Buddha much later in the 4
th
 
century at 375-355 BCE (1998: xxxvi).  However, there is no reason for this project not 
to use the standard accepted middle date of c.480-400 BCE.  There is a tremendous 
difference between the 6
th
 century dating and that of the 4
th
 century, with further 
ramifications regarding the dating of the Upaniṣads.  Firm dating is not possible, but as 
stated already, the Upaniṣads are often dated in relation to the life of the Buddha.  
Therefore, if the Buddha’s dates move a few centuries later, so too must the Upaniṣads.  
Granted, which date one chooses to affirm can have ramifications for resulting 
arguments or theories, but this thesis does not pertain to any arguments of influence, nor 
does it comment on issues of dating.   
 What is known is that the Buddha closely followed the early Upaniṣad period 
(Dasgupta, 1922: 65).  But the historicity of the Buddha is of little consequence to 
Buddhist doctrine at large (Hoffman, 1987: 6), the Buddha’s philosophical insights are 
born out of an intrinsic discontent with the Upaniṣadic Self, ātman.  The Buddha was a 
heretic, his teachings contrasted with the traditional Brahmanical teachings 
(Kalupahana, 1976: 9).  The main point of contrast was the Buddha’s new teaching of 
not-Self (anātman/anattā).  According to the new philosophical teaching there was no 
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metaphysical Self, no ātman, no Brahman within every human body.  Therefore, the 
‘being who is reborn is neither the same as nor different from the being who dies in a 
previous existence’ (McDermott, 1980: 166).   
 Although it is not necessary to go into detail, explanations of some fundamental 
doctrines of Buddhism are important.  The Buddha taught the Four Noble Truths 
(Harvey, 1995: 4): 
- Everything in life is pervaded by un-satisfactoriness/suffering 
(dukkha/duḥkha); 
- The main cause of dukkha is craving/desire/thirst (taṇhā); 
- If craving is destroyed so too is dukkha, leading to escape from rebirth 
(nibbāna/nirvāṇa); 
- The path to the cessation of dukkha is the Noble Eightfold Path. 
The Four Noble Truths are presented as a doctor’s prescription.  The diagnosis is 
dukkha caused by craving; there is a cure and the prognosis is the Noble Eightfold Path.  
Dukkha can be translated in different ways; suffering is often associated with it.  The 
translation and meaning used in this thesis will be ‘un-satisfactoriness’.  The world is 
pervaded by an un-satisfactoriness, which is intertwined with happiness: upon the 
cessation of one, the other arises.  Therefore, it is not that Buddhism denies happiness, 
but Buddhism believes worldly happiness to be transitory, which in turn leads to pain.
24
  
The Noble Eightfold Path is (Gethin, 1998: 81):  
 Right view;  
 Right intention;  
 Right speech;  
 Right action;  
 Right livelihood;  
 Right effort;  
 Right mindfulness;  
 Right concentration.   
Right view is seeing the four truths; right intention is desirelessness, friendliness, and 
compassion; right speech is refraining from false speech, divisive speech, hurtful 
                                                 
24
 Socrates states the connectedness of pleasure and pain at Phaedo 60b: ‘It is remarkable how closely it 
[pleasure] is connected with its apparent opposite, pain.  They will never come to a man both at once, but 
if you pursue one of them and catch it, you are virtually compelled always to have the other as well’. 
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speech, and idle chatter; right action is refraining from harming living beings, taking 
what is not given, and sexual misconduct; right livelihood that is not based on wrong 
speech and action; right effort is to prevent un-arisen unwholesome states, to abandon 
arisen unwholesome states, and to develop arisen wholesome states; right mindfulness 
is the contemplation of body, feeling, mind, and dharma; and right concentration is the 
practice of the four dhyānas (Gethin, 1998: 81).25  Right view and intention correlate to 
wisdom (prajñā), right speech, action, and livelihood relate to conduct (śīla), and right 
effort, mindfulness, and concentration are to do with meditation (samādhi) (Gethin, 
1998: 81). 
 What underpins Buddhist philosophy, and what the Noble Eightfold Path 
attempts to alleviate, is ignorance (avijjā).  Ignorance is the root of craving, which in 
turn leads to the prominence of dukkha.  Once ignorance is removed, craving can stop, 
and dukkha ceases without craving.  There are a further three qualities or marks of 
existence that support the Four Noble Truths (Harvey, 1995: 5/6): 
- Impermanence (anicca); 
- Un-satisfactoriness (dukkha); 
- Not-Self (anattā/anātman). 
Impermanence (anicca) is a key Buddhist doctrine.  In Buddhism, anicca represents 
how ‘everything in the world, everything we experience, is changing moment by 
moment...everything is impermanent’ (Gethin, 1998: 61).  Due to anicca, Buddhism 
does not believe in an eternal unchanging soul (anattā).  It is the third of these truths, 
anattā, which is the most complex.  The fundamental definition of anattā is ‘no 
permanent, metaphysical Self can be found in personality’ (Harvey, 1995: 7).  However, 
scholars such as Harvey postulate that early Buddhism does have an empirical self.  The 
empirical self is citta (mind) and is changeable, and is not ‘my [metaphysical] Self’ 
(Harvey, 1995: 20).  Therefore, Buddhism is in the middle between Annihilationists, 
                                                 
25
 Dhyānas are a meditational attainment (Gethin, 1998: 320). 
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who profess that ‘a s/Self does not exist’; and Eternalists who believe that ‘a s/Self 
exists’ (Harvey, 1995: 29).26  Harvey characterises the problem of anattā/ātman as an 
innocent man having to answer the question ‘have you stopped beating your wife’ 
(1995: 29)?    
 A further central Buddhist concept, one that is invaluable to this thesis, is 
dependent origination, characterised in the text Majjhima-Nikāya 1.262 ff: 
 When this is present, that comes to be; 
 from the arising of this, that arises. 
 When this is absent, that does not come to be; 
 on the cessation of this, that ceases. 
There is no such thing as accidental occurrences (Kalupahana, 1976: 28).  Humanity is 
interwoven with each other.  Everything that arises does so on the basis of certain 
principles.  The world in which we live is contingent.  Nothing occurs in and of itself, in 
the human sphere.  Buddhism, therefore, is a complex philosophical religion.  The aim 
is the cessation of suffering, through a realisation of not-Self and an ending of craving. 
2.6 Early Buddhist Literature 
 Fundamental to early Buddhist literature are three collections of Pāli Scriptures 
(‘the three baskets’ or Tipiṭaka): the Sutta, the Vinaya, and the Abhidhamma.  The Sutta 
relates to Buddhist doctrines, the Vinaya to the discipline of the monks, and the 
Abhidhamma relates to the same doctrines as the Sutta, but in a more scholarly and 
technical manner.  Although individual dates are problematic, it is commonly held that 
the three collections were completed before 241 BCE (Dasgupta, 1922: 82).  There are 
numerous individual collections within the Sutta and Abhidhamma.  The Sutta 
comprises the Nikāyas: Dīgha Nikāya, Majjhima Nikāya, Saṃyutta Nikāya, Aṅguttara 
Nikāya, and Khuddaka Nikāya.  Importantly, the Buddha is not the author of any texts 
(Gethin, 1998: 35).   
                                                 
26
 The capital refers to a metaphysical Self, whereas, the lowercase concerns an empirical self. 
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 The Milindapañha is a dialogue between a Greek king, Milinda, and a Buddhist 
monk, Nāgasena.  Dasgupta states that the ‘work known as Milinda Pañha...is of 
considerable philosophical value’ (1922: 83).  Indeed, the Milindapañha is a very 
important Buddhist work (Sick, 2007: 254).  According to Halbfass, the popular 
Milindapañha pays ‘special attention to reconciling the postulate of personal 
accountability with the Buddhist ‘no-self’ doctrine’ (1998: vol 5. 211).  The text is a 
long work, with an unknown compiler (Horner, 1964: ix).  King Milinda is believed to 
be the Bactrian Greek king Menander (Horner, 1964: xxii).  Attempting to date 
Menander have not provided any certainty, though he is often placed in the 2
nd
 century 
BCE (ibid.; Sorabji, 2006: 39).  It is not possible to state with any certainty whether the 
text dates from Milinda’s own time.  Most likely, the text was written down at a later 
date, perhaps as late as the first century CE (Horner, 1964: xxi).  But crucially, 
regardless of the date of composition, Milindapañha remains part of the early Buddhist 
literature (BCE) categorised by the earliest traditional Buddhist School of Theravāda.   
2.7 Karma and Rebirth 
 From the mass of Indian tradition I have selected two texts, both deal with 
identity through rebirth and the ethical parameters of rebirth.
27
  Within the Greek 
thought ethical responsibility and continued identity through death is analysed.  And 
both Greek themes are encapsulated by the Indian notions of karma and rebirth.  Karma 
and rebirth are two pillars of Indian thought central to my thesis.  Therefore, an 
introduction to these doctrines, however brief, is beneficial.  It will help my readers to 
understand, on a basic level, these two theories.  There is much that can be said 
regarding the development of rebirth and consequent karmic theories.  Therefore, it is 
important to present here the terms within this project at large.    
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 The Buddhist text deals with karma more explicitly than Kaṭha Upaniṣad. 
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 The doctrines of karma and rebirth appear to be intrinsically entwined.  
However, the historical roots of both doctrines may be rather different (Halbfass, 1998: 
vol 5. 216).  It is possible to have a theory of rebirth that is altogether absent of a karmic 
doctrine, for a theory of rebirth does not require karma (ibid.).   That being said, in India 
the idea of rebirth developed into a concept of karma.  Karma and rebirth ‘are among 
the most important regulative ideas in the history of Indian thought’ (ibid.).  Yet there 
has ‘never been one identical theory’ (ibid.).  As a consequence, talking about a karma 
doctrine or a rebirth doctrine in Indian philosophical history ‘is only a convenient label’ 
(ibid.).  There is less ambiguity about karma and rebirth in the Buddhist texts compared 
to the early Upaniṣads or older Vedic texts (Halbfass, 1998: vol 5. 213).  The Vedas and 
Brāhmaṇas have antecedents but lack recognition of a doctrine (Halbfass, 1998: vol 5. 
209).  Rebirth as a theory, or indeed, as a concept, is absent in the Vedas (O’Flaherty, 
1980b: 3).  This has lead McEvilley to claim that ethical reward and punishment is 
absent also (2002: 112).  In the oldest Indian sources—including early Upaniṣads— 
‘comprehensive and systematic presentations are rare’ (Halbfass, 1998: vol 5. 210).  
Therefore, India clearly has a developmental history concerning these doctrines; they do 
not arrive fully formed. 
 Halbfass, in his overview, believes karma ‘has at least three clearly separable, 
but interrelated, functions and dimensions’ in the history of Indian thought (1998: vol 5. 
217-218): 
1) A causal explanation linking the present with the past; 
2) Connecting the present with the future, through perspectives on and 
incentives for actions; 
3) A soteriological point of departure through detachment, transcendence, and 
final liberation from the temporal world. 
At the fundamental level karma is a ‘retributive power of actions and decisions’ 
(Halbfass, 1998: vol 5. 209).  I would further add to that a definition that karma directly 
affects the human world in a way that rebirth ontologies need not do.  Rebirth can have 
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rewards and punishments after death, followed by a rebirth that is separable from one’s 
previous good or bad deeds, or the rewards and punishments that one receives after 
death.  For example, after death one can be reborn within the same kin group; this leads 
to ancestral rebirth.  Karma does not allow ancestral rebirth or rebirth into the same kin 
group, for one’s actions now are direct causal links to one’s own future rebirth state.  
Therefore, causality becomes intrinsically important. 
 A progression from rebirth to karma is not always seamless.  Karma is a concept 
and a religious soteriological practice.  Furthermore, karma is not strict determinism; 
there is an important element of choice and responsibility (Halbfass, 1998: vol 5. 213).  
The ‘small print’ provides exceptions.  At the most basic level, in some later traditions 
the exception characterises itself as karmic merit.  Principally, karmic merit is the belief 
that karma can be transferred from one person to another, or indeed, from a god.  The 
hope is that through this ‘self-less’ act of giving away karmic merit, one’s own karmic 
merit will increase, or one’s next rebirth will be suitably favourable with the help of the 
god.  The paradox should be self evident.     
 One can see a transformation from an idea into a soteriological practice 
concerning people’s hopes and fears.  Therefore, karma and rebirth have a double 
meaning in Indian history.  On the one hand, they are both ideas that reflect a Truth 
about human nature, and phenomenal nature at large; yet on the other hand, both ideas 
are also part of religious movements.  And religious movements are comprised of 
people who wish to be saved.  Therefore, karma is both an ontological truth and a 
religious tool that can be used to comfort, and indeed, save the individual.    
 The double meaning is important, as it characterises the history of Indian 
thought in general.  Thinking in India is never static or confined to the sphere of thought 
only: Indian thought is a philosophy of practice.  The double meaning can dilute 
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ontological truths, but it also means that Indian philosophy is firmly rooted in what it 
means to be human.  No two humans are the same and as a result their karma will not 
be the same either.  The example used in Buddhist imagery is that, if one throws a grain 
of salt into a small cup of water, that water will become salty to taste; but, if one throws 
the same grain into the Ganges, due to the great mass of water the grain of salt will be 
undetectable (Aṅguttara-Nikāya.I.249).  Therefore, the same deed done by two different 
people can have two very different karmic consequences (Kalupanhana, 1976: 48).   
2.8 Conclusion 
 Having set out my Claims, defended the risks, and contextualised the 
comparative scholarship as well as the Indian history, I now turn to my first case study: 
Plato’s Phaedo and the Buddhist text Milindapañha.   
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Part One: Phaedo and Milindapañha 
Introduction 
The aim of Part One is to present the first test-case, Phaedo and Milindapañha.  
In Part One, I present a solution to an interpretational problem in Plato’s Phaedo 
concerning identity and moral accountability.  Chapter 1 examines Phaedo and 
Milindapañha concerning concepts of death and identity, and shows that there are 
Shared Concerns (relating to desire for the physical and purification, specifically 
concerning death (Claim 1).  In Chapters 2-4 I show how these Shared Concerns can be 
used to solve the interpretational problem (Claim 2). 
 The philosophical problem relating to death and identity is the relationship 
between identity and moral accountability in Phaedo.  Death is the gateway to a much 
larger philosophical question regarding identity: how can I survive death and should I 
be concerned about my death?  Both texts attempt to answer, in some way, the question 
of what it means to survive their death.  When asking that question one needs to 
examine the how, the I, the death, and why the I should be concerned to survive death.  
I argue that the work of Locke and the Milindapañha can be used to solve the problem 
in a way that is understandable within a Platonic framework.  The methodology is 
designed to tease out existing, yet implicit, notions within Plato.  As such, my new 
interpretations could in principle have been reached without a comparative method—for 
otherwise my conclusions would be a grave mis-reading of the original Greek 
evidence—but up to this point they have not been.  Claim 2 leads to a new interpretation 
of Plato concerning death and identity with an emphasis on moral accountability.  
Overall, new findings are presented (Chapter 4). 
 In speaking of Shared Concerns I do not intend to synthesise distinct cultural 
texts, emptying them of their individual value. These two texts have a fundamental 
difference of viewpoint—the existence of a soul.  Milindapañha concludes that one 
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achieves self knowledge in anattā; there is no metaphysical, eternal, unchanging self or 
soul.  Milindapañha explicitly and continually denies a belief in a soul.  But, Phaedo is 
concerned with the fate of a soul. Both dialogues explicitly present a quest of self-
discovery, but, differ fundamentally on what is discovered.  Purification is different: 
where Plato aims to purify the soul from the body, Buddhism has no soul to purify.  By 
contrast, through these differences come certain Shared Concerns.  By using 
Milindapañha I am able to highlight these Shared Concerns more effectively than by 
reading Phaedo without the Buddhist text.
28
  Differences between these two texts are to 
be expected given the time variances in writing, the vast geographical dislocation 
between them, and their individual cultures.  It is because of these great differences that 
their Shared Concerns are so notable and interesting.     
 Claim 2—building on from Claim 1—is that interpretational problems within 
one text can be solved through comparative analysis with another text that shares 
specific concerns.  Fundamentally, the Platonic problem in Phaedo is identity linked 
with moral accountability through sequential embodiments.  Embodied actions lead to 
consequences for the soul alone.  I will show how this is problematic when combined 
with moral accountability.  How can this problem in Phaedo be solved?   
 Through Chapters 2-3 I use Locke’s distinction between a human and a person 
to show that, although Locke’s distinction helps us to understand Plato’s concept of a 
person better, it does not in fact solve the problem.  This is mainly due to the problem of 
memory in Locke’s concept.  But by taking Locke’s fundamental notion of forensic 
persons as consciousness and linking it with Buddhist examples of ancestral relations, in 
Chapter 4 I show that Plato’s identity and moral accountability is solved through a 
                                                 
28
 It is not that one cannot draw conclusions about desire in Phaedo without the Buddhist text, but that 
Milindapañha highlights aspects that are already in Plato.  Therefore, through the methodology I do not 
Claim to find completely new readings that would not be possible any other way, but that, 
methodologically, issues are highlighted within the context of another cultural text that has Shared 
Concerns, and this illumination, therefore, helps the reader to understand Phaedo’s complex ideas. 
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forensic soul that represents Locke’s person, but does not rely on memory as Locke 
suggested.  Instead the emphasis is placed on an ancestral relation. 
 In Chapter 2 I examine the problem of moral accountability in Phaedo in three 
ways: firstly, I look at Plato directly (2.1); secondly, I engage with the modern scholarly 
commentators—specifically, I highlight the works of Sorabji, Annas, and Inwood, as 
they offer the clearest critique of sequential identity combined with moral accountability 
in Phaedo—examining issues in Plato’s work from their perspective (2.2); and thirdly, I 
present my own Claims concerning the problems in Phaedo (2.3).   
 Chapter 3 then attempts to solve the problem of moral accountability linked with 
identity in Phaedo by using a more modern philosopher, John Locke.  Locke’s 
distinction of kinds of substances is firstly examined on its own, providing the reader 
with a basic understanding of Locke’s argument.  I then use Locke’s kinds as a basic 
framework for a further analysis of Phaedo, showing how Plato’s ideas can be fitted 
into Locke’s kinds—specifically, Human, Person, and Soul—to give a deeper 
understanding, and a clearer presentation of terminology, in Plato’s Phaedo.  However, 
Locke’s reliance on memory as the fundamental aspect of moral accountability, 
although useful for Locke, cannot be used to solve the Platonic problem.  The individual 
sections break down as follows: I explain Locke’s account of humans and persons (3.1); 
I apply Locke’s distinction to Phaedo (3.2); and I explain why Locke’s concept of 
persons reliant on memory cannot fully solve the Platonic problem (3.3). 
 Finally, in Chapter 4 I use a Buddhist text to solve the problem.  But I use 
Milindapañha and Locke’s kinds of substance; just as I used Phaedo and Locke’s 
terminology.  Through the combination of Locke and Milindapañha I conclude that 
Plato’s soul is a forensic person who retains moral accountability, not through memory 
but through an ancestral relation.  I offer a solution in Chapter 4 by using the 
53 
 
Milindapañha’s idea of dependent origination (or ancestral relation) in the place of 
Locke’s memory.  
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Chapter 1: Desire and Purification 
Introduction  
 The aim of Chapter 1 is to show that Phaedo and Milindapañha have Shared 
Concerns relating to death and identity through the specific topics of desire and 
purification within a particular Platonic framework of thought. To show these Shared 
Concerns I examine each dialogue—Milindapañha (1.1) and Phaedo (1.2)—in turn, 
before finally examining both dialogues together (1.3). The Milindapañha explores 
three aspects of desire for the physical and purification: the Four Noble Truths of 
Buddhism (1.1.1); craving for the physical world (1.1.2); and the body as a wound as an 
image of purification (1.1.3). When analysing Phaedo I examine three aspects of the 
dialogue pertinent to desire and purification: the idea of death (1.2.1); the afterlife myth 
(1.2.2); and the need to care for the soul (1.2.3).  Each dialogue is critically examined 
and explored individually to begin with (1.1 and 1.2).  I then move on to the 
investigation of desire and purification across the two texts. I examine why Socrates and 
Buddhist monks do not fear death and do not crave bodily life (Death’s Appeal 1.3.1).  
Conversely I analyse what happens to those individuals who do desire to be bodily and 
do crave the physical world (Craving Corporeality 1.3.2). Finally I examine the process 
of continued existence after death for those who crave continued physical life (The Seas 
of Life 1.3.3).    
1.1. Milindapañha 
1.1.1 The Noble Truths of Buddhist Thought 
 For Buddhists there is a cycle of rebirth (saṃsāra). The rebirth cycle (saṃsāra) 
perpetuates sorrow (dukkha).  Sorrow results from desiring the physical. If one desires 
the world during human life, one will experience sorrow in the here and now but also 
rebirth must be the outcome after death and so further sorrow will arise.  An individual 
must not crave or cling to the world of existence because craving maintains sorrow.  
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Human life is characterised by desire that leads to pain, suffering, and rebirth.  Saṃsāra 
is sustained through such desire.  Therefore, suffering is linked to the craving for 
sensory pleasures.  Buddhist thought identifies a harmful craving for life (Rhys Davids, 
1890: 82) and regards becoming as requiring volitional desire. Confections (Samkhāra) 
are potentialities or possible forms of sentient existence leading on from desire and 
craving (Rhys Davids, 1890: 82 fn3). 
 Wisdom is the practical implementation of reasoned truth. It is presented as a 
form of purification. Purification does not have to refer to a mystical other-worldly 
transformation, i.e. a ritual cleansing; instead, the term can be used to denote something 
as simple as ‘to purify’, i.e. to remove contaminants from something.  The Buddha is 
the example that shows that the latter purification is possible. Wisdom (prajñā), reason 
and other good qualities help one escape saṃsāra. They are able to do this because the 
mark of wisdom is the ability to let go of those things that only bring sorrow, like 
attachment to the world. Cultivating wisdom (prajñā) and escaping saṃsāra is hard, 
requiring perseverance and endeavour. The process of escaping saṃsāra is spoken of as 
crossing a sea and as a form of purification. Nāgasena quotes a passage from the 
Saṃyutta Nikāya where the Buddha spoke of the wise man being purified and crossing a 
‘stream’ or ‘sea’ (II.1.10.36): 
By faith he crosses over the stream, 
By earnestness the sea of life; 
By steadfastness all grief he stills, 
By wisdom is he purified. 
 
In Buddhism a synonym for saṃsāra is ‘the sea of life’, a ‘wandering’ through birth, 
death, and re-birth continually (Gethin, 1998: 27).  Gethin notes how (1998: 64):  
One of the ancient and recurring images of Indian religious discourses is of 
‘crossing the ocean of existence’, that is, crossing over from the near shore, 
which is fraught with dangers, to the further shore, which is safe and free from 
danger. 
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The process is an escape from the ‘endless round of rebirth that is saṃsāra and the 
condition of duḥkha’ (Gethin, 1998: 64).  The crossing over water requires a raft.  In 
Buddhism that raft is dharma.  Gethin presents the parable of the raft through a 
quotation by the Buddha in the Majjhima Nikāya II. 58 (1998: 71-72):   
 ...a man who had set out on a long journey...might see a great river in flood, the 
 near shore fearful and dangerous, the far shore safe and free of danger, but there 
 might be no ferry or bridge for crossing from one side to the other...And this 
 man might think, “...What if I were to gather together grass, sticks, branches and 
 foliage and bind together a raft, and then using that raft...safely cross over to the 
 further shore?”.      
In the parable the imagery of journeying over a powerful body of water from one shore 
to another is clearly visible.  Problematically, we can become attached even to the 
Buddha’s teachings.  The very raft we are using to try and escape saṃsāra becomes the 
cause of dukkha that perpetuates the cycle (Gethin, 1998: 71).  What if the same man 
thought the raft to be ‘useful’ because he used it to ‘safely cross[ed] over to the further 
shore’?  And what if this man ‘were to now lift it on to [his] head or raise it on [his] 
back’ to take it with him.  Would the man ‘be doing what is appropriate’?  The monks 
who the Buddha is teaching respond, ‘Not at all’.  The Buddha suggests that instead of 
carrying the raft with you, you should instead ‘beach this raft on the shore or sink it in 
the water and go on [your] way’.  The Buddha finishes the parable with the meaning of 
his lesson about the danger of becoming attached even to the very thing that has been 
useful in your escape from the dangerous shore to the safe shore (Gethin, 1998: 72): 
 Even so, monks, as being like a raft, I have taught you how Dharma is for the 
 purpose of crossing over and not for the purpose of holding on to.  Those who 
 understand the similarity to a raft will let go even of the teachings and practices 
 (dhammā), let alone what are not the teachings and practices (adhammā). 
Bringing the discussion back to the Milindapañha, wisdom is the key to purification and 
understanding how to cross from one shore to another.   
 For Nāgasena purification, as well as wisdom, also requires right action.  Karma 
builds up through wrong action, requiring purification.  Therefore, it must be possible 
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for one to exhaust one’s ‘evil Karma’.  The end of the Buddhist path is Nirvāṇa. 
Nirvāṇa is not discussed in positive language, it is always described as what it is not.  
Nirvāṇa does not prescribe a repression of craving or desire; instead, one should 
cultivate pacification (Kalupahana, 1976: 60).  The first step towards cessation of 
suffering is recognising that craving the sensory pleasures of this world leads to one’s 
suffering.  It is ironic that one craves sensory pleasure thinking it will be pleasurable 
and end suffering; but ultimately, craving ensures one’s future suffering.  One must 
break the cycle; that break is Nirvāṇa.  Therefore, purification refers to one’s actions 
and motivations now, in this life. 
 How does the body fit into this concept of purification through non-attachment?  
Craving leads to becoming, which in turn leads to birth, and the process is characterised 
by suffering.  The body is regarded as impure but a necessary instrument with which to 
engage with the world. Bodily experience must be endured due to humans being ‘name-
and-form’ (nāma-rūpa). In Buddhist philosophy ‘Name-and-Form’ relates to the two 
elements of a human composition: body and intelligence.  One must learn to use the 
body without desire, passion, or lust. 
 The ideas of craving and purification find explicit expression in The Four Noble 
Truths.  The Four Noble Truths are identified in Buddhist thought as: 1. There is 
suffering (dukkha); 2. Suffering is caused by attachment; 3. There is an end to dukkha 
(Nirvāṇa); 4. The Eight-Fold-Path (Magga) leads to Nirvāṇa.  Buddhist philosophy is 
about the individual human being and the life they lead moving from the ignorance and 
attachment of saṃsāra towards the cessation of suffering (dukkha), an escape from 
saṃsāra (Nirvāṇa), and the cultivation of wisdom (prajñā). The individual must change 
how they perceive themselves and the world around them; then they must change the 
way they act.   
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 I will now show how the text of Milindapañha presents these ideas, examining 
the detail of its expressions and formulations. 
1.1.2 Desire: Craving the Corporeal 
 Due to the importance of non-attachment, even to the Buddha’s teachings, 
Milinda wants to know more about the Buddhist ideas of non-attachment.  He asks 
Nāgasena about ‘renunciation’, the very heart of the Buddhist practice.  Nāgasena 
replies that renunciation leads to the cessation of sorrow (II.1.5.31): 
 Our renunciation is to the end that this sorrow may perish away, and that no 
 further  sorrow may arise; the complete passing away, without cleaving to the 
 world, is our highest aim. 
There are three points to analyse in this quotation: the cessation of ‘sorrow’; a ‘complete 
passing away’; and the necessity to do so ‘without cleaving to the world’.  The aim of 
renunciation is tied to this world now, since a happier existence is possible through 
achieving the cessation of sorrow.  This is a psychological state, a state where sorrow 
has ended and no more ‘sorrow may arise’.  The sorrow-less state is here on earth in our 
daily lives, but it can also refer to rebirth.  The concept of ‘complete passing away’ is 
the cessation of rebirth.  Following directly from the advantage and aim of renunciation, 
Milinda asks if there is anyone who after death is not ‘reindividualised’ (II.1.6.32).  The 
response is similar to Nāgasena’s answer regarding ‘the complete passing away’.  
Nāgasena answers that ‘Some are so, and some not’.  Therefore, the cessation of sorrow 
is possible through ending ‘reindividualised’ embodiment after death; the ‘complete 
passing away’ leaves the bodily world behind.  Indeed, breaking the cycle of saṃsāra is 
the aim.   
 The ‘craving for existence’ or ‘cleaving to the world’ is what perpetuates 
saṃsāra.  If Nāgasena dies ‘with craving for existence in my heart’ he will be 
‘reindividualised’, ‘but if not, no’, he will not be reborn.  Craving leads to rebirth and 
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sorrow, the aim is to end sorrow through one’s actions now.  Therefore, II.1.6.32 is an 
important insight into the Buddhist concept of desire.   
 Milinda wishes to understand whether he ‘who escapes reindividualisation’ does 
so by ‘reasoning’ alone (II.1.7.32).  What follows is a short analysis of why reason and 
wisdom are different.  Nāgasena says that animals have reason ‘but wisdom they have 
not’.  The example used by Nāgasena may only provide a difference between humans 
and other animals; but, importantly humans have the capability or potential for wisdom.  
The important distinction is the divergence between animals without and humans with 
the ability for wisdom.  Reason and wisdom are differentiated: ‘Reasoning has always 
comprehension as its mark; but wisdom has cutting off’ (II.1.8.32).  Whereas reason 
leads to abstract knowing, wisdom is practical; wisdom leads to a change in action.  The 
‘cutting off’ is linked with the ideas of the previous passages concerning ‘craving for 
existence in my heart’ (II.1.6.32), ‘without cleaving to the world’, and ‘sorrow may 
perish away’ (II.1.5.31).  One cuts away craving for the corporeal so that sorrow ends, 
i.e. saṃsāra ends.  The relationship between reason and wisdom is like how ‘they reap 
the barley’ (II.1.8.33): 
 With the left hand they grasp the barley into a bunch, and taking the sickle into 
 the right hand, they cut if off with that. 
 Just even, so, O king, does the recluse by his thinking grasp his mind, and by his 
 wisdom cut off his failings. In this way is it that comprehension is the 
 characteristic of reasoning, but cutting off of wisdom. 
The image of ‘cutting off’ is prevalent.  Reason and wisdom complement each other.  
However, it is wisdom that leads to a practical change in the individual, by ‘cut[ting] off 
his failings’.  There is a difference between, on the one hand, understanding something 
to be true, and, on the other, being able to implement that truth into one’s daily life.  
One can reasonably know or agree with an argument, but it is something different to put 
that reasoning into practice.  Reason leads to ‘comprehension’ and understanding; but 
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wisdom leads to the ‘cutting off’ of ‘sinful’ action, the ‘cutting off’ of sorrow, and the 
‘cutting off’ of ‘craving for existence’.   
 Why is wisdom necessary and what is it that is cut off?  A further simile 
presented by Nāgasena offers an image of unravelling.  Desires tangle life, creating 
complication and confusion (II.1.9.34): 
 Thus shall the strenuous Bhikkhu [monk], undeceived, 
 Unravel all the tangled skein of life.    
Desire becomes entangled with existence.  This makes it hard to discern what is true 
and what is harmful to one’s endeavour.  Indeed, the image of a ‘tangled skein’ 
elucidates the great difficulty in the Buddhist path: it is hard to know which thread is the 
true path out of saṃsāra.  The untangling of a thread, built up through saṃsāric desire, 
is the goal (Nirvāṇa).  Nirvāṇa is ‘cessation’ (III.4.6.68-69).  But how is ‘cessation 
Nirvāṇa’?  To understand ‘cessation’ Nāgasena explains first why karma and rebirth 
take place (III.4.6.69): 
 All foolish individuals, take pleasure in the senses and in the objects of sense, 
 find delight in them, continue to cleave to them.  Hence are they carried down 
 by that flood, they are not set free from birth, old age, and death, from grief, 
 lamentation,  pain, sorrow, and despair, - they are not set free, I say, from 
 suffering.   
Cleaving to the senses leads to rebirth.  Nāgasena later in the dialogue describes how for 
Confections (San̠khârâ – potentialities, possible forms of sentient life) to arise ‘all have 
a gradual becoming’ (II.3.4-5.52).  This gradual becoming is caused by ‘longing 
(Tanhā), where there is longing there is grasping (Upâdâna), where there is grasping 
there is a becoming’ (II.3.4.52).  One must have a thirst (Tanhā) for existence or 
becoming.  Grasping (Upâdâna) is the stretching out in satisfying a thirst.  A craving for 
becoming is described as a ‘flood’, a power so strong that it takes the person 
involuntarily through the process of birth, death, rebirth, and all the suffering that 
characterises this process.  The ‘flood’ is human passions.  The wise man ‘neither takes 
61 
 
pleasure in those things, nor finds delight in them, nor continues cleaving to them’ 
(II.4.6.69).  As a result (II.4.6.69): 
 ...craving (Tanhā) ceases, and by the cessation of craving grasping (Upâdâna) 
 ceases, and by the cessation of grasping becoming (Bhava) ceases, and when 
 becoming has ceased birth ceases, and with its cessation birth, old age, and 
 death, grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, and despair cease to exist. 
Therefore, ‘cessation is Nirvāṇa’ since Nirvāṇa is a ‘cutting off’ of the roots that lead to 
suffering, i.e. craving/thirst.  Unfortunately, according to Nāgasena not ‘all men receive 
Nirvāṇa’.  Only the man who lives ‘righteously’, who ‘abandons those conditions which 
out to be abandoned, practises himself in those conditions which ought to be practised, 
realises those conditions which ought to be realised--he receives Nirvâna’ (III.4.7.69). 
 Enlightenment, therefore, is the process whereby Wisdom leads to Nirvāṇa, to 
an understanding, a cutting off of attachments.  To further emphasise his point 
Nāgasena compares ignorance to darkness and knowledge to a light (II.1.14.39):  
 When wisdom springs up in the heart, O king, it dispels the darkness of 
ignorance, it  causes the radiance of knowledge to arise, it makes the light of 
intelligence to shine  forth (Vidamseti), and it makes the Noble Truths plain.  Thus 
does the recluse who is devoted to effort perceive with the clearest wisdom the 
impermanency, the suffering, and the absence of any soul. 
The contrast between wisdom and ignorance, light and dark, is clearly made.  One 
banishes ignorance through cultivating wisdom.  As darkness is the absence of light, 
ignorance is the absence of knowledge, intelligence, and wisdom.  Wisdom is ‘like a 
lamp’ that is brought ‘into a house in darkness’.  The lamp ‘would dispel the darkness, 
cause radiance to arise, and light to shine forth, and make the objects there plainly 
visible’ (II.1.14.39).  The ‘objects’ that the simile refers to are the Noble Truths, which 
concern the world we inhabit.  Wisdom illuminates the Noble Truths allowing one to 
see the world as it truly is.  Three of four Truths are the ‘impermanency’ in the world 
and beings, the ‘suffering’ of beings living in ignorance, and the ‘absence of any soul’.  
Rhys Davids in his translation adds his own bracketed terms when he identifies these as 
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‘the impermanency (of all beings and things), the suffering (that is inherent in 
individuality), and the absence of any soul’ (1890: 61).    
1.1.3 Purification: The Body as Wound  
 Due to Buddhist ideas surrounding the negative consequences of craving, is the 
body an entity that will be hated and totally shunned?  When asked is ‘the body dear to 
you recluses’, Nāgasena replies ‘No, they love not the body’.  However, Milinda is 
confused and asks ‘why do you nourish it and lavish attention upon it?’.  The body is 
compared to being ‘wounded by an arrow’ on the field of battle.  The king is asked by 
Nāgasena in ‘battle, did you never get wounded by an arrow?’ (III.6.1.73).  In such 
cases ‘is not the wound anointed with salve, and smeared with oil, and bound up in a 
bandage?’ (III.6.1.74).  By treating the wound, ‘Is the wound dear to you that you treat 
it so tenderly, and lavish such attention upon it?’.  Milinda replies that ‘it is not dear to 
me in spite of all that, which is only done that the flesh may grow again’.  Therefore, the 
body for Nāgasena is like an arrow wound (III.6.1.74): 
 Just so, great king, with the recluses and the body.  Without cleaving to it do 
 they bear about the body for the sake of righteousness of life.  The body, O king, 
 has been declared by the Blessed One to be like a wound.  And therefore merely 
 as a sore, and without cleaving to it, do the recluses bear about the body. 
The body is ‘like a wound’ that we endure but do not cleave to ‘for the sake of 
righteousness of life’.  Even though the body is ‘an impure thing and foul...like a sore’, 
there can be no righteousness of life without an instrument through which to engage 
with the world.  Therefore, the body must be maintained to serve a greater purpose ‘like 
a wound’ cared for but never craved.   
Neither a passion-filled man nor a passionless man ‘desires what is wrong’.  
However, the man ‘full of passion’ does not understand what is good for him.  For the 
man who is ‘full of passion’, is ‘overpowered by craving’, and therefore ‘is in want’.  
This passion-filled man enjoys ‘both the taste and the lust that arises from the taste’ 
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when eating food (III.6.7.76).  But ‘the man free from lusts experiences the taste [of 
food] only, and not the lust arising there from’ (III.6.7.77).  Therefore, the body must be 
used and not shunned, but neither must it be an object of lust and desire.   
With this account of desire for the world and purification in Milindapañha in 
place, I will now present Plato’s account of the same issues in Phaedo.  
1.2 Phaedo 
 In this section I will set out and explain Plato’s account in Phaedo of the 
relationships between soul and body in life and death and his aim of promoting the care 
of the soul. I will show how ideas of desire for the body and the purification of soul are 
essential to his philosophy.   
 The section on Platonic deaths (1.2.1) will demonstrate that there are three types 
of death in Phaedo and that death means different things to a soul and a human.
29
  The 
three types are: 1) death as an event; 2) death as a state; and 3) death as a process of 
purification.  Soul alone—separated fully from the body—is an ideal for the philosopher 
in this embodied life now, but can only be fully realised after death, when a soul can 
truly separate from a corporeal body.  Then I examine the afterlife myth (1.2.2).  
Socrates establishes two types of souls, pure and impure, and then deepens his 
presentation into five types of souls.  I present how it is only soul ‘type 5’ that attains an 
existence completely by itself without a body.  I present the immortality of the soul and 
the following need to care for one’s soul (1.2.3).  I also analyse the soul’s potential to 
become soul ‘type 5’—the purified philosophical soul—and the effect it has on the soul.  
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 Pender’s triadic categorisation of soul and body—A) how a soul is joined and separated from a body; 
B) how soul and body relate during human life; and C) the nature of soul by itself without the body—is 
used to help further explain the relationship of body and soul (Pender, 2000: 149).  All three relate to the 
relationship between soul and human existence.  The first two explicitly concern an embodied soul.  
Category C) is unique in that the nature of soul is set against human existence, whereas, interestingly, the 
bodily states of A) and B) relate to a soul both during life and after death.  
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The process of purification appears to strip away the human elements of the soul, 
leaving soul alone.
30
  
1.2.1 Death and a Soul’s Craving for the Corporeal 
 Plato’s Phaedo considers the nature of death itself. From the discussions there 
emerge three ‘types’ of death: 1) death as an historical event; 2) death as a state; and 3) 
death as an active process of purification. When Socrates asks (64c-3) ἡγοὐμεθά τι τὸν 
θάνατον εἶναι; (‘Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?’).31  Plato is 
problematising.  At this point death relates simply to an historical event (1), an event 
that takes place within the mortal sphere.  One moment a human is conscious and 
mobile, the next they are unconscious and static.  This is death as an historical event and 
as the resulting state.  
 Through an intriguing exchange with Simmias, Socrates then describes death as 
a release of two component parts (64c4-8):   
ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν τῆς φυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος [5] ἀπαλλαγήν; καὶ εἶναι 
τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς φυχῆς ἀπαλλαγὲν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ τὸ 
σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν [ἀπὸ] τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγεῖσαν αὐτὴν 
καθ’ αὑτὴν εἶναι; ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ᾖ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο; 
 
Is it simply the release of the soul from the [5] body? Is death nothing more 
or less than this, the separate condition of the body by itself when it is 
released from the soul, and the separate condition by itself of the soul when 
released from the body? Is death anything else than this? 
 
And that it is nothing but the separation of the soul from the [5] body? And 
that being dead is this: the body’s having come to be apart, separated from the 
soul, alone by itself, and the soul’s being apart, alone by itself, separated from 
the body? Death can’t be anything else but that, can it? (tr. Gallop, 1975). 
 
It is suggested that death (θάνατος) is nothing more than ‘the release (ἀπαλλαγήν) of the 
soul (φυχῆς) from the body (σώματος)’ (64c4-5).  The separation of soul and body is the 
event called death; the death of the human composition.  But Socrates immediately 
clarifies that death is also ‘the separate condition of the body by itself’ (64c5-7).  There 
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 This process of stripping away the human aspects is important for the problem-solving of Chapters 2-4. 
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 All translations of Phaedo are Tredennick (1954) unless explicitly stated otherwise.   
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is a change of emphasis between death the event (1) and death the state (2).  Death is the 
‘separate condition’ or state ‘of the body’ after the event.  Furthermore, Socrates alludes 
to a ‘separate condition’ of the soul after the death event (64c7-8).  Therefore, the 
condition of the body and the condition of the soul are different after the death event.  
The body is in a state of death, it is inanimate, lifeless, and it has ceased.  The body 
cannot survive the death event.  But the soul’s condition is alive, animate, and, 
importantly, conscious, as is first made clear in the Argument from Opposites (71e-2), 
affirmed by the Argument from Affinity (79d-8), and maintained in the final myth 
(107d-2).  Therefore, the soul’s condition after the death event is not in a state of death 
(2), for the soul is not ‘dead’, i.e. inanimate, lifeless, and deceased.   
 When Socrates asks ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ᾖ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο; (‘Is death anything 
else than this?’, 64c9), Plato is anticipating Socrates’ argument that death for a soul is 
not a state but an active process of purification (3). Socrates has given a clear and 
precise definition of the death event (1).  Socrates’ statement on death as a separation of 
soul and body indicates that human life is the condition of soul and body together. 
Death the event (1) is a separation of a human, a coming-apart of two separable entities, 
body and soul. Death as a state (2) is the separate unconscious condition of the body as 
a corpse and thus is associated with the body and not with the soul. But Socrates will 
also develop a theory that for the soul death is an active process (3), since as a 
continuing, immortal consciousness, the soul is able to purify itself.  Purification for 
Plato thus concerns the continuing conscious soul. At 64c Socrates suggests that the 
death event is a complete separation, a clean break and from 66d-69c Plato develops the 
discussion to analyse degrees of separation due to degrees of desire for the body and 
purification of the soul. 
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 At 66d7-e2 Socrates posits that ‘if we are ever to have pure knowledge of 
anything, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things in isolation with the soul 
in isolation’ (ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμῖν δέδεικται ὅτι, εἰ μέλλομέν ποτε καθαρῶς τι εἴσεσθαι, 
ἀπαλλακτέον αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατέον αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα·).  Whilst embodied 
the soul cannot be entirely separated from the body.  But on separation from the body 
the soul may be ‘in isolation’.  Isolation ‘is only possible after death’ (as an event) for it 
is ‘only then that the soul will be isolated and independent of the body’ (τότε γὰρ αὐτὴ 
καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔσται χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος, πρότερον δ᾽ οὔ) (67a-2).   
 Death as an event turns out not to be a clean break for the soul, since the soul 
after separation can retain desire for the body and therefore some association with it.  A 
soul is able to ‘become infected (ἀναπιμπλώμεθα) with its [bodily] nature’ during 
embodied human life (67a5-6).
32
  For Socrates we must ‘purify ourselves’ 
(καθαρεύωμεν) (67a6) in this life now. It is not possible for ‘one who is not pure 
himself to attain to the realm of purity’ (μὴ καθαρῷ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ 
θεμιτὸν ᾖ) (67b2-3) after death.  Therefore, the active process of purifying the soul after 
death (3) places great significance on pre-death, i.e. embodied human life.  The 
importance is placed on us now.  We gain everything or lose it all now.  For although 
death as an event destroys the body, the death event does not destroy the desire for 
bodily association that is rooted in the soul through being previously connected to the 
body. 
At 67d-e Socrates presents the idea of philosophy as a practice for death. At 
67c9-d2 he argues that both ‘now and in the future’ one must allow the soul to be ‘freed 
from the chains of the body’ (ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος).  Death 
requires preparations and so ‘philosophers make dying their profession’ (οἱ ὀρθῶς 
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 The infection might be psychological not physical.  
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φιλοσοφοῦντες ἀποθνῄσκειν μελετῶσι) (67e4-5).  A philosopher’s ‘profession’ allows 
for the ‘freeing and separation of soul from body’ in this life and in the next (67d7-10):  
Λύειν δέ γε αὐτήν, ὥς φαμεν, προθυμοῦνται ἀεὶ μάλιστα καὶ μόνοι οἱ 
 φιλοσοφοῦντες ὀρθῶς, καὶ τὸ μελέτημα αὐτὸ τοῦτό ἐστιν τῶν φιλοσόφων, λύσις 
 καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος· ἢ οὔ;   
And it’s especially those who practise philosophy aright, or rather they alone, 
 who are always eager to release it, as we say, and the occupation of philosophers 
 is just this, isn’t it—a release and parting of soul from body? (tr. Gallop, 1975).  
Importantly, death the event (1) has specific implications for death as the process for a 
soul (3), which is different from death as a state for the body (2).   It seems that 
although death physically separates body and soul (1), there is a need to anticipate and 
practise this separation whilst alive.  Therefore, death is much more than ‘simply the 
release of the soul from the body...nothing more or less than this’ (64c).  For if death 
were simply a release, it would come to all naturally and there would be no need to 
practise death as one’s ‘profession’.  
 At 69c Socrates develops the ideas of the pure and impure soul. A soul within a 
body can become ‘infected’ or filled up (ἀναπιμπλώμεθα) in its nature (67a5).  The 
infection will have negative consequences on a soul both during human life and after 
death separates it from a body. Socrates presents a two-fold distinction between the pure 
and the impure after death (69c3-7):  
 καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς ἡμῖν οὗτοι καταστήσαντες οὐ φαῦλοί τινες 
 εἶναι,  ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι [5] πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς 
 Ἅιδου  ἀφίκηται ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος 
 ἐκεῖσε  ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει.  
  
 Perhaps these people who have established religious initiations are not so far 
 from the mark, and all the time there has been a hidden meaning beneath their 
 claim that he who enters the next world uninitiated and unenlightened shall lie in 
 the mire, but he who arrives there purified and enlightened shall dwell among 
 the gods. 
 
The ascent is from the ‘mire’ to the ‘gods’ through purification.  There is a clear 
distinction between, on the one hand, the soul that prepares for death as a process of 
purification (death type 3) by initiating a separation of soul and body (death type 1) and, 
68 
 
on the other hand, a soul during human life that fails to understand that it must prepare 
for death the event (1).  It is the soul that becomes purified, but that purification must be 
instigated whilst embodied.  
 Examining the Phaedo’s presentation of the soul after death, one finds a 
complex relationship between body and soul with degrees of purity established.  When 
‘soul and body share the same place’, or joined together, that is human nature (79e-
80a).
33
 After the death event one expects to find the soul alone.
34
  However, the life of 
most souls after death remains associated with the body.
35
 For the majority of souls the 
after-death existence is not disembodied in a strict sense.  The souls leave the deceased 
state of a human body but most do not leave embodiment per se.  Souls can become 
attached to the body and bodily desires, and, hence, strive for re-embodiment.  At this 
point, rebirth becomes volitional. A soul that is to progress from embodiment to strict 
disembodiment is described by Socrates as ‘pure’ with no trace of the body (80e2-
81a2):  
 ἀλλὰ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὧδ᾽ ἔχει· ἐὰν μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται, μηδὲν τοῦ 
 σώματος συνεφέλκουσα, ἅτε οὐδὲν κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἑκοῦσα εἶναι, 
 ἀλλὰ φεύγουσα αὐτὸ καὶ [5] συνηθροισμένη αὐτὴ εἰς ἑαυτήν, ἅτε μελετῶσα ἀεὶ 
 τοῦτο— τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ὀρθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσα καὶ τῷ ὄντι [81a] 
 τεθνάναι μελετῶσα ῥᾳδίως· ἢ οὐ τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη μελέτη θανάτου; 
 
 The truth is much more like this: if at its release the soul is pure and does not 
 drag along with it any trace of the body, because it has never willingly 
 associated with it in life; if it has shunned it and isolated itself because that is 
 what it always practises – I mean doing philosophy in the right way and really 
 getting used to facing death calmly; wouldn’t you call this “practising death”? 
If at its ‘release the soul is pure and does not drag along with it any trace of the body, 
because it has never willingly associated with it in life; if it has shunned it and isolated 
itself because that is what it always practises’ through philosophy it can be said to have 
been ‘practising death’.  The ‘pure’ soul that ‘has never willingly associated with’ the 
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 ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῇδε ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὦσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα (79e8-80a) 
34
 Pender category C (2000: 149). 
35
  Pender category B (2000:149). 
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body ‘in life’, departs to a place that is ‘like itself – invisible, divine, immortal and 
wise’ (81a4-5).  This describes the nature of soul when it is by itself.36   
 In contrast, the state of a soul still actively desiring the body is described as 
‘impure’.   The soul that ‘at the time of its release...is tainted and impure’, associated 
with the body during life (81b1-c2): 
 ἐὰν δέ γε οἶμαι μεμιασμένη καὶ ἀκάθαρτος τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττηται, ἅτε τῷ 
 σώματι ἀεὶ συνοῦσα καὶ τοῦτο θεραπεύουσα καὶ ἐρῶσα καὶ γοητευομένη ὑπ᾽ 
 αὐτοῦ  ὑπό τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν, ὥστε μηδὲν ἄλλο δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀληθὲς 
 [5] ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὸ σωματοειδές, οὗ τις ἂν ἅψαιτο καὶ ἴδοι καὶ πίοι καὶ φάγοι καὶ πρὸς 
 τὰ ἀφροδίσια χρήσαιτο, τὸ δὲ τοῖς ὄμμασι σκοτῶδες καὶ ἀιδές, νοητὸν δὲ καὶ 
 φιλοσοφίᾳ αἱρετόν, τοῦτο δὲ εἰθισμένη μισεῖν τε καὶ τρέμειν καὶ φεύγειν, οὕτω  
 [c] δὴ ἔχουσαν οἴει ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εἰλικρινῆ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι; 
 Because it has always associated with the body and cared for it and loved it, and 
 has been so beguiled by the body and its passions and pleasure that nothing 
 seems real to it but those physical things which can be touched and seen and 
 eaten and drunk and used for sexual enjoyment, making it accustomed to hate 
 and fear and avoid what is invisible and obscure to our eyes, but intelligible and 
 comprehensible by philosophy - if the soul is in this state, do you think that it 
 will be released just by itself, uncontaminated? 
This soul has existed with a human body, as part of the sensual human world.  More 
than that, this soul has enjoyed this co-existence.  This type of soul ‘desires to live in a 
way which it only can if it has a body’ (Broadie, 2001: 304).  In fact, the premise is that 
a soul such as this will long to re-enter a body after death.  Therefore, this type of soul 
‘seeks to be in a body’ (Broadie, 2001: 304).  It is contaminated by what it enjoyed 
experiencing in a body – its desires and lusts for physical pleasures. Broadie concludes 
that ‘some embodied souls cannot live separate from a body suited to their desires, 
while others, a minority perhaps, can’ (2001: 305). It is not simply being in a body that 
matters, but the level of association/dissociation that a soul has with that bodily 
existence.   
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The ‘tainted and impure’ soul is ‘permeated by the corporeal’ and it is ‘ingrained 
in its very nature’ (81c5).  The language used by Plato to describe the bodily association 
after death is striking: a soul is ‘permeated’ (διειλημμένην) with, has had ‘intercourse 
with’ (ὁμιλία), and is ‘ingrained in its very nature (ἐνεποίησε σύμφυτον)’ (81c4-6):  
ἀλλὰ [καὶ] διειλημμένην γε οἶμαι ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς, ὃ αὐτῇ ἡ ὁμιλία τε καὶ 
 συνουσία τοῦ σώματος διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ συνεῖναι καὶ διὰ τὴν πολλὴν μελέτην 
 ἐνεποίησε σύμφυτον.   
On the contrary, it will, I imagine, be permeated by the corporeal, which 
 fellowship and intercourse with the body will have ingrained in its very nature 
 through constant association and long practice. 
Rather, I imagine, it will have been interspersed with a corporeal element, 
 ingrained in it by the body’s company and intercourse, through constant 
 association and much training? (tr. Gallop, 1975). 
Furthermore, Plato uses the imagery of weight and attachment concerning a soul’s 
bodily association: the ‘corporeal is heavy, oppressive, earthly (γεῶδες) and visible 
(ὁρατόν)’ so that a soul is ‘weighed down (βαρύνεταί) and dragged back into the visible 
world (ὁρατὸν τόπον)’ (81c8-11):  
 ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἴεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν· 
 ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεταί τε καὶ ἕλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν 
 τόπον φόβῳ τοῦ ἀιδοῦς τε καὶ Ἅιδου.   
 And one must suppose, my friend, that this element is ponderous, that it is heavy 
 and earthly and is seen; and thus encumbered, such a soul is weighed down, and 
 dragged back into the region of the seen through fear of the invisible and of 
 Hades; (tr. Gallop, 1975). 
Such a soul is unable to leave the visible earthly realm due to a process of a soul 
becoming bodily in ‘its very nature’ (81c5).37 As noted by Burnet, the ‘suggestion is 
that of a restless spirit which cannot tear itself away from the body’ (1911: 73).  
Astoundingly, supposedly separated souls after the death of the body are still corporeal, 
visible, bodily, and human.  
 It is true that one could interpret the graveyard section as entirely allegorical.  
Or, indeed, interpret ‘a touch of Socratic playfulness in this theory’ (Burnet, 1911: 73).  
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But Socrates is describing a specific type of soul.  Rowe notes how these souls are ‘non-
philosophical’ (1993: 193). In these cases, a soul is still firmly rooted in the previous 
deceased earthly life.  As Archer-Hind notes, the emphasis is on the blend of two 
materials that ‘become virtually one nature’ (1894: 54).  
Thus ‘the question of separability of soul from body is not a simple one’ 
(Broadie, 2001: 305).  If souls desire bodily characteristics as Broadie argues, and are 
represented by Plato as bodily, then it appears that death alone is not guaranteed to 
‘simply...release...the soul from the body’ completely (64c); physically or 
psychologically.  For although death separates soul from body—the body decays on 
earth, whilst the soul moves on – nevertheless souls do not become blank slates at death, 
since they are not separated psychologically from their previous embodied existence.  
Some souls are still attached to bodily existence after the death event (81c8-d4):
38
   
 ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, τοῦτο οἴεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὁρατόν· 
 ὃ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη [10] ψυχὴ βαρύνεταί τε καὶ ἕλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν 
 ὁρατὸν τόπον φόβῳ τοῦ ἀιδοῦς τε καὶ Ἅιδου, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ [d] 
 μνήματά τε καὶ τοὺς τάφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὤφθη ἄττα ψυχῶν 
 σκιοειδῆ φαντάσματα, οἷα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἴδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς 
 ἀπολυθεῖσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται.  
 And we must suppose, my dear fellow, that the corporeal is heavy, oppressive, 
 earthly and visible. So the soul which is tainted by its presence is weighed down 
 and dragged back into the visible world, through fear (as they say) of Hades or 
 the invisible, and hovers about tombs and graveyards. The shadowy apparitions 
 which have actually been seen there are the ghosts of those souls which have not 
 got clear away, but still retain some portion of the visible; which is why they can 
 be seen. 
The ‘impure’ human soul is ‘weighed down (βαρύνεταί) and dragged back (ἕλκεται 
πάλιν) into the visible world’ (ὁρατὸν) through the new human emotion ‘fear’ (81c9-
10).  The human soul ‘hovers about tombs and graveyards’ clinging to the visible, 
corporeal, and human realm (81d).  Socrates is using pre-existing beliefs among the 
Greeks regarding ghost experiences (Rowe, 1993: 193-194; Bremmer, 1983: 108-23; 
Burkert, 1985: 195).  Plato is therefore using a ‘popular belief’— in ghosts—and is 
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filling it ‘with a deeper meaning of his own’ (Archer-Hind, 1894: 54): presenting souls 
that are unwilling to leave.  The souls are ‘compelled (ἀναγκάζονται) to wander 
(πλανᾶσθαι)’ as a ‘punishment (τίνουσαι) for their bad (κακῆς) conduct in the past’ 
(81d).  Furthermore, the desire of the soul is crucial (81d9-e2):  
 καὶ μέχρι γε τούτου πλανῶνται, ἕως ἂν τῇ [e] τοῦ συνεπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ 
 σωματοειδοῦς, ἐπιθυμίᾳ πάλιν ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα· 
 And they wander about until, owing to the desire of the corporeal [e] element 
 attendant upon them, they are once more imprisoned in a body. (tr. Gallop, 
 1975). 
The half-life as a ghost (φάντασμα) is an experience for a soul that wishes to be fully 
corporeal, as it has ‘craving (ἐπιθυμίᾳ) for the corporeal (σωματοειδοῦς)’ which 
‘unceasingly pursues them (συνεπακολουθοῦντος)’, but cannot be realised in ghostly 
form.  In contrast to the ‘pure’ soul that leaves the corporeal for the ‘happiness’ of the 
divine realm, the ‘impure’ soul will be ‘imprisoned (ἐνδεθῶσιν) once more in a body’ 
(81e-2).  It is ironic that some souls find happiness in or long for the process that keeps 
them ‘imprisoned’ in a cycle of humanly death.  How is a soul to avoid such existences?   
 Philosophy is the key to purification, having a liberating and purifying effect on 
the soul.  Plato describes the soul as a ‘helpless prisoner’ directly associated with its 
prison cell, the body, where it views reality from which (82d9-e): 
 Lovers of knowledge recognize that when philosophy [e] takes their soul in 
 hand, it has been literally bound and glued to the body, and forced to view the 
 things that are as if through a prison, rather than alone by itself; (tr. Gallop, 
 1975). 
The soul ‘is a helpless prisoner (διαδεδεμένην), chained hand and foot in the body 
(προσκεκολλημένην), compelled (ἀναγκαζομένην) to view reality not directly but only 
through its prison (εἱργμοῦ) bars, and wallowing in utter ignorance (ἀμαθίᾳ)’ (82e1-
5).
39
  The ‘ingenuity (δεινότητα) of the imprisonment (εἱργμοῦ)’ is illuminated by 
philosophy showing that ‘the prisoner’s own active desire (ἐπιθυμίας)’ is the very thing 
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that ‘makes him first accessory to his own confinement’ (ὡς ἂν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ 
δεδεμένος συλλήπτωρ εἴη τοῦ δεδέσθαι) (82e6-83a1).  It is the conscious soul that is 
responsible for continued imprisonment.  There is no god-bestowed punishment on the 
soul to begin with; the ‘first accessory’, the foremost reason for imprisonment, is the 
soul’s own desire for a bodily life.  The fault lies within one’s desire – one’s ‘own 
active desire’ perpetuates the imprisonment.  The soul desires to be human and bodily. 
 The soul’s desire for bodily existence and its resultant imprisonment within a 
body is not new to Socrates’ argument.  Indeed, Socrates presented an example of a soul 
that after the death event remains ‘tainted and impure’ having ‘associated with the body 
and cared for it and loved it’ (81b1-3).  Consequently, the impure soul is ‘compelled to 
wander’ through ‘craving for the corporeal’ until the soul is ‘imprisoned once more in a 
body’ (81d7-e2).  It is the desire for bodily existence of the soul that leads to 
imprisonment/embodiment once again.  The soul desires the corporeal, and gets its 
desire.  Therefore, both 81b-e and 82e-83a present a cycle of imprisoned embodiment 
for the soul perpetuated by the conscious desire of a soul.  
What is the nature of bodily existence that makes it so treacherous for a soul, 
keeping it imprisoned? Bodily existence provides a strong sensation of reality for the 
soul, having to ‘view reality not directly but only through its prison bars’ (82e).  The 
souls become confused due to the strong nature of pleasure and pain whilst embodied 
(83c5-8): 
 ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι σφόδρα ἢ λυπηθῆναι 
 ἐπί τῳ  καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι περὶ ὃ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχῃ, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε 
 εἶναι καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον· 
 When anyone’s soul feels a keen pleasure or pain it cannot help supposing that 
 whatever causes the most violent emotion is the plainest and truest reality; 
 which it is not. 
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 It’s that the soul of every human being, when intensely pleased or pained at 
 something, is forced at the same time to suppose that whatever most affects it in 
 this way is most clear and most real, when it is not so. (tr. Gallop, 1975). 
There is a lack of understanding on the part of the soul.  Due to the soul feeling new 
intense ‘pleasure or pain’ whilst embodied, it starts to believe bodily reality is the ‘truest 
reality’.  As Rowe states, the emphasis is no longer on the direct effects of the pleasure 
or pain, but on the indirect effect that is not taken into account, namely the greatest evil 
for the soul (1993: 198).  
 It is the extreme of the feeling that deceives the soul.  This results in a dramatic 
effect for the soul (83d4-6):  
 ὅτι ἑκάστη ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη ὥσπερ ἧλον ἔχουσα προσηλοῖ αὐτὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα 
 καὶ προσπερονᾷ καὶ ποιεῖ σωματοειδῆ, δοξάζουσαν ταῦτα ἀληθῆ εἶναι ἅπερ ἂν 
 καὶ τὸ σῶμα φῇ.   
 Because every pleasure or pain has a sort of rivet with which it fastens the soul 
 to the body and pins it down and makes it corporeal, accepting as true whatever 
 the body certifies.  
 Because each pleasure and pain fastens it to the body with a sort of rivet, pins it 
 there, and makes it corporeal, so that it takes for real whatever the body declares 
 to be so. (tr. Gallop, 1975). 
Both desire and strong emotion attach themselves to a soul creating external features 
that were not present in the soul prior to embodiment.  Therefore, Socrates believes a 
soul has no need to fear death, but there is a real and substantial fear of the body itself.  
Through association with strong pleasures, pains, and desires the soul ‘cannot help 
coming to share its character’ (ὁμότροπος) (83d8).  Phaedo thus describes how bodily 
existence alters the soul (83d) and how the relationship between the soul and the body is 
complex, since the body ‘makes it [soul] corporeal’ (83d). The emphasis is on 
submission and pinning down through external attachments. The soul, according to 
Socrates, is not just embodied, but becomes bodily through ‘rivets’ and ‘pins’.  That is 
not to say a soul becomes a body, but that a soul through ‘rivets’ fails to distinguish 
itself from the body.  These ‘rivets’ could be psychological.  A soul in this state after the 
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death-event: ‘soon falls back again into another body, where it takes root and grows’ 
(ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν εἰς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι) (83d10-e).40  
A soul acquires a new body, no longer distinguishing itself from bodily existence.  The 
soul desires to remain bodily, and therefore, is embodied.  The soul is becoming or 
aligning itself with the human. 
 A soul’s desire is the ‘first accessory’ to embodied imprisonment.  The soul 
attaches itself to the body through rivets ensuring its constant desire for the bodily 
(ἡδοναῖς καὶ λύπαις) (84a4-5).  The consequence is that upon the death event of the 
body the conscious intelligent soul craves and desires corporeality and embodiment due 
to its attachments.  The most harrowing image of a ‘tainted and impure’ soul portrays 
the endless rounds of embodiment.  A soul in this cycle is ‘thus condemning itself to an 
endless (ἀνήνυτον) task, like Penelope, when she worked to undo her own weaving’ 
(84a6-7).
41
   
 At each stage it is the soul’s ‘own active desire’ that sustains the cycle of 
embodiment.
42
  It is only through realisation of philosophical insight that a ‘soul brings 
calm to the seas (γαλήνην) of desire’ (84a8).  The philosophical soul ‘is rid for ever of 
human ills’ (ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν) and, indeed, one might say, human 
nature itself (84b5).  Penelope stops undoing her weaving.     
1.2.2 Afterlife Myth: Association and Dissocation after Death 
 The myth is a complex and multi-layered device, fulfilling several purposes.  
Scholars agree that the myth can be used literally and allegorically; though disagree on 
how literal it is.  Pender believes that the purpose of the myth is to convey the ‘urgent 
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 Comparable again to 81b-e. 
41
 As Tarrant notes in his introduction to Tredennick’s translation this is an ‘undoing by night [of] what 
she had woven in the day’ (2003: 101). But as Tarrant also notes (footnote 4, page 101), Penelope does 
this so that her weaving would never be complete (2003: 114). 
42
 Furthermore, comparisons with Republic’s Myth of Er are strong: ‘The fault lies not with God, but with 
the soul that makes the choice’ (Rep. 617e).   
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need to philosophize in the here-and-now’ (2012: 199).  Rowe states that the myth is ‘in 
large part allegorical’ (2007: 103).  Pender and Rowe are correct that by seeing what 
lies ahead a soul realises how to avoid it, through practising philosophy now.  Further as 
Edmonds and Rowe state, Phaedo’s closing myth is not simply an allegory of this life 
now (Edmonds, 2004: 220); and the myth is both an account of ‘what awaits us after 
death and an allegory of life as we live it now’ (Rowe, 2007: 107).  Plato, earlier in 
Phaedo, describes how some souls wander around tombstones after death craving their 
previous embodied life (81c-d).  The earlier account at 81c-d can be used in conjunction 
with the Phaedo myth.
43
  Moreover, the myth mirrors and elaborates on the earlier 
account (Affinity Argument), specifically regarding a soul’s after death bodily 
experience.   
 At the opening of the myth Socrates presents the distinction prevalent 
throughout Phaedo between souls that associate with the body and are therefore impure, 
and souls that are not attached to a body and are therefore pure (108a6-b3): 
 ἡ μὲν οὖν κοσμία τε καὶ φρόνιμος ψυχὴ ἕπεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ τὰ παρόντα· ἡ 
 δ᾽ ἐπιθυμητικῶς τοῦ σώματος ἔχουσα, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον, περὶ ἐκεῖνο 
 πολὺν  [b] χρόνον ἐπτοημένη καὶ περὶ τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, πολλὰ ἀντιτείνασα καὶ 
 πολλὰ  παθοῦσα, βίᾳ καὶ μόγις ὑπὸ τοῦ προστεταγμένου δαίμονος οἴχεται 
 ἀγομένη. 
 Well, the wise and disciplined soul follows its guide and is not ignorant of its 
 surroundings;
44
 but as for the soul which is deeply attached to the body – after a 
 long infatuation with it and with the visible world, as I said before – it is only 
 after much resistance and suffering that it is at last forcibly led away by its 
 appointed guardian spirit. 
 Now the wise and well-ordered soul follows along, and is not unfamiliar with 
 what befalls it; but the soul in a state of desire for the body, as I said earlier, 
 flutters around it for a long time, and around the region of the seen, and after 
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 The justification for collating the myth and the Argument from Affinity is due to what Socrates says.  
Within the myth, when describing wise unattached and ignorant attached souls, Socrates says ‘as I said 
before’ (ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν εἶπον) (108a8).  Socrates at 108b is alluding to the graveyard scene at 
81c-d.  Both scenes are not to be assimilated, they are two different stories.  However, when used in 
conjunction they provide a fuller account of Socrates’ argument regarding bodily association and 
conscious continuation after death.  The tombstone scene can be used to help understand soul types 1-4 
that are about to be presented.   
44
 ‘Guide’ here is not in the Greek, but is an inference through ‘guardian spirit’, and the earlier mention of 
‘guides’ at 108a1-4. 
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 much resistance and many sufferings it goes along, brought by force and against 
 its will by the appointed spirit.
 
(tr. Gallop, 1975). 
This connects the myth, 107c-108c, with the Argument from Affinity.
45
  Pender is 
correct when she suggests that the myth supports the Affinity Argument (2012: 217); 
the connection is a further deepening of Socrates’ original position.  Originally, the 
Affinity Argument presents examples of two paradigm positions: pure and impure.  
Socrates, described what would happen after the death event to each of the two types of 
soul, pure and impure.  But, Socrates clarifies his earlier discussion of two opposing 
types of soul, stating that ‘extreme instances are few and rare’ (90a).46  Socrates asks, 
‘do you think anything is rarer than finding an extremely large or extremely small 
man?’ (90a4-6).47  These are opposed to the ‘intermediate ones [which] are plentiful and 
common’ (90a7-9).  Reading this between the Affinity Argument and the closing Myth 
draws the reader’s attention to what has been said and to what is yet to be said.  Socrates 
leads his interlocutors from a position of binary positions.  He leads them towards a 
more nuanced understanding that the vast majority of things exist in between binary 
oppositions.  And the things that Socrates is most concerned about are souls.   
 In the myth Socrates begins by presents two binary positions—pure and 
impure—establishing what has already been posited by the Affinity Argument.  And 
then Socrates elaborates by presenting types of souls within those binary extremes.  
Given Socrates’ statement at 90a8-9, souls are likely to exist in between pure and 
impure.  What follows is a further detailed five types of souls, with four separated 
through a process of judgement
48
 (διεδικάσαντο) (113d-114c):49 
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 The comparison with the Affinity Argument at 81a-84b is intentional on Plato’s part.        
46
 Translation: Gallop, 1975. 
47
 Translation: Gallop, 1975. 
48
 I have added a 5
th
 type of soul above the four types identified by the underworld judges. 
49
 There are further judgment scenes in Republic 614c-616a and Gorgias 523a-526d.  In both dialogues 
the judges are more prominent than in Phaedo.  Furthermore, Gorgias agrees with Phaedo that death is a 
separation of soul from body and that after death the soul ‘is left in much the same state as when a person 
was alive’ (524b).  This includes ‘not only its natural endowments but the modifications brought about by 
various habits which its owner has formed’ (τά τε τῆς φύσεως καὶ τὰ παθήματα ἃ διὰ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν 
ἑκάστου πράγματος ἔσχεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος) (524d). 
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1.   ‘neutral’ souls (113d4-e1): 
καὶ οἳ μὲν ἂν δόξωσι μέσως βεβιωκέναι, πορευθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀχέροντα, 
ἀναβάντες ἃ δὴ αὐτοῖς ὀχήματά ἐστιν, ἐπὶ τούτων ἀφικνοῦνται εἰς τὴν 
λίμνην, καὶ ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦσί τε καὶ καθαιρόμενοι τῶν τε ἀδικημάτων διδόντες 
δίκας ἀπολύονται, εἴ τίς τι ἠδίκηκεν, τῶν τε εὐεργεσιῶν [e] τιμὰς φέρονται 
κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν ἕκαστος·   
 
Those who are judged to have lived a neutral life set out for Acheron, and 
embarking in those vessels which await them, are conveyed in them to the 
lake; and there they dwell, and undergoing purification are both absolved by 
punishment from any sins that they have committed, and rewarded for their 
good deeds, according to each man’s deserts. 
 
2.  ‘incurable’ (ἀνιάτως) souls (113e1-6): 
οἳ δ᾽ ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱερο- 
συλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς 
ἐξειργασμένοι ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα τυγχάνει ὄντα, [5] τούτους δὲ ἡ 
προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν. 
 
Those who on account of the greatness of their sins are judged to be 
incurable – people who have committed many gross acts of sacrilege or 
many wicked and lawless murders or any other such crimes – these are 
hurled (ῥίπτει) by their appropriate destiny into Tartarus, from whence they 
emerge no more (ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν). 
 
3. ‘curable’ (ἰάσιμα) souls (113e6-114b7): 
οἳ δ᾽ ἂν ἰάσιμα μὲν μεγάλα δὲ δόξωσιν ἡμαρτηκέναι ἁμαρτήματα, οἷον πρὸς 
πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπ᾽ ὀργῆς βίαιόν τι πράξαντες, καὶ μεταμέλον αὐτοῖς  
τὸν ἄλλον βίον βιῶσιν, ἢ ἀνδροφόνοι τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ γένωνται, 
τούτους δὲ ἐμπεσεῖν μὲν εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἀνάγκη, ἐμπεσόντας δὲ αὐτοὺς 
καὶ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐκεῖ γενομένους [5] ἐκβάλλει τὸ κῦμα, τοὺς μὲν ἀνδροφόνους 
κατὰ τὸν Κωκυτόν, τοὺς δὲ πατραλοίας καὶ μητραλοίας κατὰ τὸν Πυριφλεγ-
έθοντα· 
 
Other are judged to have been guilty of sins which, though great, are curable; 
if, for example, they have offered violence to father or mother in a fit of 
passion, but have spent the rest of their lives in penitence, or if they have 
committed manslaughter after the same fashion.  These two must be cast into 
Tartarus; but when this has been done and they have remained there for a 
year, the surge casts them out – the manslayers down Cocytus and the 
offenders against their parents down Pyriphlegethon. 
 
4. Souls of surpassing ‘holiness’ (ὁσίως βιῶναι) (114b6-c2): 
οἳ δὲ δὴ ἂν δόξωσι διαφερόντως πρὸς τὸ ὁσίως βιῶναι, οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τῶνδε 
μὲν τῶν τόπων τῶν ἐν τῇ γῇ ἐλευθερούμενοί τε καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι ὥσπερ 
δεσμωτηρίων, ἄνω δὲ εἰς τὴν καθαρὰν οἴκησιν ἀφικνούμενοι καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς 
οἰκιζόμενοι. 
 
But those who are judged to have lived a life of surpassing holiness – these 
are they who are released and set free from imprisonment in these regions of 
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the earth, and passing upward to their pure abode, make their dwelling upon 
the earth’s surface. 
 
This fourth class of souls is then further divided to produce a fifth type: 
 
5. The ‘purified’ (καθηράμενοι) souls (114c2-6): 
τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι 
τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων [5] καλλίους 
ἀφικνοῦνται, ἃς οὔτε ῥᾴδιον δηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι. 
 
And of these such as have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy 
live thereafter altogether without bodies, and reach habitations even more 
beautiful, which is not easy to portray – nor is there time to do so now. 
 
And among their number, those who have been adequately purified by 
philosophy live bodiless for the whole of time to come, and attain to 
dwelling places fairer even then these, which it is not easy to reveal, nor is 
the time sufficient at present. (tr. Gallop, 1975). 
Soul types 1-4 are embodied after death (death types 1 and 2).  Only soul type 5 exists 
disembodied by itself, attaining an existence of soul alone through purification after 
death (death type 3).  It is not surprising, therefore, that the majority of souls retain a 
desire for the body (death type 2), even after death the event.  Surprisingly those souls 
that ‘lived exceptionally holy lives’ and are ‘freed and delivered’ from the hollow 
regions of the earth to ‘make their dwelling above ground’ on the true surface, are still 
embodied (114b7-c1).
50
  Within the holy group there is a sub-group of sufficiently 
purified philosophers that ‘attain to dwelling places fairer even than’ the true earth.  
Furthermore, it is only these philosophically pure that ‘live bodiless for the whole of 
time to come’.  A clear hierarchy of progression and degradation is presented.  
Therefore, Socrates is explicit, if not completely unambiguous, that being a sufficiently 
purified philosopher is the only guarantee of separating the soul from the body, not 
death.     
 Inwood is correct that in the myth ‘it is difficult to avoid language that suggests 
that disembodied souls have shadowy bodies’ (2009: 31).  Plato describes souls stuck in 
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 Translation: Gallop, 1975. 
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the cycle of rebirth (at least soul types 1-3, if not soul type 4 as well) in a quasi-
embodied way.  Souls after death need to be able to recognise each other and act in a 
bodily manner: the impure ‘soul is shunned and avoided by all’ (108b-c); the souls 
‘embarking in those vessels which await them’ (113d); souls are ‘hurled (ῥίπτει)...into 
Tartarus’ (113e); souls ‘call upon those whom they have killed’ (114b).  The souls exist 
within the after death rivers and lakes, with ‘movement to and fro’ violently being taken 
from one region to the next, providing a tangible description not possible for fully 
separated and disembodied souls.  Throughout the after death topography the ‘soul’s 
nature changes’ accordingly (Pender, 2012: 218), meaning one witnesses a process 
more akin to changeability rather than separability (at least at this stage and for these 
corrupted souls). 
 Not all souls become completely disembodied at death, as all souls are not 
philosophers or sufficiently purified by philosophy.
51
  Two of five ‘types’ of soul—4 
and 5—are described as being ‘released and set free from imprisonment in these regions 
of the earth and passing upward to their pure abode’; type 5 is also described as living 
‘thereafter altogether without bodies’ reaching ‘habitations even more beautiful’ (114b-
c).    
 Therefore, Soul types 1-4 maintain a basic level of embodiment though, clearly, 
not all in the same way.  Soul type 5 is the exception.  The souls of type 5 cannot be 
described as human or bodily at all.  After death ‘purified’ souls leave all bodily 
existence behind and exist as truly disembodied, i.e. not only do they exist without a 
body, but they no longer desire to exist in a bodily way.  It is clear why philosophy is 
seen as a purifying effect given the existence awaiting a non-bodily soul.  The ‘purified’ 
soul lives an intellectual life that is not a human existence.     
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 Such an assertion complements Plato’s Affinity Argument. 
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1.2.3 Immortality and Caring for the Soul – Soul ‘Type 5’ as a Potentiality  
 The arguments within Phaedo are concerned with the immortality of the soul.  
However, Hackforth suggests that the purpose of the dialogue is not to prove the human 
soul to be immortal, although he concedes that ‘much of it is devoted to arguments for 
that thesis’ (1955: 3).  Instead, Hackforth offers this assessment of the main aim of 
Phaedo: 
 It is, I would say, to extend and deepen, through the mouth of a consciously 
 Platonised Socrates, the essential teaching of Socrates himself, namely that 
 man’s supreme concern is the ‘tendance of his soul’, or (in more modern 
 language) the furthering of his insight into moral and spiritual values and the 
 application of that insight in all his conduct. 
Hackforth believes that the ‘essential teaching of Socrates’ is expressed by Plato in the 
Phaedo.  That ‘essential teaching’ is ‘man’s supreme concern’ with ‘his soul’.  
Hackforth references Apology 30b, and Gorgias 503a as evidence for this ‘essential 
teaching of Socrates himself’.  Is it possible, as a reader, to separate the concern for 
one’s soul from its immortality?  At the least, the concern for the soul over all time 
depends on proving the soul to be immortal.  For if not, what is there to be overly 
concerned about?  Socrates, in Phaedo, predicates the care of soul over all time on its 
immortality (107c1-5):  
 ἀλλὰ τόδε γ᾽, ἔφη, ὦ ἄνδρες, δίκαιον διανοηθῆναι, ὅτι, εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, 
 ἐπιμελείας δὴ δεῖται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τούτου μόνον ἐν ᾧ καλοῦμεν τὸ ζῆν, 
 ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός, καὶ ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, [5] εἴ 
 τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. 
 If a soul is immortal, then it needs care, not only for the sake of this time in 
 which we call “life” lasts, but for the whole of time; and if [5] anyone is going to 
 neglect it, now the risk would seem fearful. (tr. Gallop, 1975). 
The immortality demands the care over all time: ‘if the soul is immortal, it demands our 
care not only for that part of time which we call life, but for all time’.52  Perhaps 
Hackforth’s conclusion is correct, that ‘[i]mportant as Plato clearly conceives it that the 
human soul should be proved to be immortal, no careful reader of the dialogue can 
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 There will be a time that is un-like this life. 
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believe that such proof is its main purpose’ (1955: 16); at least concerning ‘this time in 
which we call “life” lasts’.  But the soul’s immortality is necessary for its care over all 
time; at least according to the Platonic Socrates.   
 Rowe sees Phaedo as having two main conclusions: that the best life is a 
philosophical one; and that the soul is immortal.  The immortality of the soul and 
philosophy are ‘inseparably connected’ (Rowe, 1993: 3).  Furthermore, Rowe accepts 
that if ‘none of the arguments proves the immortality of the soul, then on the terms of 
the discussion, death will be something to be feared’, but ‘if they are successful, we 
should not fear death, but rather the manner of our life’ (1993: 3).  Therefore, 
Hackforth’s emphasis on the importance of care can be conditioned on the soul’s 
immortality.  If the soul is not immortal, the care of the soul would be less important, 
according to Plato’s argument.  Without a causal connection, death would simply 
become an escape from the soul’s own wickedness.  Therefore, the immortality of the 
soul is paramount to Plato’s concept of philosophy as the best way of life.  But as Rowe 
maintained, care and immortality are ‘inseparably connected’. Plato confirms a causal 
link: the soul goes on, therefore, we must care for it.   
 The soul for Plato has the potential to become a fully perfect rational soul.  This 
is the state of being fully purified. However, very few souls are able to reach this 
potential.  The soul goes on in one of five types of ways. The idea of caring for one’s 
soul relies on the potential for a soul to reach the 4
th
 and 5
th
 type.  At death there is no 
hope of fully uprooting desires from the body for all (Boys-Stones, 2004: 7).  But, 
presumably, death as an event provides a sufficiently purified philosopher (one out of 
five soul types) with that chance.   
 How is the 5
th
 philosophical type of soul supposed to relate to Socrates’ 
statement at 80e4-5: ‘it [a pure soul] had no avoidable commerce with it [a body] during 
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life, but shunned it’?53  It seems to have two distinct propositions.  Proposition one is 
that a soul can potentially purify itself and shun the body and not wish to associate with 
it.  This is coherent with Socrates’ general argument.  But what exactly is ‘avoidable 
commerce’?   
 For Socrates a human must not forcibly separate body and soul through 
committing suicide (62b).  So some interaction with the body is necessary.  But the 
body will eventually die.  The soul must have un-‘willingly associated with it in life’.  
In that way intention is key to keeping a soul ‘pure’, instead of the interaction as a 
whole being impure.  There is a need to avoid excess.  It is the excess that is ‘avoidable 
commerce’.  A soul can use a body whilst understanding that it [as a soul] is not a body.  
The emphasis is on ‘willingly’, or, as Gallop translates, ‘avoidable’.  It is the volition of 
the soul to decide how much interaction it has with the body, beyond what is necessary 
for survival.  Purity is avoiding excess and so allowing soul’s rational potential to 
develop.  The philosopher cares for his soul by becoming pure, by avoiding excess, and 
by becoming rational.   
 It appears a fine balance between the soul that, on the one hand, must exist 
within a body enough as not to kill it, but on the other hand, not enough as to desire it.  
There are palpable effects for the souls that get it wrong (81c4-6).  All this could be 
interpreted as psychological.  If a soul is conscious then this deformity is taking place 
within that consciousness.  As the body is the part Socrates states is most ‘human’, one 
might tentatively say that ‘impure’ souls are becoming human (80b).  Therefore, this 
‘impure’ soul is quite literally becoming more human; or akin to the most ‘human’ part, 
the body.  Furthermore, there is a suggestion that emotion is becoming part of the soul.  
The soul now has ‘hate and fear’ (81b).  The process of a soul becoming more human is 
not desirable for Socrates.  The attachment an impure soul shows towards embodiment 
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represents a misunderstanding of the true nature of happiness (Broadie, 2001: 307).  
Hence, souls have different desires according to their differing experiences and different 
bodily lives.  This places them at different variations of soul types 1-5, although for 
Socrates, all souls should strive for the potential soul type 5.  This type is only brought 
about through philosophy.   
 Souls are able to achieve their potential through philosophy.  A soul is to ‘collect 
and concentrate itself in isolation’ from the body, ‘trusting nothing but its own isolated 
judgement’ becoming aware of the ‘intelligible and invisible’ contrasted with the 
‘sensible and visible’ objects (83a-b).  Using the conscious intellect, the soul realises 
that the bodily ‘senses abounds with deception’ and the soul is ‘to refrain from using 
them unless it is necessary’ (83a4-7).  A minority of souls can separate their desire from 
bodily existence (Broadie, 2001: 305).    
 The aim of philosophy, therefore, is to train the soul in order to make the 
transition from embodied life to disembodied death more complete and uncomplicated.  
This is a process of purification.  One should abstain from the body now in life so that 
one does not long for bodily existence after death.  The philosopher feels no distress at 
the separation of soul and body because the philosopher has been ‘preparing themselves 
for dying and death all their lives’ (64a). 
 What they are preparing for through fulfilling their potential to be fully rational 
souls is a state of being that is remarkably different from being human.  Socrates states 
that human nature is embodied: ‘are we not part body, part soul?’ (79b). Therefore, the 
potential existence of a ‘pure’ soul is not in human form.  A ‘pure’ soul upon leaving 
‘any trace of the body’ behind has inadvertently (or advertently) also left ‘that which is 
human’ behind at death (80b).  The pure soul leaves ‘all other human evils’ as well as 
the body (81a).  It is hard to reconcile humanity with the Socratic ‘pure’ soul after 
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death.  But, for Socrates, that is a positive.  The separation of soul and humanity is 
perhaps intentional, given humanity’s liability to suffering, death, change, and bodily 
variance.  Gerson, following Plato, describes this process as becoming ‘godlike’ (2003: 
60).  Anything to the contrary of aiming for godlike purity is a mistake on the part of the 
soul.  This includes soul types 1-3, and possibly even type 4.  These souls, not being in 
tune with philosophy, misjudge what brings happiness.  In this way, it makes little sense 
to speak of all souls (soul types 1-4) as separate from the body.  But, for soul type 5 at 
least, it make little sense to speak of these souls as human.
54
 
 Therefore, the soul’s philosophical ascent to purity strips away the bodily and 
the human aspects, leaving the human realm behind.  That is philosophy’s purification, 
an uncovering of what was always there—the rational soul—by discarding attachments.  
Rowe is correct to believe souls ‘are perpetual players’ (2007: 117).  But Socrates fails 
to quell his interlocutors’ emotions regarding the fear of death as he has proven the soul 
to be immortal, but, as a result, confirmed human existence to be mortal.  The 
juxtaposition of emotions, Socrates’ calmness and the interlocutors’ tears, provide the 
perfect characterisation of the distinction between a pure disembodied soul (type 5) on 
the one hand, and an impure embodied soul (types 1-4) on the other.  Socrates assumes 
that his companions want an existence completely devoid of bodily desire, existing as a 
disembodied intelligent soul.  The interlocutors are sad because they have lost Socrates 
the human, and the immortality of Socrates’ soul is no substitute.  But, perhaps, it 
should be.   
1.3 Shared Concerns 
 My claim is that there are specific Shared Concerns relating to ideas of desire 
and purification in Phaedo and Milindapañha.  I shall now present my evidence to show 
that three key philosophical themes are used by both dialogues. First, both Plato’s ideal 
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 This issue of the potential purity of the soul being not the kind human being is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2-4. 
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philosopher and the enlightened Buddhist monk see death as a continuation and not 
something to be feared.  Once a Buddhist monk attains enlightenment (nirvāṇa) craving 
and bodily desire cease and upon their death they attain Parinirvāṇa (1.3.1). Second, 
both texts identify a craving for corporeality that keeps an individual rooted in an un-
satisfactory cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (1.3.2). Third, both texts advocate using 
philosophical understanding, associated with purity, to navigate through overpowering 
craving and desire, an activity presented as a voyage on the sea (1.3.3).  
1.3.1 Death’s Appeal 
 For Socrates, death’s appeal is that it separates soul from body (64c). Socrates 
believes a philosopher to be practising death.  As discussed at the beginning of 1.2, 
death can be viewed in three ways: 1) death as an event; 2) death as a state; and 3) death 
as a process of purification.  Dying is a philosopher’s profession (87e).  Specifically, 
philosophers are concerned with death 3) the upward process of a soul towards the 
potential soul type 5.  The ideal philosophers ‘have actually been looking forward to 
death’ (64a).  What is more, ‘true philosophers are half dead’ whilst living (64b). For 
the Buddhist the ideal death represented by Parinirvāṇa is a removal of something that 
was there before; literally a ‘blowing out’, a death ‘without remainder’, or a ‘full going 
out’ (Gethin, 1998: 26).  Therefore, Parinirvāṇa for an enlightened Buddhist is ‘a 
complete passing away, without cleaving to the world’ (II.1.5.31).  
Contrasts are apparent between these two views of the ideal death.  The Platonic 
idea of the immortal soul is fundamentally un-Buddhist.  In Buddhist thought there is no 
soul and, therefore, no release of the soul.  In contrast to the Buddhist negation, Plato 
presents a positive afterlife, where the fully purified soul remains and continues on to 
‘dwelling places fairer even’ than the most beautiful physical environments (114c). 
Thus while Buddhism talks of what Nirvāṇa is not, Plato attempts, at least in part, to 
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map the soul’s journey after the separation of the body.55  However, it is notable how 
Plato in Phaedo does not illuminate his reader on the nature of the pure philosophical 
soul’s new surroundings, beyond suggesting they are beautiful. The key idea is that they 
live ‘without bodies’ (114c1-6):  
 τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθηράμενοι ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τὸ 
 παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, καὶ εἰς οἰκήσεις ἔτι τούτων [5] καλλίους 
 ἀφικνοῦνται, ἃς οὔτε ῥᾴδιον δηλῶσαι οὔτε ὁ χρόνος ἱκανὸς ἐν τῷ παρόντι. 
 And among their number, those who have been adequately purified by 
 philosophy live bodiless for the whole of time to come, and attain to dwelling 
 places fairer even than these, which it is not easy to [5] reveal, nor is the time 
 sufficient at present.  
Therefore, negative formulations are used for both the Buddhist Parinirvāṇa and Plato’s 
philosophically pure souls.  Neither gives a full topography of what is expected after 
death.  But, importantly, the outcomes remain distinct: Socrates sees a release of a soul 
while in Buddhism karma is ‘blown out’ (Nirvāṇa). Therefore, Parinirvāṇa is very 
different to Plato’s idea of the life of a philosophically purified soul.56 
Plato believes the soul should be removed from the body as much as possible.   
That is why philosophers ‘make dying their profession’ (67e).  The philosopher has 
‘trained himself...throughout his life to live in a state as close as possible to death’ (67d-
e).  As a result, at the death of the body a soul is ‘freed (ἐκλυομένην) from the chains 
(δεσμῶν) of the body (σώματος)’ (67d1-2).  The philosophical death is a ‘release 
(ἀπαλλάττηται)’ of the ‘pure (καθαρὰ)’ soul that ‘does not drag along (συνεφέλκουσα) 
with it any trace (μηδὲν) of the body (σώματος)’ (80e2-3).57  Socrates’ ‘pure soul’ 
‘passes into the realm of the pure (καθαρόν)’ at death (79d), and is free from wandering 
(πλανᾶται) in the human realm ‘confused and dizzy (μεθύουσα)’ (79c7-8).   
                                                 
55
 There are examples of this positive death in Plato’s myths: see Republic’s Myth of Er, or Phaedo’s 
closing myth.  
56
 For more information on Nirvāṇa see Gethin, 1998: 74-79.  Fundamentally, Nirvāṇa is the end of 
suffering (dukkha). 
57
 These represent the very few completely pure souls (1/5) which philosophy has purified of all bodily 
association, as presented in my section on Phaedo. 
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 But despite these important differences, there exist Shared Concerns about 
craving corporeality here and now.  Moreover, both are concerned about the effects 
such craving will have on following lives.  Neither Socrates nor the Buddha sees 
impending death as an evil to be avoided (Dillon, 2000: 530). Neither believes that 
bodily life should be desired.  Socrates and Nāgasena also have Shared Concerns about 
what causes continual re-embodiment, as will now be shown.   
1.3.2 Craving Corporeality    
Both have a Shared Concern about the continuing imprisonment through 
attachment to corporeality.  Socrates believes a soul is imprisoned in a body, whereas, 
the Buddha speaks of imprisonment in saṃsāra, i.e. where the person is a prisoner to 
dukkha and karma.  Both texts have different views on the what that is imprisoned. Both 
texts see the craving for the corporeal during life as the root of imprisonment.  
 Further, both philosophical texts describe how an individual is attached to this 
world by their own desire or craving.  For both this results in rebirth after death: for 
Buddhists this is saṃsāra and for Plato is re-embodiment. Obeyesekere correctly states 
that the ‘Phaedo resembles Buddhist texts in emphasizing craving as the cause of 
continuity in the rebirth cycle’ (2002: 250-1). In Milindapañha there are individuals that 
cannot gain release from saṃsāra.  Nāgasena states that ‘If when I die, I die with 
craving for existence in my heart’ then I will be ‘reindividualised’ (II.1.6.32). The 
process is put eloquently by Nāgasena later at II.3.4.52: 
 Where there is sensation there is a longing, where there is longing there is a 
 grasping, where there is grasping there is a becoming, where there is becoming 
 there is birth,  and at birth old age and death, grief, lamentation, pain, sorrow, 
 and despair begin to be.
58
 
For Plato the ‘I’ is different.  Socrates expresses how souls ‘continue wandering 
(πλανῶνται)’ after death ‘until at last, through craving (ἐπιθυμίᾳ) for the corporeal 
(σωματοειδοῦς)’ souls become ‘imprisoned (ἐνδεθῶσιν) once more in a body’ (81d9-
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 My own emphasis.  Each stage is dependently conditioned by the previous.  A fuller account of the 
twelve-link chain of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) can be found in Saṃyutta Nikāya ii.20. 
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e2). For Nāgasena there is nothing like soul that is being imprisoned, instead there is 
causal continuation of consciousness, fundamentally different to Plato’s soul.  It is the 
craving for bodily existence that perpetuates rebirth in both Milindapañha and in 
Phaedo. But what is continuing differs significantly, since there is no immortal soul in 
Buddhist thought and since Plato has no doctrine comparable to anattā. 
 Both texts hold that the overall nature of human life is un-satisfactory. For 
Buddhism this is dukkha,
59
 where the fault of the individual in Milindapañha leads to 
un-satisfactory human existence and pain.
60
 The continuation of consciousness in a 
body is wanted, and such craving leads to suffering. Similarly in Phaedo the fault of the 
soul leads to un-satisfactory human embodiment.  The evidence for this opinion is 
grounded in statements and language throughout the dialogue. At 107b1 Socrates says 
explicitly: ‘I have such a poor opinion of our weak human nature (ἀνθρωπίνην 
ἀσθένειαν ἀτιμάζων)’. He sees human life as an existence in ‘a sort of lock-up 
(φρουρᾷ)’ (62b3-4) and as a period of imprisonment in a body (δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ 
σώματος, 67d1-2; ἐνδεθῶσιν εἰς σῶμα, 81e2), where soul is a helpless prisoner 
(ἀτεχνῶς διαδεδεμένην, 82e). Death is appealing since after death a soul may be ‘rid for 
ever of human ills’ (ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κακῶν, 84b3-4). Clearly human 
existence is un-satisfactory for souls.   
 A reductive understanding of dukkha concludes that this world is painful, and 
that Buddhism is pessimistic in its outlook.  Yet, the nature of dukkha combines 
pleasure and pain.  Buddhism recognises that the human world does have pleasures, but 
that these pleasures are transitory and will be followed by further un-satisfactoriness 
once the pleasure ceases.  It is one’s grasping for transitory pleasures again and again 
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 Gethin translates dukkha as approximately ‘suffering’ (1998: 59).  A better translation is un-
satisfactoriness.   
60
 I am basing the concept on the Buddhist notion of dukkha.  Although human existence has pain, I wish 
to emphasise the un-satisfactoriness of human existence for Plato and Buddhism.     
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that leads to dukkha.  Therefore, anicca underpins dukkha.  Because everything in this 
world is impermanent, pleasure too is impermanent, and longing for pleasure, or trying 
to hold onto pleasurable experiences is, therefore, un-pleasurable.  How the Buddhist 
overcomes dukkha is through understanding anattā.  If I too am impermanent, then 
there is nothing for pleasure to attach itself to.  Therefore, one can experience pleasure 
without grasping.   
 Socrates too understands how pleasure and pain are intricately connected ‘like 
two bodies attached to the same head’, with one you get the other after (60b-c).  
However, the differences are perhaps more illuminating than the commonality.  In 
Buddhist thought dukkha is linked to anicca and anattā as a Universal Truth.  However, 
the un-satisfactory nature of the human sphere for Plato rests on the fundamental 
distinction between soul and body.  Plato concludes that soul has a permanent nature 
through its affinity to what is ‘unvarying and constant’.  At 80b-6 Socrates contrasts the 
natures of soul and body:  
 The soul is most like that which is divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, 
 indissoluble, and ever self-consistent and invariable, whereas body is most like 
 that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, dissoluble, and never 
 self-consistent. 
soul is most similar to what is divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, 
 indissoluble, unvarying, and constant in relation to itself; whereas body, in its 
 turn, is most similar to what is human, mortal, multiform, non-intelligible, 
 dissoluble, and never constant in relation to itself. (tr. Gallop, 1975). 
Plato’s soul fundamentally differs from Buddhism’s Truths anicca and anattā: where 
Buddhism denies finality and an internal tangible core, Plato states that the soul is 
eternal.  Indeed, where Buddhists take refuge in the non-attachment of anattā, Plato 
specifically describes the dangers for the soul of the human bodily world, where the 
soul is ‘permeated by the corporeal’, having had ‘intercourse with the body’, and so 
becomes ‘ingrained in its very nature’ (81c4-6).  For Plato, unlike the Buddhist 
counterpart, there is an entity to which desire can attach itself.  Buddhists take refuge in 
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impermanency and the denial of permanency, whereas Plato takes refuge in permanent 
Being and immortal soul as the permanent part of us. Although Plato does not share the 
ontology of anicca and anattā, he does have a clear concept of physical impermanence 
in his idea of Becoming.   
 The soul’s fault is craving an un-satisfactory existence and one that is ultimately 
beneath the level a soul can aspire to.  In Buddhism, un-satisfactoriness is a Universal 
Truth within the conditioned world of saṃsāra (dukkha-dukkha). The aim is the 
absolute cessation of craving, which is Nirvāṇa (Kalupahana: 1976: 76). For Socrates, 
impure souls crave a bodily existence characterised by human un-satisfactoriness and 
imprisoned suffering.  Instead of realising their true nature and habitations as ‘bodiless’ 
(114c), some souls cling to corporeal life.  Rejecting this approach Socrates says ‘I 
should only make myself ridiculous in my own eyes if I clung to life’ (117a). Craving 
for the corporeal and its pleasures leads to the continuation of embodiment or saṃsāra 
because for Buddhists it causes the delusion of permanency and for Plato this deluded 
craving leads to bodily existence. 
 In the Phaedo the soul is the ‘first accessory to [our] own confinement’ within 
bodily existence (83a).
61
  For Plato and Buddhism it is the individual now—however 
defined—that has the responsibility; we crave the corporeal and so we become. In 
Milindapañha ‘All foolish individuals take pleasure in the senses’ and ‘continue to 
cleave to them’ (III.4.6.69) and the passionate man is ‘overpowered by craving’, since 
in a state of ‘want’, he eats food enjoying ‘both the taste and the lust that arises from the 
taste’ (III.6.7.76-77). For Plato the lustful individual ‘has been so beguiled by the body 
and its passions and pleasures that nothing seems real to it but those physical things 
which can be touched and seen and eaten and drunk’ (81b). Thus individuals feel ‘a 
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 Plato’s conscious soul is confined, but there is nothing to confine in Nāgasena’s view; Skandhas are all 
there are. Therefore, the language of confinement or imprisonment is more Platonic than Buddhist; 
though imprisonment within the larger saṃsāric cycle is possible.   
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keen pleasure or pain’ and ‘cannot help supposing that whatever causes the most violent 
emotion is the plainest and truest reality’ (83c).  The ignorant fools do not realise that 
‘every pleasure or pain has a sort of rivet with which it fastens the soul to the body’ 
making it ‘corporeal’ (83d).  Dillon notes that desire is the cause of imprisonment and 
suffering (2000: 539).   
 For Plato and Buddhism, ‘those physical things’ are transitory yet damaging.  
Man craves permanent happiness, but searches for it in impermanent things; happiness 
from impermanent things is temporary, hence it results in human sorrow (Kalupahana, 
1976: 37).  Craving for bodily pleasures leads to suffering, encapsulated in the Buddhist 
cycle of saṃsāra and in Plato’s cycle of rebirth.      
1.3.3 The Seas of Life 
 The image of human life as a sea or seas is used in both Plato’s Phaedo and the 
Milindapañha to present the cycle of life, death and rebirth.62  In Phaedo the image of 
human life as a ‘sea’ is explicit at 84a and 85d. First, at 84a the ‘soul brings calm to the 
seas of desire’ (84a7), where the soul is the purified soul and the desire refers to the 
presence of pleasures and pains.
63
  Second, at 85d Socrates speaks of the soul using 
intelligence as a ‘raft to ride [sail over] the seas of life’ (85d1-4). Socrates is here 
advising that where it is impossible to attain truth a second-best method is to (85c7-d2): 
 to select the best and most dependable theory that human intelligence can 
 supply, and use it as a raft to ride the seas of life 
 adopt the best and least refutable of human doctrines, embarking on it as a kind 
 of raft, and risking the dangers of the voyage through life, unless one could 
 travel more safely and with less risk, on a securer conveyance afforded by some 
 divine doctrine. (tr. Gallop, 1975).     
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 See 1.1.1 
63
 The language of purification is prevalent throughout the Argument from Affinity (78b-84b).  Specific 
examples include: 79d; 80e; 81b; 82b9-c1; 82d.  See 1.2.  
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In Milindapañha the image of crossing water is seen when Nāgasena refers to the 
Saṃyutta Nikāya (II.1.10.36).64  The passage describes a process of crossing a ‘stream’ 
and ‘the sea of life’ leading to a state of ‘wisdom’ that is characterised by purity.  In 
1.1.1 I commented on the inclusion of the Buddhist raft parable.  Socrates’ comment on 
‘the seas of life’ is thus close to the Buddhist image of Dharma as a raft on the sea of 
saṃsāra (Dillon, 2000: 538).  The raft for Socrates is intelligence pointing to the 
exercise of philosophy while for Nāgasena the stream is passable by the example of the 
Buddha and the teachings he gave, the Dharma.  The process of crossing or sailing over 
the ‘sea of life’ is the journey from bodily existence towards a purified release – for 
both Plato’s soul and Buddhism’s consciousness.   
 However, it is intriguing to postulate a further difference in the use of this 
imagery.  The parable of the raft serves as a reminder for Buddhists to let go of all 
attachments, including the practices and teachings that helped one cross the sea of 
desire, saṃsāra.  But, Socrates has no such problem with attachment per se.  
Philosophy is the vehicle, the raft to cross the sea of human desires, as it is ‘the most 
dependable theory that human intelligence can supply’ (85d-2).  As such, philosophy 
purifies the soul of the body.  As it were, philosophy helps one move from the near 
shore to the far shore.  But, there is no suggestion that the purified soul (soul type 5—
see 1.2.2) once ‘set free from imprisonment’ (114b6-c2) and living ‘altogether without 
bodies’ (114c2-6) no longer practice philosophy.  Therefore, examining the imagery of 
crossing a sea in the Milindapañha and Phaedo helps one understand the problem of 
bodily desire for the Platonic soul, but only in a specifically limited way.  Buddhism 
detaches from all attachments, even the dharma—the very raft that led to one’s escape 
of saṃsāra.  Socrates, as far as one can infer, sees philosophy and the intellectual 
journey as carrying on even after one’s release from imprisonment.       
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 See 1.1.1. By faith he crosses over the stream, By earnestness the sea of life; By steadfastness all grief 
he stills, By wisdom is he purified (II.1.10.36). 
94 
 
I turn back now to the correlation between both texts concerning the problem of 
human desires.  The image of a journey on a sea is associated with the power of desires, 
where the seas become turbulent through craving. For Buddhists saṃsāra is a painful 
mix of craving and impermanence and for Plato also the seas the unpurified soul must 
sail are linked with the continual physical desires of the soul.  A connection is made in 
both between the power of water and the power of desire. Nāgasena states that 
individuals are ‘carried down by that flood’ of desire (III.4.6.69). The ‘flood’ described 
by Nāgasena correlates to the ‘delight’ individuals take in the ‘senses’ and the 
‘pleasure’ that they ‘continue to cleave to’ (III.4.6.69). It is by quelling the ‘flood’ of 
the senses and desires that Buddhists achieve Nirvāṇa, Similarly, Socrates’ idea of ‘seas 
of desire’ at 84a refers to the need for the soul to ‘bring calm’ to the turbulence caused 
by physical pleasures and pains. This idea prepares the way for the later afterlife myth 
which presents the image of afterlife souls travelling on vast rivers and lakes. For 
Socrates describes Hades as a system of underground channels through which ‘flows a 
great volume of water, monstrous unceasing subterranean rivers of waters’ (111d).  The 
underworld rivers produce ‘movement to and fro’ (111e). Just as the ‘seas of life’ 
require a ‘raft’ on which to travel safely (85d), so too some of the ‘subterranean rivers’ 
are violent and in need of calming as they oscillate and move wildly.  Further, the 
afterlife souls that ‘embark’ on ‘vessels which await them’ (113d) are comparable to 
those travelling by a raft during life.  In the myth of the underworld it is only those souls 
still craving bodily existence that are presented as sailing on or immersed in the waters.  
Nāgasena’s ‘flood’ thus sheds light on the tremendous power of Plato’s water imagery, 
where souls are condemned to the waters of Tartarus through craving for the body. 
Where I claim that the main Shared Concern between Plato’s voyaging and 
Nāgasena’s flood imagery relates to the power of desire, Gold suggests that Plato’s 
eschatological topography represents yogic breath control and meditative techniques 
95 
 
(1996: 23).
65
  Gold concludes that ‘In both Plato and Yoga, we have a picture of hot and 
cold energy surging through channels, conduits, and hollows’, and in Plato they are a 
coded ‘meditation technique’ (Gold, 1996: 24).  Platonic scholars have interpreted the 
afterlife world as a living organism: Pender states that the Tartarus region is a ‘gigantic 
bodily system’ (2012: 232); and Edmonds describes Hades as ‘endlessly pulsating like 
the breathing of a living creature’ (2004: 211).  Therefore, Gold’s focus on the myths 
similarity to a breathing system is in keeping with aspects of Platonic scholarship.   
My next point on the shared sea imagery of these two texts is that it provides a 
further, surprising parallel. At 84a Plato uses the imagery of travelling across the sea in 
close proximity with that of weaving a web. Speaking about how a soul gains release 
from the body, Socrates notes that a ‘philosophic man’: 
…would not think that while philosophy should release it, yet on being released, 
 it should of itself surrender to pleasures [5] and pains, to bind it to the body 
 again, and should perform the endless task of a Penelope working in reverse at a 
 kind of web. Rather, securing rest [γαληνην] from these feelings, by following 
 reasoning … [84b] when it has died, it will enter that which is akin and of like 
 nature to itself, and be rid of [5] human ills. (tr. Gallop, 1975). 
Plato thus couples the unpurified soul wandering through bodily rebirths with Penelope 
who is condemned ‘to an endless task’ (84a). Edmonds believes that the sea and raft 
imagery relate to Odysseus embarking from Calypso’s isle at Odyssey V.232-281 
(2004: 204). Plato is combining the two images to advise that the soul should use 
intelligence as a ‘raft’ over the turbulent ‘seas’ to avoid condemning itself to an ‘endless 
task’, like Penelope’ herself.  Plato’s Penelope image relies heavily on the audience’s 
knowledge that Penelope wove by day and by night un-wove that which she had 
worked. Gallop, in his commentary, notes that the unpurified soul is doing the ‘reverse’ 
of Penelope, because, ‘through sensual indulgence, it weaves again by night the ‘web’ 
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 Gold’s argument is one that I find useful and intriguing, but wish not to defend as part of my thesis. 
First, meditation is an interesting interpretation and it remains to be seen how the breathing can be un-
coded to actually represent a practical technique. Gold’s theory is useful as a further example of how 
Phaedo and Buddhist imagery can be used together. 
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that philosophy has unravelled by day’ (1975: 91).  The image of weaving suggests the 
complexity of human desires.  Also, Penelope specifically implies a repetition or 
longevity where one is constantly striving for something that is then un-done.    
Is it possible that Plato uses Penelope’s imagery to suggest the complexities of 
human life and the difficulty of the task facing the soul?  In Milindapañha Nāgasena 
also uses an image of unravelling as he posits that desires tangle life, creating 
complication and confusion (II.1.9.34): 
 Thus shall the strenuous Bhikkhu [monk], undeceived, 
 Unravel all the tangled skein of life.
66
    
This image of a ‘tangled skein’ elucidates the great difficulty in the Buddhist path.  The 
un-weaving of a ‘tangled skein’ is a positive for Nāgasena.  It appears that ‘wisdom’ 
leads the Buddhist monk to discover the tangles and work to ‘unravel’ them. The 
tangled thread refers to the complications of life caused by attachment to the body. The 
untangling of the thread presents release from the confusions built up through saṃsāric 
desire, allowing a crossing over from ‘the near shore’ to ‘the further shore’, which 
represents escape from the condition of duḥkha. Therefore untangling the thread and 
crossing the sea can be seen as parallel processes. 
 Following Gallop’s interpretation, Plato’s purified soul does something very 
similar to the Buddhist monk: using philosophy or ‘wisdom’ the soul and the monk 
‘unravel’ threads.  However, Plato’s account is not as positive as Nāgasena’s since 
Plato’s soul re-weaves by night the web that it has worked to undo by day when it was 
using philosophy. Whereas Nāgasena uses a single untangling leading to a positive 
outcome, Plato’s web of Penelope stands for a repetitive cycle, where the reference to 
the plight of Odysseus’ wife helps to conjure pity for the endless cycles of the embodied 
soul.  The ‘endless task’ of the soul’s weaving works with the constant backwards and 
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 I do not intend the Shared Concern to hinge on specific translations of specific words.  Rather, I wish to 
emphasise the general concern towards the complexity of desire. 
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forwards motion of the dialogue.
67
  This reinforces the idea of the unpurified soul stuck 
in the cycle of rebirth.  In contrast, Milindapañha suggests a single ‘crossing’, a linear 
journey from one point to another without return. But despite this significant difference 
in aim, the two images of the voyage and the tangled skein/woven web, both used in 
close proximity, show how these texts have Shared Concerns not only on philosophical 
themes but also imagery and expression.  
1.3.4 Conclusion 
 There are notable Shared Concerns in the Phaedo and Milindapañha concerning 
desire and purification in the context of their respective ideas on death and purification.  
I conclude that both texts see death as something not to be feared and bodily life as an 
existence not to be desired.  The craving for bodily existence is the cause of the 
recurrence of bodily rebirth and human un-satisfactoriness.   
 Having discussed the Shared Concerns regarding the nature of death, desire and 
purification, I analysed the imagery used to describe bodily life now and the transition 
towards bodily release.  I focused on the common image of sea/life and 
raft/understanding.  The ‘raft’ in Buddhism is Dharma, the Truth uncovered by the 
Buddha, carrying one from the dangerous shore to the safe shore.  For Plato, the ‘raft’ is 
philosophical understanding, the Truth available to philosophical reasoning.  Although 
the Truth is not the same for Plato and the Buddha, both see the Truth as the means to 
escape.  However, Buddhists through the raft parable learn to let go of all attachments 
including the raft itself, whereas Plato suggests that philosophy remains important even 
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 The concept of journeying there and back is seen within the myth. The rivers  flow into Tartarus and 
‘flow forth again’ (112a); the water ‘rushes’ to one side of the earth and ‘returns to this’ side (112b), 
causing ‘terrible and monstrous winds as it passes in and out’ (112b-c). And all the while the soul is 
travelling around this afterlife topography in a vessel or in the waters themselves. Water imagery is 
surprisingly dominant in Phaedo:  ‘we live round the sea (θάλατταν) like ants or frogs round a swamp 
(τέλμα)’ (109b); ‘as fishes (ἰχθύες) see our world when they put up their heads (ἀνακύπτοντες) out of the 
sea (θαλάττης)’ (109e); ‘monstrous unceasing subterranean rivers (ὕδωρ ῥεῖν)’ (111d4); ‘rivers (ποταμοὶ) 
flow together (συρρέουσί), and from it they flow forth again (πάλιν ἐκρέουσιν)’ (112a5-6); and 
‘monstrous (δεινούς) winds (ἀνέμους)’ (112b8).  
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after purification.  Also, the journeys appear different.   The Buddhist image is of a 
linear crossing, as opposed to a repetitive cyclical image in Phaedo.  That being said, 
the cyclical nature of saṃsāra shares in the cyclicality of Plato’s repetitive weaving and 
un-weaving. Both texts present a journey from an un-satisfactory life of embodiment—
due to the over-powering nature of desire—to a disembodied release through 
purification by quelling/restraining physical desire.  Both have a Shared Concern for 
achieving purification through Truth and a cessation of bodily desire.   
 Claim 1—that different cultural texts have Shared Concerns—has been 
established enabling the thesis to now turn to Claim 2: that using different cultural texts 
with Shared Concerns helps problem solve in one of the texts.  Through the 
foundational Shared Concerns of desire and purification, I delve deeper into the 
problem of identity and moral accountability within a landscape of continuing identities.  
As souls journey round the life-death topography what happens to their identities as 
they become purified or degenerate further into bodily desires?  Furthermore, who or 
what is it being punished?  Therefore, Claim 2 builds on Claim 1 by showing how 
Shared Concerns can lead to problem-solving; and the specific problem analysed here is 
where moral accountability fits into a landscape of changing identities across death. 
  
99 
 
Chapter 2: Identity and Moral Accountability in Phaedo 
Introduction 
 This chapter aims to set out the problem of identity and moral accountability in 
Plato’s Phaedo.  It builds on the Shared Concerns of Chapter 1 (Claim 1), and 
elucidates the problems to be solved (Claim 2).  Following on Chapter 1’s in-depth 
study, Chapter 2 offers a succinct appraisal of the problem to be solved (Claim 2). The 
chapter is split into three sections.  Firstly I examine the text itself, providing a short 
over-view of the main problems; I keep scholarly critics to a minimum, instead focusing 
on Plato’s text (2.1).  Secondly I bring in the modern commentators, to show their 
opinions and analysis of the problem (2.2).  In particular I focus on Sorabji’s idea of 
intellect as a true self (2006: 34), Inwood’s summation that Plato must convince the 
reader that ‘the soul to be rewarded or punished will be me’ (2009: 31), and Annas’ 
concern that ‘reincarnation and the final judgement myth have not been successfully 
combined’ (1982: 127). Thirdly I present my own solution on how the problem in 
Phaedo can be solved (2.3).    
2.1 The Problem of Moral Accountability: Phaedo 
 Socrates’ own soul is fundamental to the Phaedo discussion.  Having given his 
interlocutors his arguments for why death should not be feared and how this soul is 
immortal, Socrates proclaims ‘I shall remain with you no longer’ (Phd. 115d) and 
‘when I am dead I shall not stay, but depart and be gone’ (Phd. 115d-e).  But Socrates 
means something more than a cessation at death: Socrates the person is identical to 
Socrates the soul.  Socrates believes who he really is ‘shall not stay’, he will ‘depart’ 
but not cease.  According to McCabe, for the philosopher ‘my death has no sting 
because my soul marches on afterwards’ (McCabe, 1994: 29).  To achieve this position 
McCabe believes that Plato ‘needs to show that souls are separate from bodies in the 
sense that they survive the separation from the body and death loses its sting’ (1994: 
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64).  The Argument from Affinity is a product of the interlocutors’ fear that the Theory 
of Recollection proves that a soul existed before our birth, but not that our souls exist 
after the death event or have a different existence to the death state of the body, i.e. the 
corpse (77a-78b).  Socrates argues that souls are separable from bodies as the Cyclical 
Argument shows immortality both before and after the death event.  Furthermore, 
recollection shows that souls have consciousness/intellect when disembodied meaning 
souls are different from the state of death found with the body.  Socrates believes that 
the Cyclical Argument establishes the continued existence of souls (77c6-d4):  
 ἀποδέδεικται μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σιμμία τε καὶ Κέβης, ὁ Σωκράτης, καὶ νῦν, εἰ 'θέλετε 
 συνθεῖναι τοῦτόν τε τὸν λόγον εἰς ταὐτὸν καὶ ὃν πρὸ τούτου ὡμολογήσαμεν, τὸ 
 γίγνεσθαι πᾶν τὸ ζῶν ἐκ τοῦ τεθνεῶτος. εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν μὲν [d] ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ 
 πρότερον, ἀνάγκη δὲ αὐτῇ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἰούσῃ τε καὶ γιγνομένῃ μηδαμόθεν 
 ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ τεθνάναι γίγνεσθαι, πῶς οὐκ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν καὶ 
 ἐπειδὰν ἀποθάνῃ εἶναι, ἐπειδή γε δεῖ αὖθις αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι; 
 ‘That’s been proved already, Simmias and Cebes’, said Socrates, ‘if you will 
 combine this argument with the one we agreed on earlier, to the effect that all 
 that is  living comes from that which is dead. [d] Because if the soul does have 
 previous existence, and if when it enters upon living and being born, it  must 
 come from no  other source than death and being dead, surely it must also  exist 
 after it has died, given that it has to be born again?’ (tr. Gallop, 1975). 
By combining the Theory of Recollection and the Cyclical Argument Socrates believes 
the proof has been made, that what already existed was born and that it must survive 
death to be born once more, since ‘every living thing comes from the dead’ (77c6-d5).   
 McCabe goes on to say that ‘any soul...will be individual, not universal’, and 
this is because ‘what survives is Socrates, or you, not just a world soul’ for there is ‘no 
consolation otherwise’ (ibid.).  What McCabe means by ‘individual’ is the same as 
personal: ‘Phaedo’s arguments are emphatically concerned with personal survival’ 
(McCabe, 1994: 64 fn20).  Therefore, Socrates’ soul, taking McCabe’s point, is 
personally Socrates.  However, taking a different perspective, Broadie correctly states 
that ‘the self that is Socrates’ intellect is the self bound up with his body’ (Broadie, 
2001: 303).  Socrates whilst alive is human, whether his person is mainly his conscious 
101 
 
soul or not, and whilst human, Socrates lives in a bodily way.  Chapter 1 analysed the 
difficulty certain souls had with leaving the body at the death event.  Socrates describes 
certain souls that are unable to leave their individual human life behind (81e2-3):  
 ἐνδοῦνται δέ, ὥσπερ εἰκός, εἰς τοιαῦτα ἤθη ὁποῖ᾽ ἄττ᾽ ἂν καὶ μεμελετηκυῖαι 
 τύχωσιν ἐν τῷ βίῳ.   
 And as you might expect, they [souls] are attached (ἐνδοῦνται) to the same sort 
 of character or nature which they have developed during life.    
The ‘same sort of character’ provides a causal link between t1 and t2, which challenges 
McCabe’s reassurance that ‘my death has no sting’.68  As Broadie surmises, the self is 
‘bound up with a body’: it is the ‘nature...developed during life’ that continues.  
Therefore, for Gerson ‘one’s disembodied fate flows from one’s embodied career’ 
(Gerson, 2003: 87) and for Rowe a soul turns into an animal that suits their behaviour 
(Rowe, 2007: 107).   
 Socrates takes his immortality argument further when he states that ‘we shall 
know whether to feel confidence or fear about the fate of our souls’ (καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ 
ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων θαρρεῖν ἢ δεδιέναι ὑπὲρ τῆς 
ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς) (78b7-9).69  It is the moral accountability that comes with the soul’s 
immortality that is the utmost concern.  For the language ‘fate of our souls’ shows 
moral concern and care for our souls.  Rowe states that if Socrates succeeds in his 
arguments then ‘we should not fear death’ (1993: 3).  However, to feel care for one’s 
soul in future requires further arguments.   
 It is the afterlife myth that provides the most abundant source of evidence on the 
problem of moral accountability.  However, due to the contested allegorical and literal 
readings of Phaedo’s myth, interpretations exploring moral continuation through lives 
                                                 
68
 T1 being this human life now and t2 being the next life after death. 
69
 My own emphasis highlights the moral accountability of the immortal soul. 
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are contested.  All souls are judged specifically on their previous bodily life.
70
  The 
‘judgement’ is to determine who has ‘lived well and holily, and those who have not’ 
(113d). At no point in Phaedo does Socrates or Plato describe the judgement of souls as 
a final judgement.  And it is certainly not the case, as Annas believes, that a ‘final 
morally rectifying judgement is still there’ in the myth (1982: 127).  But it seems highly 
unjust to have a ‘final judgement’ for one mortal life.  For the eternal soul has led 
countless human and animal lives.  Therefore, wherever the forensic focus is, it cannot 
justifiably be as specific as one of those countless lives.  Indeed, a final judgement for 
all souls seems unlikely.  Once a final judgement is cast, the chance to change is 
severely reduced if not diminished entirely.  The soul would then be stuck with the 
consequences of one directly preceding life.  The only judgement of the myth that can 
be seen as ‘final’ is that of the worst morally corrupt souls at 113e5-6 where the souls 
cast into Tartarus will emerge ‘nevermore’.  
 The judgement of souls in Phaedo lacks a ‘morally rectifying judgement’, one 
that Annas would rather have (1982: 129).  The lack of ‘finality’ that Annas 
distinguishes is precisely due to the fact that the life that is being judged is only one of 
many lives for the soul; a perennial punishment for a finite life would be severely 
unjust.  For Plato souls are not eternally condemned by what they did, but continue on 
by means of what they can achieve.
71
   
 Phaedo’s judgement is of the soul’s previous embodied existence.  It is the soul 
that undergoes judgement, but it is the particular human life that is being judged.  The 
two are linked, death does not end moral continuity.  The problem of moral 
                                                 
70
 Scholarship is divided on the issue of judgement and its relationship with re-embodiment as discussed 
in Chapter 1.   
71
 The worst souls in Tartarus have taken a number of lives to get into that morally corrupt state and are 
probably seen as not able to return to the cycle since they would be unable to achieve any improvement in 
those conditions.  But as Tarrant notes in footnote 191 of his commentary, line 113e5-6 seems to 
contradict the Argument from Opposites (2003: 250).  
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accountability across t1 and t2 becomes apparent.
72
  Rowe states that belief in the 
immortality of an individual soul on the one hand and the cycle of reincarnation of souls 
on the other is an incompatible position (1993: 9).  This view links to a question asked 
by Annas: why should I be just if it is only my soul that will bear the consequence? 
(1982: 129).  If I am in command of my soul, but it is only the soul that will be 
punished, there appears no reason for me being afraid or deterred from moral depravity.  
It appears that death may still be ‘a godsend for the wicked’ (Gallop, 1975: 107c6-7).   
 In 2.2 I turn to the scholarly work on identity and the problem of moral 
accountability in Phaedo.  I rely on Sorabji, Inwood, and Annas to help shape the 
problem in Phaedo, further clarifying the question I aim to solve.  
2.2 The Problem of Moral Accountability: Sorabji, Inwood, and Annas 
 Sorabji, in his 2006 book Self, provides a comparative approach that focuses on, 
in his terms, the concept of ‘self’.  Sorabji’s personal view is ‘that there is an embodied 
self plain to see, which has or owns both psychological and bodily characteristics’ 
(2006: 32).  Additionally, he believes the ‘answers that are furthest from the one I have 
favoured are probably those in the Platonist tradition’ (2006: 33).  Sorabji concludes 
that soul for Plato is the ‘true self’, and that ‘true self is the reason or intellect’ (2006: 
34).  For Plato all souls are potentially Sorabji’s ‘true self’ as ‘reason or intellect’ 
(2006: 34).  However, as seen in 1.4, some souls are not fulfilling that potential. 
 Sorabji asks ‘Does the idea of reincarnation provide a possible way to avoid 
annihilation?’ (2006: 302).  Sorabji’s answer is that annihilation can only be avoided if 
‘it is the very same person as before who is reincarnated’ (2006: 302).  The emphasis is 
placed on the re-incarnation of ‘the very same person’.73  But, Sorabji correctly 
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 Once again, t1 represents this life now and t2 the life post death. 
73
 Later, in Chapter 3, I will analyse Locke’s concepts of Human and Person.  Person is a very specific 
term.  Locke shows that one needs continuation of consciousness and memory for the ‘same’ person to be 
attributed at different stages.   
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questions whether two sequential lives for the reincarnated soul can be thought of as the 
‘same individual’ (2006: 302).  Is there a discrepancy between ‘the very same person’ 
and the ‘same individual’?  Sorabji rhetorically questions whether a soul can retain a 
strong ‘psychological connection’ through reincarnation (2006: 303):  
 But even reincarnation as a baby in a new environment, let alone class, culture, 
 or race, seems to involve the loss of many mental and physical characteristics.  
 Can the psychological connection, then, be strong enough? 
If Sorabji is correct and there is not enough ‘psychological connection’ between soul at 
t1 and soul at t2, then who, or what, is morally accountable for the human life lived?  
Rowe, Annas, and Inwood are also specifically concerned with the question of why I 
should be morally accountable across different reincarnations.   
 Rowe concludes that the immortality of an individual soul is incompatible with a 
cycle of transmigrating souls as there is no ‘continuity of consciousness between one 
period of incarnation and another’ (1993: 9).  The donkey and Sardanapallus lack 
resemblance and memory, and, therefore, cannot retain an identity (Rowe, 1993: 9).
74
  
Likewise, Annas believes that ‘reincarnation and the final judgement myth have not 
been successfully combined’ (1982: 127).  Conversely, Pender believes that 
reincarnation is consistent with the ‘myth of final judgement’, since while most souls 
continue on the cycle of rebirths, a minority – those condemned to Tartarus – have 
received a ‘final’ sentence (2012: 199). Edmonds sees a contradiction between the 
Cyclical Argument and eternal punishment or reward, although he relegates this issue to 
a footnote (2004: 218, fn179).  But Inwood is even more critical, stating that the 
‘doctrine of reincarnation is not very plausible’ (2009: 37), although he justifies Plato’s 
‘doctrine of reincarnation’ as it seems to serve ‘the cause of justice’, at least for Plato 
(2009: 38).  Inwood correctly states how embodied persons perform acts but since ‘the 
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 Additionally, Inwood comments that although souls may retain ‘idiosyncratic tastes and aversions’ of 
their former life, the ‘souls differ significantly from their embodied possessors’ (2009: 31), except 
perhaps in ‘their moral condition’ (2009: 30).     
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souls [after death] differ significantly from their embodied possessors’ (2009: 31), 
‘what is rewarded or punished is not these embodied people’ (Inwood, 2009: 30). 
Therefore, the views of Rowe, Annas, and Inwood raise the question of whether I 
should feel concern for my soul. 
 The forensic problem for Annas and Inwood stems from the problem of moral 
accountability when individuals do not continue at t1 and t2.  The moral concern is the 
problematic interpretation focused on here.  The problem of continuation through time 
can be summarised by Inwood (2009: 31): 
 If the myth is to persuade me to improve my earthly life, I must be convinced 
 that the soul to be rewarded or punished will be ‘me’. 
For the myth to work allegorically and literally, I must be sure that it is me who will 
benefit after death from the philosophy I now practice.  Or, I must feel concern for the 
future.  Inwood identifies that benefit as reward and punishment.  But Inwood’s 
objection also concerns the here-and-now: for if I practise philosophy now hopefully I 
will observe some benefit in my life before being rewarded or punished after death.   
 Other scholars have raised an issue with continuity through time and its 
relationship with morality.  Annas asks: ‘Why should I be deterred from injustice by the 
thought that my soul will be reincarnated in a wolf?’ (1982: 129).  Both Annas and 
Inwood believe it must still be ‘me’ after the death of ‘my’ body if the myth is to deter 
me from evil now.  Indeed, the concern for the soul at t2 by the soul at t1 is affirmed by, 
according to Annas and Inwood, the soul at t1 and t2 being me and me again.  Annas 
argues that the myth gives one ‘a reason to be just which is clearly consequentialist’, 
whilst maintaining that ‘reincarnation blurs this message’ by making justice more about 
oneself and removing the ‘finality of the morally rectifying judgement’ (1982: 129).  
Therefore, the issue is whether these consequences need be final to be just.    
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 Does Plato’s view of justice need a final ‘morally rectifying judgement’?  Due to 
the role of purification in Phaedo any punishment or reward need not be final.  Annas 
prefers the idea of final rewards and punishments as the consequences of moral 
behaviour towards others has a finality that binds the soul to justice.  However, 
reincarnation prevents this finality, and, therefore, the justice, in Annas’ opinion.  Annas 
sees the effects on others as our best reason for being just, and is disappointed with 
Plato’s best reason for being just: promoting one’s own purity.  The objection raised by 
Annas corresponds with Hackforth’s note that in Phaedo ‘ethics are wholly 
individualistic: every man is to be concerned with his own spiritual welfare’ (1955: 7).  
The issue for my thesis is not whether the effects on others are more important than the 
effects on one’s self, but whether any effect or consequence is final.    
2.3 The Problem of Moral Accountability: the possible solution 
 For Plato there is a causal link between a soul’s life, death, and rebirth.  In the 
soul’s next embodiment they have the ‘same sort of character’.  This is morally 
problematic, especially concerning Socrates’ care argument.  If the soul becomes re-
embodied and takes on a new individual personality, with only the ‘same sort of 
character’, then it shall not be me and me again, and so I shall feel no need to care for 
my soul at that future time. For example, after death there is no assumption that 
Socrates the individual is still Socrates the human being.  Is it enough, therefore, to 
conclude that Socrates the person continues after the death event, and not Socrates the 
human being, and that Socrates the person—as identified with his rational soul—is the 
forensic locus?    
 By not distinguishing the identity of human and person, the separability of soul 
from the body at death is blurred.  Therefore Socrates’ proof of the soul’s immortality 
and his reasoning for being just are also blurred.  Various scholars, Inwood, Annas, and 
Rowe, conclude that moral accountability—underpinning the idea of a judgment of 
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souls—is incompatible with a soul that becomes embodied once more: t2 is the result of 
t1 but the connection in identity is too weak to maintain a moral concern for welfare; 
therefore, I have no concern for my soul at that future stage. 
 In Chapters 3-4 I present an argument that what survives death is not Socrates 
the human being.  Instead I argue that Socrates the person is the conscious rational soul.  
Furthermore, it is Socrates the person—the conscious rational soul—that is the locus of 
moral accountability. As such, it is the person who is judged after death, and not the 
human; thereby solving the problem of locating moral accountability in the judgement 
and re-embodiment of souls. It is important to clarify that it is the soul, not the human 
being, that is judged to be morally accountable.  And, therefore, our care now does 
equate with our care later.  
 Sorabji’s rhetorical question concerning individuality surviving physiologically 
dissonant embodiments is a guiding principle.  Why should we be concerned for the fate 
of our souls later, if the soul is immortal but develops resultant characters and natures?  
Can a soul in sequential re-incarnations be the ‘same individual’, but not the same 
human?  In this case, the soul is the same soul and so its consciousness is linked through 
reincarnations and it remains the same person.      
 Annas’ disappointment is with a view in which a certain condition of soul is 
better regardless of external consequences because it is a better way of being a person, 
and that the value of this condition partly derives from fulfilling a role in something 
larger and more significant than one human composition.  If I want to be just because I 
want to be rewarded, then I will be disappointed to realise that my rewards do not last 
for eternity.  But if reincarnation, judgement, and justice are decided on the basis of 
something greater than one single embodied human life, then Plato answers Annas’ 
objection about being ‘deterred from injustice’. For on this view Plato would broaden 
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his concerns: what matters is no longer your human rewards, but justice as a whole in a 
de-individualised, but still an inter-connected, way.   
 But would being the same person, but not the same human, satisfy the 
requirement for moral accountability through t1 and t2?  Is it possible to solve this moral 
accountability problem by using Locke’s distinction of kinds as a guide and so splitting 
humans (as individuals) and persons (as forensic souls)?  Annas, Rowe, and Inwood all 
suggest that there is a discrepancy between an individual human life and the soul that 
travels after the human’s death; that distinction is why they object that reincarnation 
blurs the moral judgment.  Their objections are significant, but need not be 
insurmountable to Plato’s argument. 
In Chapter 3 I will examine the Lockean ideas of human, person, and forensics, 
in order to assess whether placing the forensic nature with the soul rather than the 
human enables Plato to account for continuing moral accountability across distinct 
embodied existences at t1 and t2. 
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Chapter 3: Locke and Phaedo 
Introduction  
 In Chapter 3 I attempt to solve the problem of moral accountability in Phaedo 
by using the philosophy of Locke presented in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, in Chapter XXVII entitled ‘Of Identity And Diversity’.  Particularly I 
am interested to observe whether creating two kinds, person and human, solves the 
Platonic issue of moral accountability across rebirths.  Locke’s idea of a conscious 
person helps us to understand Phaedo’s soul as consciousness in a loose sense (3.2.2), 
but issues of memory lead to further problems in Phaedo when thought of in a strict 
Lockean sense (3.2.3).  That is why I turn to Milindapañha in Chapter 4.  Milindapañha 
is useful as a working model of a philosophy which has had to deal in practical terms 
with issues of moral accountability and continuity between embodiments.   
 Although too fixated on memory to solve the problem of moral accountability in 
Phaedo, Locke’s work is useful in clearly articulating ideas on the human, the person, 
and forensic questions.  I use Locke as a framework in which I firstly attempt to solve 
Phaedo’s problem on its own, but then secondly as a framework for the solution 
through my comparative method.  Locke grounds my discussion between Phaedo and 
Milindapañha within an over-arching philosophical framework.  This framework is 
applied individually on both texts and then during the discussion of both texts together.  
I use Locke for clarity of expression and thought, and to also maintain a basic 
philosophical grounding independent of both cultural texts but applicable to both 
cultural texts.   
3.1 Locke’s Human, Person, and the Problem of Memory 
 Locke’s discussion of identity begins with what identity consists of. To find the 
answer of where identity resides Locke suggests that one must compare a thing now to a 
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thing later.  What makes the thing ‘similar’ across time and place will be identity (II, 
27: 182-183):  
 when considering anything as existing at any determined time and place, we 
 compare it with itself existing at another time, and thereon form the ideas of 
 identity. When we see anything to be in any place in any instant of time, we are 
 sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another.
75
 
 
So, what is it to be the same person at t1 and at t2?  For Locke, one must know what kind 
of ‘substance’ one is dealing with.  There are three ‘substances’/‘things’ that Locke 
identifies: 1) lumps or masses of atoms, 2) living organisms, and 3) Persons. The 
identity of each of the three ‘things’/‘substances’ will be different since the appropriate 
criterion of identity depends on what ‘substance’ is described. This is known as the 
‘principle of the relativity of identity’ (Mackie, 1976: 173): a person is different from a 
living organism which in turn is different from a lump of matter. What constitutes 
sameness of identity over time for a lump of atoms is different to that for a Person.  Rey 
highlights how ‘the identity of persons at a given time is also inescapably bound up with 
the identity of those persons across time’ (1976: 51). Therefore, the difficulty is with 
identity and diversity through time, not at any one time (Mackie, 1976: 140).  Locke 
concludes that what constitutes a Person is the psychological line of consciousness, i.e. 
consciousness is the pre-eminent criterion of personal identity over time.  Taking each 
type of substance in turn I show Locke’s findings and then express the problem of 
memory within Locke’s idea of a morally accountable person. 
3.1.1 Mass of Atoms 
 Locke describes the identity of a lump (mass) of atoms (II, 27: 185): 
 whilst they exist united together, the mass, consisting of the same atoms, must 
 be the  same mass, or the same body, let the parts be never so differently 
 jumbled: but if one of these atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no 
 longer the same mass, or the same body.  
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 But does Locke ‘beg-the-question’ here? Locke assumes that there is a concept of identity, and to find 
that concept we compare a thing to the same thing previously’. 
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Locke’s theory is strict. If one atom is removed from the lump of atoms, what Locke 
terms ‘the mass’, then the identity of that lump has changed, i.e. it is no longer one-and-
the-same lump of atoms. So if I had a lump of clay and worked it with my hands into a 
shape, the fact that some atoms that made-up the clay are now on my hands means that 
the lump of clay is no longer strictly one-and-the-same lump of clay.  The clay ‘is no 
longer the same mass’ because atoms have been taken away. 
 Mackie explains how the continuous solid lump of matter is one-and-the-same at 
t1 and t2 ‘only if there is a spatio-temporally continuous history’ (1976: 141). As Mackie 
surmises, things that are identical over time with each other must share identical 
properties (1976: 170): 
 it is a fact that our present concept of identity is in itself a clear and a strict one, 
 with well-defined logical rules attached to its standard terms, especially the rules 
 that each thing is identical only with itself and hence that if A is identical with B, 
 B has all the same properties as A.  
What do we claim when saying something that exists at a later time, t2, is identical with 
something which existed at an earlier time t1 (Mackie, 1976: 141)? What for Locke does 
it mean to be the same? Two things perhaps: to be qualitatively similar or numerically 
identical.  
3.1.2 Living Creatures: Man 
 Lumps or mass require numerically identical atoms for X to retain its identity. 
However, ‘In the state of living creatures, their identity depends not on a mass of the 
same particles, but on something else’ (Locke, II, 27: 185).  By definition living 
creatures change: food is consumed and waste is excreted; atoms are changing. 
Therefore, something keeps going whilst being gradually modified and repaired, 
creating a continuous animal linking t1 and t2 (Mackie, 1976: 142). To explain how the 
identity of living creatures ‘depends not on a mass of the same particles, but on 
something else’ Locke uses the differences between an oak and a mass of matter. In the 
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case of a living creature—the oak—it is not about change of matter but more about the 
organization of matter (Locke, II, 27: 185): 
 [The] variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity [because] one 
 [mass of matter] is only the cohesion of particles of matter anyhow united, the 
 other [oak] such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an oak, and 
 such an organization of those parts.  
A living organism thus has ‘parts’ and ‘organization’.  Living organisms are 
individuated by their functional organization, the purpose of which is to preserve the 
same life through changes of matter (Uzgalis, 2007: 64). There is one continuous 
history of one living life, concurrent with acquiring and losing matter; one life history 
equals one living organism (Locke, II, 27:185): 
 For in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity; an oak, 
 growing from a plant to a great tree, and then lopped, is still the same oak: and a 
 colt, grown up to a horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while the 
 same horse. The reason whereof is that in these two cases—a mass of matter 
 and a living body—identity is not applied to the same thing.  
For Mackie, Locke attempts to ‘apply the concept of identity to a persisting but 
changeable thing’, hence, the old oak is the same as the sapling (Mackie, 1976: 145). 
Therefore, if Locke believes that man is the same man—due to organization of body 
and the same continued life—regardless of sequential atomistic change, then he requires 
for identity no stable thing within the man. As a result, Locke has no need for a 
traditional or Platonic view of soul.  Ultimately consciousness replaces soul as the 
bearer of personal identity (Uzgalis, 2007: 67), but continuity of organization of body in 
one continued life is sufficient for a man’s identity. Locke presents various arguments 
for why a soul is a bad criterion for identity of a man over time (II, 27: 186-187). I 
mention this now in keeping with the structure of Locke’s argument, but I will examine 
soul in further detail below (3.1.5).  
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 Man, as a human animal, is a living organism and, therefore, consists of parts 
and organization.
76
  Therefore, what constitutes the identity of man over time is (II, 27: 
186):
77
 
 nothing but a participation of the same continued life by constantly fleeting 
 particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body.  
For Locke an organism has ‘the same continued life communicated to different particles 
of matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organized living body’ (II, 
27: 187). Therefore, Locke’s principal concern is continuity ‘successively’ through 
change. For this idea Mackie’s uses the phrase ‘spatio-temporal continuity’. The 
appropriate criterion for the identity of man is a continuous sequential organization 
linked to a body.   
3.1.3 Persons 
 Locke’s third substance is that of Persons. Locke’s Person stands for ‘a thinking 
intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the 
same thinking thing, in different times and places’ (II, 27: 188). There is a clear 
distinction between man and person: man is species specific, whereas a person is not 
(Uzgalis, 2007: 65). By a thought experiment of the rational Parrot or Cat, Locke posits 
that a rational Parrot or Cat may be a Person, albeit not a Man. Therefore, Locke admits 
‘a trans-species conception of person’ (Uzgalis, 2007: 65). The ‘essential’ element to 
thinking is ‘consciousness’; ‘consciousness which is inseparable from thinking’ (Locke, 
II, 27: 188): 
 and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or 
 thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now [as] it 
 was then. 
 
Personal identity over time, therefore, is the continuity of consciousness over time. This 
Person for Locke can exist in different substances (II, 27: 189): 
                                                 
76
 Man or ‘human’ is the name of a particular animal species, just as ‘lion’ is the name of a particular 
animal species. 
77
 But, Rey suggests that ‘physical continuity seems to withstand replacement of parts only so long as that 
replacement is gradual over time’ (1976: 60).  
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 For it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, 
 personal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed only to one 
 individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances. 
Therefore, the ‘same’ continuation of consciousness remains the ‘same’ person 
regardless of ‘distance of time, or change of substance’, just as a man would not become 
‘two men by wearing other clothes to-day than he did yesterday, with a long or short 
sleep between’ (Locke, II, 27: 189).  
 Presumably, substances, i.e. bodies, are like clothes for persons—neither 
necessary nor unique. Locke distinguishes between the same person and the same man, 
as Mackie notes (1976: 174). One can have the same person even if not the same 
substance; therefore, substance is not a necessary condition for personal identity 
(Uzgalis, 2007: 69).  As Uzgalis notes, ‘Locke treats the presence or absence of 
consciousness as a necessary and sufficient condition for being the same person’ (2007: 
69). To articulate his point further Locke provides an example of a man whose hand is 
cut off (II, 27: 190):  
 the substance, whereof personal self consisted at one time, may be varied at 
 another, without the change of personal identity; there being no question about 
 the same person, though the limbs which but now were a part of it, be cut off. 
The hand that is cut off ‘is no longer a part of that which is himself, any more than the 
remotest part of matter’.  Therefore the identity of persons does not rely on their bodily 
make-up.   
 Locke is aware that ‘in the ordinary way of speaking, the same person, and the 
same man, stand for one and the same thing’ (II, 27: 193). But, ‘consciousness, as far as 
ever it can be extended…united existences and actions…into the same person, as well 
as it does the existence and actions of the immediately preceding moment’.  Therefore, 
‘whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is the same person to whom 
they both belong’ even when in different bodies (II, 27: 193). Therefore, a man and a 
person are two separate things.  
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 Persons are not species-specific, but a confusion stems from this given that for 
the moment ‘human beings are the only persons we recognize’, as Dennett points out. 
Yet as he goes on to say, ‘on the one hand we can easily contemplate the existence of 
biologically very different persons’ (Dennett, 1976: 175): 
 I am a person, and so are you. That much is beyond doubt. I am a human being, 
 and probably you are too. If you take offence at the “probably” you stand 
 accused of a sort of  racism, for what is important about us is not that we are 
 the same biological species, but that we are both persons, and I have not cast 
 doubt on that. 
 
This quotation from Dennett highlights the distinction prevalent in Locke’s writing, that 
a human being is one ‘thing’ and a person another ‘thing’. For Dennett, as for Locke, 
the importance is placed on being a person, not necessarily being a human. Dennett 
deems this aspect of personhood the ‘metaphysical notion’, i.e. there is an intelligent, 
conscious, feeling agent (1976:177). 
3.1.4 The Forensic Question 
 Forensic means related to law and legal matters, i.e. it refers to one’s desert and 
punishment. Dennett describes the forensic aspect of personhood as the moral notion of 
rights and responsibilities (1976: 176). The distinction between Person and Man leads 
Locke onto rewards and punishments: I am concerned with my future in a particularly 
intimate way; in a practical, not simply theoretical, way. Locke uses this idea of 
intimate concern and looks into a person’s past.  He describes how the sequential 
succession of consciousness through different substances makes the person accountable.  
He concludes that the substance which consciousness finds itself in now at t2, is 
accountable for any action done in a previous substance at t1, however long ago down 
that continuous conscious past.  Locke at II, 27: 194 states: 
 For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this present self 
 be made up of the same or other substances, I being as much concerned and as 
 justly accountable for any action was done a thousand years since, appropriated 
 to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment. 
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On a strict view of ‘consciousness’ if ‘you are conscious of something someone did a 
thousand years ago then you are the same as that person’ (Uzgalis, 2007: 69). Locke’s 
hyperbole may be rhetorical in design, but there is no reason why in Locke’s 
understanding the same person cannot theoretically traverse vast periods of time. The 
main point is Locke’s insistence on the forensic nature of persons and the concern that it 
should necessitate, and on its being based on memory. 
 Locke’s moral accountability of the person is based on his view that ‘person’ is 
‘a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit’ (II, 27: 198).  As Mackie states, 
‘the sameness of a person is intended to carry with it legal and moral responsibility for 
actions’ (1976: 176). Therefore, since the hub of moral accountability lies with the 
consciousness—the continuous person—there is a radical distinction between 
consciousness and substance (Uzgalis, 2007: 69).  
 To conclude, for Locke it is the consciousness alone that makes the self.  
Therefore, ‘the same numerical substance is not considered as making the same self’ (II, 
27: 196).  Instead ‘the same continued consciousness, in which several substances may 
have been united’ can be ‘the same person preserved under the change of various 
substances’ (II, 27: 198). Furthermore, since personhood is a forensic concept, the 
person with their continuation of consciousness ‘becomes concerned and accountable, 
owns and imputes to itself past actions, just upon the same ground and for the same 
reason that it does the present’ (II, 27: 198-199).  
 Locke claims moral continuity between past and future actions within one 
continuous conscious person regardless of the person’s differing substances. Continuity 
is, therefore, both retrospective and prospective. The prospective aspect is seen in the 
future concern for the ‘great day’, where at the Christian final judgement everyone 
receives what they deserve ‘according to his doings, [because] the secrets of all hearts 
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shall be laid open’ (II, 27: 198). As Mackie notes, the concern is based on memory 
(Mackie, 1976: 177):  
 If I know that the future self for which I have this special concern will be 
 punished for my wrong actions (which it will remember and impute to itself), 
 this gives me a reason for now refraining from wrong actions.  
Hence, it is not the ‘man’ that is punished for previous actions that it did not do, but it is 
the person who is punished for actions committed. The consciousnesses ‘are the same 
that committed those actions, and deserve that punishment for them’ (II, 27: 199). 
Therefore, for Locke in Dennett’s eyes, the ‘metaphysical personhood is a necessary 
condition of moral personhood’ (1976: 177). For Locke, the man is not the person, and 
man is not a forensic concept.  
3.1.5 Locke on the Soul 
 Locke does not view the ‘soul’, or sometimes what he calls the ‘spirit’, as the 
necessary condition for human animals or personhood (II, 27: 186): 
 For if the identity of soul alone makes the same man, and there be nothing in the 
 nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not be united to different 
 bodies, it will be possible that those men living in distant ages, and of different 
 tempers, may have been the same man: which way of speaking must be, from a 
 very strange use of the word man, applied to an idea out of which body and 
 shape are excluded’.  
Using problem cases and thought experiments Locke explains why soul should not be 
considered fundamental.  
 Much of what being a man, a living organism, entails is bodily existence. For 
Locke, there is ‘nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not 
be united to different bodies’ leading to problems such as if ‘the soul of Heliogabalus 
were in one of his hogs, would [he] say that hog were a man or Heliogabalus?’ (II, 27: 
187).  Since no one would call a ‘hog’ a man, regardless of what soul inhabited the 
‘hog’, man’s identity resides in the body. Therefore, the same soul does not make the 
same man. Rather, continuity of organised substance makes the same man. 
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 Does the same soul equal the same person? Locke splits consciousness from 
soul (II, 27: 192): 
 The same immaterial substance [i.e. soul], without the same consciousness, no 
 more making the same person by being united to any body, than the same 
 particle of matter, without consciousness, united to any body, makes the same 
 person. 
Consciousness for Locke replaces the traditional Christian soul as the bearer of personal 
identity (Uzgalis, 2007: 67). Therefore, the same identical soul in two successive bodies 
is not necessary or sufficient to make the same identical person. For Locke the 
determinant of personal identity is not ‘whether it be the same identical substance [i.e. 
soul] which always thinks in the same person’ (II, 27: 189).  It is instead whether there 
is continuity of consciousness. Locke concludes that soul, no more than matter, without 
the same consciousness, cannot be the same person.   
3.1.6 Locke: The Problem of Memory 
 
 It is now important to analyse in further detail Locke’s idea of moral 
accountability based on memory to see if it can be applied to Plato’s account in Phaedo.  
Locke’s idea of the forensic person is based on memory.  The ability of the person to 
remember previous actions necessitates concern for the person in the future.  Thereby 
Locke establishes memory as the necessary condition for concern.  I now present 
reasons why such a view is problematic.     
 According to Locke whether the same immaterial substance becomes two 
distinct persons depends on memory (II, 27: 191): 
 the same immaterial being, being conscious of the actions of its past duration, 
 may be wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence, and lose it 
 beyond the power of ever retrieving again: and so, as it were, beginning a new 
 account from a new period.  
Therefore, in this instance a new line of consciousness is created, resulting in a new 
person. The ‘substance cannot unite remote existences into one person while 
consciousness can’ (Uzgalis, 2007: 67). Locke wonders whether, if it could be proved 
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that I had the same identical soul as Socrates but none of Socrates’ memory, I would be 
Socrates (II, 27: 192):  
 ‘would any one say that [I], being not conscious of any of Socrates’ actions or 
 thoughts, could be the same person with Socrates?  
Not under Lockean rules, since the consciousness does not reach back to any of 
Socrates’ actions or thoughts in the past. A numerically identical soul does not create 
the same person any more ‘than if some of the particles of matter that were once a part 
of Nestor were now a part of’ me (II, 27: 192-3): 
 The same immaterial substance, without the same consciousness, no more 
 making the same person by being united to any body, than the same particle of 
 matter, without consciousness, united to any body, makes the same person. But 
 let him once find himself conscious of any of the actions of Nestor, he then finds 
 himself the same person with Nestor.  
Without conscious memory there is no continuous person for Locke.  And without 
memory the continuation of Locke’s forensic person is not possible. For Locke it is the 
memory that predicates the concern and consequently moral accountability.   
 For Locke, to be the same person one must have conscious memory of past 
actions - his whole argument for moral accountability of persons affirms so much. 
Without memory Locke envisages a situation where you will have different persons in 
the same man (II, 27: 195-6):  
 But yet possibly it will still be objected, Suppose I wholly lose the memory of 
 some parts of my life, beyond the possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I 
 shall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same person that did 
 those actions, had those thoughts, that I was once conscious of, though I have 
 now forgot them? To which I answer, That we must here take notice what the 
 word I is applied to; which in this case, is the man only…But if it be possible for 
 the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, 
 it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons. 
In strict Lockean logic, ‘If you really cannot remember some act that was done 
yesterday, then you are not the same person who did that act’ (Uzgalis, 2007: 69). 
Somehow this new person interrupted what had been a conscious I-history. Mackie 
states that (1976: 172):  
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 we might believe the successive intermittent occurrences to be not only similar 
 but directly causally connected with one another across and despite the temporal 
 gaps.  
But Mackie remains sceptical as ‘we have at present no reason to believe that any such 
form of causation occurs’ (1976: 172). Mackie is primarily talking about a 
‘discontinuous series of thing-occurrences’ where the ‘same thing exists at different 
times but exists intermittently’. Interestingly Mackie is unsure why in these instances 
we ‘talk about identity…rather than about a mere sequence of numerically diverse but 
qualitatively similar things’ (1976: 172).  It is clear how far Locke requires memory as a 
necessary criterion of personal identity. Memory of past actions is a vital criterion for 
Locke, preventing splicing of consciousness into two distinct person lines.  
 However, stating the importance of memory recall, above a continuous line of 
continuation, has overtly negative consequences for Locke’s theory. Locke requires 
‘perfect recall of all actions’ for moral accountability, but that is ‘a distinctly non-
naturalistic account of memory’ (Uzgalis, 2007: 72). Locke asks, what if I lose parts of 
my memory (II, 27: 195):  
 [If I] lose the memory of some parts of my life, beyond the possibility of 
 retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again…am I 
 not the same person that did these actions, had those thoughts, that I was once 
 conscious of, though I have now forgot them?’  
Locke’s answer is not satisfactory for the forensic notion of person: ‘we must here take 
notice what the word I is applied to; which in this case, is the man only’ (II, 27: 195). 
The person who did those forgotten actions is not the same person that I am now—no 
matter if ‘memory bridges’ connect them (Mackie, 1976: 181). The importance is ‘to 
relate rewards or punishments for actions done’ and, therefore, understand why you are 
being punished (Uzgalis, 2007: 70). In order to be the same person one must remember 
(Mackie, 1976: 182): 
 having identified a person at a particular time we are to take as belonging to that 
 person all and only those past actions and experiences which he could now be 
 brought to recollect, and, presumably, all and only those future person-
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 occurrences for which he feels a concern somewhat like the special, intimate 
 concern that one feels for one’s present self.  
But imagine a man who drink-drives one night. And what if the person that night—
whoever that is—was involved in a hit-and-run accident. Furthermore, what if the 
person who wakes up has no recollection of what happened the night before. If the 
person is a forensic concept, then who is it that the law should punish? Being the same 
man is not enough, for man is not a forensic concept. Indeed, we see a situation where 
‘what we will have is the same man but not the same person’ for the reason that 
(Uzgalis, 2007: 72):  
 if I cannot remember, beyond the possibility of recall, something which ‘I’ did, 
 then it was done by a different person, even if that person happened to be 
 operating in the same living human body.  
Locke should have realised ‘that fragmentary memories and interruptions of 
consciousness are…a problem for his own theory’ (Mackie, 1976: 182).  Does this 
account provide any practical framework for moral accountability?  Or, indeed, for 
persons? 
 Can we exclude the one forgotten night from the I-history, and say that, even 
though there happened to be a different person on that night, overall the person who 
woke up is the same person who remembers waking up the previous morning, but that 
for a confined time—an I-occurrence—the very same man was a different person? If 
personhood is so slippery, perhaps it is the concept that is flawed. Further support for 
this view comes when Locke further states the issue of memory within I-histories and I-
occurrences (II, 27: 192-3): 
 But let him once find himself conscious of any of the actions of Nestor, he then 
 finds himself the same person with Nestor. 
How can that be true? If I am conscious of any of Nestor’s actions then I am Nestor? 
Any action?  What if my memory now links to one of Nestor’s actions previously?  I 
will be the I-history Nestor, but what are we to make of the intervening I-occurrences?  
Is remembering an inconsequential action in Nestor’s youth sufficient for calling myself 
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the very same person as Nestor, i.e. the I-history Nestor? If I remember this one action 
but have no recollection of any council at Troy, I cannot claim to be the very same 
person who was at Troy.  What does that mean for how we understand Nestor as an I-
history?  
 What troubles Locke’s argument further is the assumption that there is an I-
history that is Nestor. The idea of Nestor as a fully-remembering person is a fallacy. 
There are points in Nestor’s life that even Nestor can’t remember, and, therefore, Nestor 
is not the very same person at those points in his life. The very idea of ‘Nestor’—of the 
identity of persons—breaks down at any memory lapse. And, therefore, so too does 
moral accountability. Mackie suggests that at this point we are with Hume, where 
‘identity is a nest of fictions’ (Mackie, 1976: 147).  Locke’s forensic person becomes 
meaningless: if persons are to be punished, and persons can disappear as I-occurrences, 
who is left to be morally accountable?  A culture is left with no alternative but to punish 
the very same man, something that Locke suggests should not happen.  
 Locke’s notion of personal responsibility disappears quickly. The continuous 
and remembered I-history of personal identity based on memory is a mirage; it has not 
provided a positive explanation for why I should feel concern for the future person. The 
importance of memory for Locke does not provide a sure account for moral 
responsibility in the past either. At best there are I-occurrences inter-dispersed and 
interwoven into a continuing consciousness that the person may or may not remember. 
 In Locke’s view of forensic persons, the person at t2 now sober would not be 
responsible for what the person at t1 did when drunk, if the person at t2 had no memory.  
Under Locke’s terms, no one is punished, as it is wrong to punish the man. Mackie is 
correctly hesitant regarding the validity of Locke’s terms of personal identity when 
considered within the moral sphere (1976: 183):  
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 do we also want to say, with Locke, that I am not now responsible for all those 
 actions, good or bad, which were performed by the man that I am, and 
 performed under normal conditions, while the man was sane, sober, and wide 
 awake, but the memory of which I have in a quite ordinary way lost 
 beyond recall? 
There is a solution to Locke’s insistence on memory as the necessary condition for the 
moral accountability of persons.  In 3.1.7 I will analyse Thomas Reid’s polemic against 
Locke’s forensic person and Mackie’s explanation of an ‘ancestral relation’.   
 3.1.7 Memory - the Solution 
 I begin with Reid’s objection and then move onto the ancestral relation as a 
solution.  Reid’s objection to Locke’s use of memory comes in the form of a thought 
experiment.  Suppose that an elderly general remembers capturing a standard as a young 
officer, but cannot remember being flogged as a boy for stealing from an orchard, 
whereas the young officer can remember being flogged. Therefore, the general is one-
and-the-same person as the young officer, but not with the boy; and the boy is one-and-
the-same person with the young officer but not with the general (1975: 114). The 
problem stems from memory. 
 Reid gives four specific problems for Locke’s person based on memory (1975: 
115-117).  One of which is the breakdown of Locke’s idea of a forensic person based on 
memory.  Moral accountability becomes redundant: because ‘reward and punishment 
are founded on personal identity, no man could be responsible for his actions’ once 
personal identity breaks down (Reid, 1975: 117).   
 In the end Mackie concludes that Locke has described a ‘theory of action 
appropriation’, rather than a theory of personal identity (1976: 183): 
 Since a man at t2 commonly remembers only some of his experiences and 
 actions at t1, whereas what constituted a person at t1 was all the experiences and 
 actions that were then co-conscious, Locke’s view fails to equate a person 
 identified at t2 with any person identifiable at t1. It is only a theory of how some 
 items which belonged to a person identifiable at t1 are appropriated by a person 
 who can be identified as such only at t2. It is therefore hardly a theory of 
 personal identity at all, but might be better described as a theory of action 
 appropriation. Locke seems to be forgetting that ‘person’ is not only ‘a forensic 
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 term, appropriating actions and their merit’, but also the noun corresponding to 
 all the personal pronouns. 
Is action appropriation not enough? Do the personal pronouns beg the question? If at the 
end one finds no identical persons at t1 and t2, does it matter as long as moral 
accountability remains? 
 Responsibility and concern need not be wholly linked to memory. What if one 
turned the problem of transitivity into an advantage, where a unit of consciousness is 
not determined by ‘could remember’, but by its ancestral—ancestor to parent—relation 
(Mackie, 1976: 180)?
78
 The ancestral relation solves the difficulty of memory 
concerning forensics: X is an ancestor of Y if either X is a parent of Y or X is a parent 
of an ancestor of Y. One can still have a human animal and a conscious forensic person 
but memory cannot be the strict determinant for moral accountability.  And it is moral 
accountability that is important, not persons. 
 The ancestral relation is recursive in its definition, but ostensibly offers a 
solution comparable to emphasising the causal connection between the boy and the 
general, instead of emphasising the memory of the general as the boy. It is an extension 
of Locke’s account that allows iterated memories to count in forensic terms; a 
continuity of experience. Because the general can remember the officer’s experiences, 
and the young officer can remember the boy’s, ‘the general’s experiences and the boy’s, 
as well as the young officer’s, all belong to the same unit of consciousness, the same 
unified mental history’ (Mackie, 1976: 180).  Mackie concludes that successive I-
occurrences overlap into one another, generating a ‘continuous I-history’, of which, the 
‘person, the I, is what is taken to be there, all at once, at each moment in an I-history’ 
(Mackie, 1976: 180). Therefore, the consciousness history, made from many individual 
I-occurrences, is the person; the person is not divided into many distinct I-occurrences, 
                                                 
78
 Ancestor to parent is a sequential line of continuation: parent gives rise to child that gives rise to new 
generation continuously. Therefore, at each stage identity is numerically individual, yet at the same time, 
qualitatively lined in succession. This idea was developed by Grice, 1941: 330-350.   
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but is held together in a whole I-history, regardless of memory. This leaves the person 
as one conscious transitive, yet symmetrical, person (Mackie, 1976: 181).  
 Locke argues against the transitivity of personal identity because ‘he sees 
persons as bearers of responsibility’ (Mackie, 1976: 182). But Locke’s concept is of 
little practical use, especially regarding moral concern.  To be clear, the ancestral 
relation ‘is a revision, not an interpretation, of Locke’s account’ (Mackie, 1976: 181).  
In this instant the forensic concept is retained. Locke’s option is to have a concept of a 
person but forensic redundancy.   
3.2 Applying Locke’s Distinctions to Phaedo 
 Does applying Locke’s forensic person to Phaedo help to solve the problem of 
moral accountability outlined in Chapter 2?  Locke’s distinction between human and 
person provides an interesting, and ultimately enlightening, way of reading Phaedo.  It 
offers glimpses into new ideas on identity and moral accountability, highlighting where 
moral accountability should be located.  But, I conclude that Locke’s forensic person is 
still not enough to solve the problem of Platonic moral accountability due to the 
problem of Locke’s account of memory.  Plato’s idea of soul as consciousness is similar 
to Locke’s idea of a forensic person in a loose sense (3.2.2), but in a strict sense Plato’s 
soul cannot allow for Locke’s necessity of memory (3.2.3).  The Theory of Recollection 
might be regarded as bridging the gap between ideas of memory and moral 
accountability in Plato and in Locke, but unfortunately there is a discrepancy between 
Locke’s necessity for memory and Plato’s account in Phaedo.  I confront this question 
of compatibility here and find that Locke’s idea is problematic for moral accountability 
in Phaedo.  To start with I examine Plato’s concepts of the Human Animal (3.2.1) and 
the Person (3.2.2) in Lockean terms, and then I analyse why Plato’s idea of soul as 
consciousness cannot satisfy Locke’s criterion of memory, and, consequently, why the 
problem of moral accountability in Phaedo remains unresolved (3.2.3). 
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3.2.1 Locke’s Human Animal in Phaedo  
 In Phaedo Plato presents a stark opposition between human and soul that 
requires further explanation and refinement as the dialogue progresses.  This distinction 
between human and soul rests on the opposition between ‘composite’ and ‘incomposite’ 
things (78c6-8): 
 οὐκοῦν ἅπερ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, ταῦτα μάλιστα εἰκὸς εἶναι τὰ 
 ἀσύνθετα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτ᾽ ἄλλως καὶ μηδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτά, ταῦτα δὲ σύνθετα; 
 What is always constant and invariable is incomposite, and what is inconstant 
 and variable is composite. 
An entity made whole by the process of parts being put together is more liable to 
division than an incomposite whole.  The form of absolute beauty is ‘constant and 
invariable’ (78d3-7); whereas, the ‘many instances of beauty’ in the sensory world ‘are 
never free from variation’ (78e1-4).  Socrates is presenting a twofold world, where the 
senses and what they perceive are variable but reason and what it knows is constant.  
This duality is explicit within the language of body and soul, of sensory world and 
Forms.   
 Human beings are composite.  Socrates asks ‘are we not part body, part soul?’ to 
which Cebes replies that we are (79b).  But Socrates is problematising.  It is possible 
that Socrates and Plato do not believe Cebes’ positive reply to be true.  We should 
believe Cebes’ reply because, as Rowe states, the composition of ‘part body, part soul’ 
has been assumed since 64c due to the definition of the death event as the separation of 
soul from body (1993: 185).  Therefore by asking this question explicitly now, Socrates 
may be suggesting a new idea: that whereas ‘we’, in actuality, are human now, ‘we’ are 
not ultimately human.  Human existence is unsatisfactory for Plato and Socrates.  As 
human beings ‘You and I are composites’ (Harte, 2002: 8).  Therefore if we as a human 
are ‘part body, part soul’, then we are ‘inconstant and variable’, being a ‘composite’ of 
two parts.  That means that we as embodied humans ‘are never free from variation’ 
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(78e).  Humans exist in the realm of soul and body, i.e. the fluctuating and variable 
sensory world.
79
 
 But this suggestion remains implicit, since Socrates does not explicitly enquire 
about the nature of human composition at this point in the discussion.  This section 
rather analyses the distinction between soul and body as separate entities.  Nevertheless, 
being alert to Socrates’ argument throughout Phaedo, Socrates is making clear here at 
79b that, although now human and made from two parts, I am the soul, i.e. I should be 
concerned with being a person, not a human being.  Thus, whilst a soul is in our human 
charge, we should help prepare the soul for its future disembodied existence.  This is 
achieved by associating more with the intellect than with our body in the here and now 
(79d-81a). 
 Both soul and body have distinct separable natures: ‘soul is more similar than 
body to the invisible, whereas body is more similar to that which is seen’ (ὁμοιότερον 
ἄρα ψυχὴ σώματός ἐστιν τῷ ἀιδεῖ, τὸ δὲ τῷ ὁρατῷ) (79b16-17).80  What is ‘always 
constant and invariable is incomposite, and what is inconstant and variable is 
composite’ (78c6-8).  Furthermore, things put together by parts are more liable to 
division ‘where it was put together’; as opposed to something without divisible parts 
that ‘is not affected in this way’ (78c-4).81  Therefore, within the composite bodily 
world of sense perception (soul and body), stability is in short supply. The idea of a 
human composition fits into Socrates’ duality.  As Rowe states, the soul has a 
‘potentiality to achieve a godlike rationality’ that is opposed to ‘what it is forced to be 
by its conjunction with a body’ (1993: 9).  Therefore, a potential or ideal for a soul to 
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 I hold this to be true even when engaged in internal intellectual meditation.  One reasons within a 
spatial body.  One is aware of thinking here and not somewhere external.  
80
 Translation Gallop, 1975. 
81
 This argument disproves the continuation of human beings, which should not be a surprise, given 
Socrates’ definition of the death event. 
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reach, Rowe’s ‘godlike rationality’, is a process of upward purification.82  But there also 
exists an actuality, where the soul associates with a body within the human sphere of 
sense perception, i.e. the variable world.     
 There is then a clear and tangible difference between soul and body.  But the 
interplay between the two parts within embodied human form is complex.  Importantly, 
body and soul come into contact as ‘human nature’.  To be human for Socrates, or at 
least for his interlocutors, is to be ‘part body, part soul’.  Therefore, human nature is 
highly changeable, but with potential inner stability achieved through the exercise of 
reason.  At birth, the immortal, previously pure, soul becomes embodied, forgets the 
knowledge of the Forms through sense perception, becomes ‘confused and dizzy’ and 
‘loses its way’ within the ‘realm of the variable’ (79c6-8).  Therefore, embodiment and 
human existence present real dangers for a soul.  Human nature is embodied, but a 
soul’s true nature is disembodied.       
 Within one’s human nature Socrates presents a dichotomy between the soul and 
the bodily (80b-5): 
 τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιαλύτῳ καὶ ἀεὶ 
 ὡσαύτως κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον εἶναι ψυχή, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ 
 θνητῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνοήτῳ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδέποτε [5] κατὰ ταὐτὰ 
 ἔχοντι ἑαυτῷ ὁμοιότατον αὖ εἶναι σῶμα. 
 The soul is most like that which is divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, 
 indissoluble, and ever self-consistent and invariable, whereas body is most like 
 that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, dissoluble, and never 
 self-consistent. 
The statement is the culmination so far of the Socratic argument concerning the 
distinction between body and soul.  There is nothing regarding body and soul that is 
extraordinary or contrary to what one would expect within a Platonic framework of 
thought.  However, there is something shocking when the ideas here are combined with 
Socrates’ account of ‘human nature’: ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή 
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 See Chapter 1. 
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(79b-2).  Human nature is ‘part body, part soul’.  At 80b3 Socrates further states that it 
is the body that is most like that which is  ‘human’ (ἀνθρωπίνῳ) (80b3), i.e. the body is 
the most human characteristic.  As one examines the remaining features that are likened 
to human nature, one does not feel exceptionally confident about immortality at all: the 
body is most like that which is ‘mortal, multiform, unintelligible, dissoluble and never 
self-consistent’.  If human nature is body and soul then it is true that we as humans are 
‘multiform’ and ‘dissoluble’.  The striking conclusion is that soul for Socrates is not 
very human at all.  Indeed, since consciousness is not specifically human, a person is 
not human.  In a soul’s purest form it is most like the incomposite and the things that are 
incomposite, i.e. Forms.  No wonder Socrates’ interlocutors still fear death, for Socrates 
has described the human part as the part that dies.  They are not reassured by the 
continuity of the soul because they understand themselves as human, i.e. they identify 
with the composite which is extinguished by death.  Socrates argues for why we are not 
human but his interlocutors fail to grasp his argument. The implication in Socrates’ 
argument in Phaedo is that there is a distinction between persons—as conscious souls—
and humans.  
 Plato discusses the relationship between parts and wholes and how this affects 
the identity of a thing or substance.
83
  Human nature is fundamentally made of two 
parts: ‘part body, and part soul’ (Phd. 79b).84  An individual human is a temporary 
union of soul and body.  It is an entity constantly changing.  It remains organised 
through one life, but separates from the body at death, with one part continuing and the 
other part ceasing.  Therefore, according to Locke’s criterion, the human animal ceases, 
i.e. the organization has separated.  Therefore, after death the individual is no longer the 
human animal, but is the conscious soul.  Let us now see if the conscious soul can be a 
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 In the Theaetetus, Socrates states that a wagon’s nature is made of its ‘wheels, axle, body, rails, yoke’ 
(207a).  And to understand a wagon fully one must go ‘right through the thing element by element’ (Tht. 
207b).  If one must go through a ‘thing element by element’ what are the constituent parts of a human?   
84
 Or translated by E.E. Pender as: something of us is body, something of us is soul.  
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forensic person in Locke’s terms, hence solving the problem of moral accountability in 
Phaedo. 
3.2.2 Soul as Person in a Loose Sense of Lockean Memory 
 In Plato is it possible to imagine personal existence without a body?  For clarity, 
I take ‘Person’ to refer to Locke’s definition of continuing consciousness with memory.  
I wish to show why Plato’s person can be Lockean in a loose sense, through the idea of 
soul as consciousness.  This is in preparation for the succeeding demonstration (3.2.3) 
of why Plato’s person cannot be Lockean in a strict sense, i.e. with memory of its 
personal experiences, as the Theory of Recollection does not satisfy Locke’s criteria.   
 Robinson believes that when Socrates says ‘our souls do exist in the other 
world’ this ‘can only mean individual survival’ (1995: 26).  Furthermore, Robinson 
categorically states that a ‘person is definitely not the body’ (1995: 33).  Robinson 
assumes that the individuality that survives is us.  But Plato, through Socrates, suggests 
that we, although human now, need not be human before and after embodiment.  Stating 
that an individual soul had intelligence and a pre-embodied existence is not necessarily 
the same as saying that I had a previous existence as a disembodied soul; since that 
depends on what the I is, person or human.  As Robinson suggests, the ‘true person is 
the soul: the body is a necessary evil’ (1995: 33).  Therefore, by using Locke’s human 
and person distinction we can clarify that for Plato there is a human animal, but the 
person—as soul—is also distinct from that animal.    
 According to Locke what would make Plato’s soul a person would be the 
continuation of intelligent consciousness.  This idea is presented in Phaedo in the 
Cyclical Argument and in the Theory of Recollection.  There is a distinction for 
Socrates between the embodied human now and the disembodied soul then.  But is that 
the same as saying there is a human and a person, with the latter existing before the 
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former’s birth?  The human composite cannot exist independently of the soul, and it is 
the soul that brings consciousness, existing before the human composite.   
 For Gerson, Plato’s ‘person is a soul and a human being is a composite soul and 
body’ (2003: 2).  Gerson suggests that ‘we’ are not human beings (2003: 2/3).  The 
person we are now is connected to, but at the same time is not, the ideal achievement 
possible (Gerson, 2003: 3).  Personhood is for Plato an ideal, a goal for realisation.  
Perhaps as Dennett suggests, we should not be concerned with being human, but only 
with being a person.  For, according to the Cyclical Argument, it is the conscious 
intellect that carries on as soul.  Therefore, if anything in Phaedo is to be called a 
person, on Locke’s terms, at this point in the argument the intellect has the best claim, 
and for Plato that is soul as rational.   
 Gerson correctly states that the ‘proofs for the soul’s immortality, which 
includes the Cyclical Argument, provide the context and the justification for 
distinguishing persons and human beings’ (2003: 50).  Long, however, comments on the 
illogicality of stating that a human being has a body and a person (2005: 176).  But is 
this illogical? Even when one agrees that for Plato personhood rests on soul, i.e. on 
Locke’s continued consciousness, there is still a human now that interacts with the 
sensory world.  Indeed, Locke does not deny this; nor does Plato.   
 The Theory of Recollection is important in understanding the consciousness of a 
soul before embodiment, and provides an insight into the nature of personhood in 
Phaedo.  It becomes clearer that Plato is talking about soul only, and not the human, and 
often in an idealised sense.  We understand ourselves better once we realise our own 
disembodied personhood, liberating us from the desire and misinformed need for bodily 
life.  Therefore, Plato encourages us to split the human animal and the conscious person. 
The Cyclical Argument described how the ‘living have come from the dead no less than 
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the dead from the living’ (72a4-6).  The statement seems to require a transmigrating 
soul (Morgan, 2000: 195).  This means that, ‘the souls of the dead must exist in some 
place from which they are reborn’ (72a6-8). The view that ‘learning is really just 
recollection’ (72e6) depends on the idea of the pre-existence of a conscious soul before 
human life.  Socrates clarifies that to recollect ‘we must have learned at some time 
before’, and that this ‘is impossible unless our souls existed somewhere before they 
entered this human shape’ (τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ ἦν που ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχὴ πρὶν ἐν τῷδε 
τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει γενέσθαι) (72e7-73a2).  A better translation is Gallop’s, ‘before 
being born in this human form’. In the myth it is said that the soul carries intellect, 
consciousness, and knowledge with it as it travels through a cycle of rebirth (107d).   
The soul existed before becoming this human form; and since it carried things with it, 
there is a causal line linking past and future states of consciousness.  It therefore makes 
sense within Plato’s framework to call the soul a person, and distinguish it from the 
human composition.  Therefore, the Theory of Recollection presents an insight into the 
soul’s consciousness, an idea which Locke’s idea of personhood illuminates in a loose 
sense. 
3.2.3 The Problem of Soul as Person in a Strict Sense of Lockean Memory 
 But Locke in a strict sense places great importance on personal memory.  Plato 
in Phaedo links memory with moral accountability, using memory of consciousness in a 
loose sense. But, as I shall show, this does not satisfy Locke’s criterion for moral 
accountability.  
 Immortal souls allow recollection, i.e. the exercise of memory stretching back 
before this life.  Such a causal line of consciousness is very important in Locke’s 
personhood.  Speaking of losing and regaining memories of knowledge Socrates says 
(75e2-6):  
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 εἰ δέ γε οἶμαι λαβόντες πρὶν γενέσθαι γιγνόμενοι ἀπωλέσαμεν, ὕστερον δὲ ταῖς 
 αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι περὶ αὐτὰ ἐκείνας ἀναλαμβάνομεν τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἅς ποτε 
 καὶ πρὶν [5] εἴχομεν, ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὃ καλοῦμεν μανθάνειν οἰκείαν ἂν ἐπιστήμην 
 ἀναλαμβάνειν  εἴη;  
  
 But on the other hand, I suppose that if, having got them before birth, we lost 
 them on being born, and later on, using the senses about the things in question, 
 we regain those pieces of knowledge that we possessed at some former time, in 
 that case wouldn’t what we call ‘learning’ be the regaining of knowledge 
 belonging to us? (tr. Gallop, 1975) 
Socrates considers the possibility that ‘we acquired our knowledge before our births, 
and lost it at the moment of birth’ (75e2-3).  Thus the process called ‘learning’ is simply 
the ‘recovery of our own knowledge’ (75e5-6). Memories, although forgettable, are 
retrievable; the souls carry pieces of knowledge from the pre-human to the human life.   
 But Plato’s Theory of Recollection does not amount to Locke’s idea of forensic 
personhood based on memory for moral concern.  After all, Platonic Recollection is not 
the soul remembering its own past actions but abstract universal concepts within the 
universe.  This is not necessarily personal memory.  As a result Plato’s Theory of 
Recollection in Phaedo is not explicitly committed to the conscious awareness of 
previous actions across re-embodiments.  Thereby the Theory of Recollection does not 
provide valid grounds for previous or future concern, in Lockean terms.     
 Socrates suggests a disembodied existence of the soul, in which the soul’s pre-
embodied existence ‘had intelligence’ (76c12-13).  The soul carries this intelligence 
through its lives, thereby linking consciousness and memory; but where the 
consciousness can be of a personal type, the memory is not presented as of a personal 
history.  The soul’s knowledge is intelligible, not sensory.  A purified and disembodied 
soul has intelligible knowledge but forgets due to its association with a body.
85
  Socrates 
adheres firmly to the belief that the exact process of embodiment, i.e. a soul coming into 
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 Compare to Republic Myth of Er 621a-b.  There is an ambiguity in Plato whether the soul forgets or the 
human forgets.  But according to Phaedo the human never directly ‘saw’/realised the knowledge.  The 
human only has indirectly acquired knowledge through its soul part.  
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contact with a body, makes a soul forget (76c6-7).  Socrates reinforces the idea that soul 
has/is conscious, has specific knowledge, which it forgets,  but still has a continuous 
causal line of consciousness.   
 For Plato, the distinction between human and person is complex and blurry. 
After death as an event, the soul can retain memories of its human life for a period, even 
though the body is gone and the human composition has separated. At the opening of 
the myth Socrates states on the soul: ‘For it takes nothing with it to the next world 
(Ἅιδου) except its education (παιδείας) and training (τροφῆς)’ (107d2-5):  
 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔχουσα εἰς Ἅιδου ἡ ψυχὴ ἔρχεται πλὴν τῆς παιδείας τε καὶ 
 τροφῆς, ἃ δὴ καὶ μέγιστα λέγεται ὠφελεῖν ἢ βλάπτειν τὸν τελευτήσαντα εὐθὺς 
 ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς ἐκεῖσε πορείας.   
 For the soul enters Hades taking nothing else but its education and nurture, 
 which are, indeed, said to do the greatest benefit or harm to the one who has 
 died, at the very outset of his journey yonder. (tr. Gallop, 1975). 
There is a distinction, yet a connection, between the soul that has learned as an 
embodied human, and the physically dead human.  The soul as consciousness takes 
something with it after death, but can these be called memories?  Perhaps this is, at best, 
only a very limited kind of memory. 
 Given Socrates’ statement at 107d regarding παιδείας τε καὶ τροφῆς—‘education 
and nurture’—continuing with the soul, there is a continuity of consciousness.  Annas 
states that ‘nothing in the Phaedo suggests that there is continuity of consciousness 
between reincarnations’ and expresses a concern regarding the unavailability of ‘the 
experiences of different incarnations’ to ‘the same self’ (1982: 129).  Rowe agrees that 
there is no ‘continuity of consciousness between one period of incarnation and another’ 
(1993: 9).  But can a continuity of consciousness be seen as coming from the 
numerically identical soul, with its ‘education and nurture’?  The soul continues, and the 
soul is conscious, intelligent, and has knowledge.  The numerically identical soul is 
alive after death and engaging with other souls: disembodied souls are conscious 
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throughout the myth of Phaedo.  The soul after death is numerically the same soul that 
was previously embodied, and it is the same soul that becomes embodied once more, 
unless it escapes the cycle of rebirth.  But here is where Annas and Rowe find difficulty 
with Plato.  It is clear that Socrates believes in continuity, at least with regards to 
‘education and training’ (107d), intellect (Cyclical Argument), and knowledge (Theory 
of Recollection) in this life.  But the position on the soul’s memory is harder to establish 
through re-embodiments.  It is unclear how far ‘education and training’ can be 
moralised. 
 Locke’s distinction between a human and a person is useful because just as a 
person can have many bodies, so too can a soul.  And that is not the same as saying a 
soul has many persons.  But on strict Lockean terms, if the soul does not remember, if it 
has no memory of its previous lives, then the soul is not the same person.  And if the 
soul is not the same person, then according to Locke, it does not retain moral 
accountability.  Is this a problem still for Plato?  If we take the immortal soul in Phaedo 
as lacking personal memory across incarnations, then in a Lockean sense, yes it remains 
a problem.  This is because, although the soul has a continuous consciousness, the fact 
that it cannot retain personal memories means that it cannot maintain concern for its 
future and past embodiments.  As a result, moral accountability in Plato’s Phaedo 
remains a problem.   
 But is memory a problem for Plato as it is for Locke?  The Theory of 
Recollection seems to use a non-personal form of memory, thereby not providing a 
Lockean type of memory and there is nothing else in Phaedo that suggests memory of 
previous lives and personal experiences.  But is it possible to remove Locke’s stringent 
need for memory as the basis for moral concern and still retain moral accountability in 
Phaedo?  
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 I suggest that Plato, unlike Locke, does not place too much importance on 
memory for the continuation of persons.  In Plato’s Phaedo moral accountability 
depends on continuation of consciousness, not memory.  And there is continuity of 
consciousness in Phaedo through the soul.  While that consciousness does change 
across incarnations, change does not rule out ‘continuity’.  Locke’s forensic account of 
memory helps to clarify a single t1 to t2 relation, but in Plato, as the soul’s rebirth cycle 
continues to t3 and to t4, such memory is lost. Hence, Locke’s view of memory does not 
solve Plato’s problem of moral accountability.  
 In conclusion, Socrates the person is his rational soul: ‘when I am dead I shall 
not stay, but depart and be gone’ (115e).  Socrates the person has continuation of 
consciousness.  Inwood states how Socrates’ soul ‘is after all very different from 
Socrates’ the individual who is embodied (Inwood, 2009: 33).  Through my use of the 
Lockean framework I can clarify that Socrates’ soul is a person and that is very different 
from Socrates the human animal.  And what Plato wants us to be concerned about is the 
person, i.e. the soul, and not the human animal.  For Plato, the soul is a person, but not a 
fixed person; instead, a Platonic soul can be seen as similar to Locke’s causal 
consciousness but without the necessity of continuing personal memory.  The lack of 
continuing memory means that the Lockean framework has not solved the problem of 
moral accountability in Phaedo, for Plato’s soul can be viewed as a person, but not a 
forensic person.     
 The soul as a person, in a strict Lockean sense, does not solve the problem of 
moral accountability across incarnations.  This is due to Locke’s insistence on memory.  
Plato’s soul cannot adequately remember its past knowledge and seems not to 
remember its past lives and, therefore, is not Locke’s forensic person.  However, 
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Locke’s idea of personhood has produced useful insights helping us to notice the soul as 
a conscious person.   
Conclusion 
 By using Locke’s ideas I have clarified the distinction in Plato between the 
human animal and the person (Chapter 3). But the problem of moral accountability in 
Phaedo was not solved by implementing Locke’s ideas on the forensic person, due to 
the importance he places on remembering past actions as the chief cause for concern for 
the future.  In Chapter 4 I will present an alternative theory of a morally accountable 
person without Locke’s need for memory, by using instead the idea of ancestral 
relations.  My aim is to solve the problem of moral accountability in Phaedo by 
emphasising the continuity of consciousness.  I suggest that divorcing the human being 
from forensic responsibility, as Locke suggests, is of paramount importance also to 
Plato.  But where Locke retains a problematic view of personhood due to memory, Plato 
can admit the redundancy of memory whilst retaining moral accountability. Therefore, I 
look at Plato without Locke in Chapter 4. 
 The solution to the problem of moral accountability in Phaedo is the ancestral 
relation.  This has been suggested through the Lockean tradition, as seen in 3.1.7, but in 
Chapter 4 I offer a working and practical model as used in the Buddhist text 
Milindapañha instead of a merely theoretical solution.  I am thus putting the term 
‘ancestral relation’ into the Buddhist context, alongside the similar Buddhist term of 
‘dependent origination’.  The ancestral relation or dependent origination, as I will show, 
is at the heart of Buddhist ethics, and can also be usefully applied to Plato’s soul in 
Phaedo. You are the inheritor of previous conscious actions because this consciousness 
now is the inheritor of that previous consciousness then, i.e. the consciousness of X and 
Y are linked through a causally dependent line continuing across rebirths.  
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 In Chapter 4 I examine the Milindapañha within the Lockean framework in 
order to ground the Buddhist text in the terminological framework of the discussion so 
far. By the end of Chapter 4 I will have offered conclusions on how Shared Concerns, 
when combined in a specific methodology, can offer solutions to specific problems 
(Claim 2), namely those of identity and moral accountability in Phaedo. 
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 Chapter 4: Milindapañha and Phaedo 
Introduction 
 There are specific reasons for moving away from the Lockean tradition and 
towards the Buddhist tradition as a means to interpret Plato’s account of immortal soul 
and identity in Phaedo.  The first is Milindapañha’s practical usefulness.  This cultural 
text provides a working model of a philosophy which has had to deal with issues of 
moral accountability and continuity between embodiments. The second reason is the 
usefulness of analysing two cultural texts specifically dealing with the issue of rebirth. 
Locke and the extended Lockean tradition worked within a Christian cultural setting.  
Locke spoke of continuing identity, but not specifically within a tradition of rebirth in 
different bodies.  I have highlighted ethical problems that require solving in Phaedo and 
I will now show how using the Milindapañha with its developed philosophy offers 
possible solutions for the Platonic problems.    
 Even the smallest shift in understanding can have large implications.  Using the 
Lockean tradition that emphasises continuity of consciousness and forensic 
responsibility over and above an idea of an unchanging person has helped to clarify 
Platonic forensics.  The emphasis in Buddhism, in contrast, is on continuity through 
sequential change, drawing on the idea of an ancestral relation.  Applying the idea of an 
ancestral relation that retains moral continuation to Plato shows how Plato’s soul retains 
moral continuity, even if one challenges the continuation of a numerically identical 
person. Plato’s main issue is answering why I now should be concerned for the fate of 
my soul later.   
   For clarity of expression and terminology I firstly bring the Milindapañha into 
the Lockean framework.  Using Locke’s differentiation between human animal and 
person, I show what the Milindapañha believes about humans and persons, as well as 
about forensic accountability.  I claim that the Milindapañha retains moral 
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accountability without the need for Locke’s ideas on memory as necessary for concern 
about a future self.   
4.1 Buddhist Ideas Within the Lockean Framework  
 I start by analysing the relevant Buddhist ideas within the Lockean framework 
(4.1).  The issues are the human animal (4.1.1), the soul (4.1.2), the person (4.1.3), the 
ancestral relation (4.1.4), and forensics (4.1.5).  Once I have grounded the Buddhist 
ideas expressed in Milindapañha within the Lockean framework, I then move on to 
show how reading the Buddhist text alongside Phaedo can solve the Platonic problem 
of moral accountability via the idea of ancestral relation (4.2).  
4.1.1 Human Animal 
 In Milindapañha the venerable Nāgasena is asked by the King ‘How is Your 
Reverence known, and what is your name, sir?’ (II.1.25.1); to which Nāgasena replies: 
 I am known as Nāgasena, O king, and it is by that name that my brethren in the 
 faith address me.  But although parents, O king, give such a name as 
 Nāgasena...yet this, Sire, - Nāgasena and so on – is only a generally understood 
 term, a designation in common use.  For there is no permanent individuality 
 involved in the matter.
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This passage is extremely important.  Rhys Davids translates Na puggalo upalabbhati 
as ‘no permanent individuality’.  Instead I use the term ‘no person’, as ‘person’ 
(puggalo) is better than Rhys Davids’ ‘individuality’.  Nāgasena rejects any notion of a 
person existing in the ultimate sense (Giles, 1993: 187).  This means that there is ‘no 
permanent, metaphysical Self [that] can be found in personality’ (Harvey, 1995: 7).  The 
King is astounded, and Milinda proclaims ‘this Nāgasena says there is no permanent 
person implied in his name.  Is it now even possible to approve him in that?’ (II.1.25.1).   
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 All translations are by Rhys Davids.  In his translation Rhys Davids provides the bracketed ‘no soul’ 
after ‘individuality’.  I have left Rhys Davids’ inference out from my quotation hoping to avoid 
prejudging the unfolding argument.  
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 To understand what it is Nāgasena means, i.e. that there is no permanence, 
Milinda attempts to locate the part of Nāgasena that is Nāgasena.  Milinda starts by 
asking whether the individual bodily characteristics are Nāgasena, i.e. Nāgasena’s hair 
(II.1.26.1).  However, Nāgasena is not the individual bodily features seen before the 
King.  Milinda asks about the individual components (Skandhas) of character 
(II.1.26.1):  
 Is it the outward form (Rūpa) then that is Nāgasena, or the sensations (Vedanā), 
 or the  ideas (Saññā), or the confections (Saṃkhāra), or the consciousness 
 (Vigññāṇa), that is Nāgasena?   
These five Skandhas include the physical and mental constituents that comprise a 
human being in the Milindapañha (Rhys Davids, 1890: fn 42:3).  To further convey this 
position Nāgasena implements what is known as ‘The Chariot Simile’.  
 The simile attempts to locate the fixed aspect that can be called chariot.  It starts 
with a request from Nāgasena to King Milinda: ‘please explain to me what that (chariot) 
is’ (II.1.27.1).  Nāgasena asks ‘Is it the pole that is the chariot?’, to which Milinda 
replies ‘I did not say that’.  Then what part is the chariot (II.1.27.1): 
 Is it the wheels, or the framework, or the ropes, or the yoke, or the spokes of the 
 wheels, or the goad, that are the chariot?     
To ‘all these he [Milinda] still answered no’.  The chariot is not any individual 
component part.  But is a chariot ‘all these parts’ in combination?  What makes a 
combination a chariot and not simply a collection of parts?   
 The simile employs the same logic as in the case of the individual, starting with 
individual parts, moving to a combination of parts, and finishing ‘outside’ the parts.  
Milinda realising that the chariot is not ‘outside’ the combination of its parts is beaten 
and Nāgasena declares ‘I can discover no chariot’ (II.1.27.1).  The irony is that Milinda 
arrived in a physical chariot, but now concedes that the chariot does not exist.  
Nāgasena concludes that (II.1.27.1):  
142 
 
 It is on account of its having all these things - the pole, and the axle, the wheels, 
 and the framework, the ropes, the yoke, the spokes, and the goad – that it comes 
 under the generally understood term, the designation in common use, of 
 ‘chariot’.   
Both conclude that the chariot is equivalent to no permanent person, but ‘chariot’ is 
instead a ‘generally understood term’ lacking permanence.  That is the discussion; the 
logic needs to be examined. The first examination regards the chariot as individual 
parts, then as a combination, and finally as an entity ‘outside’ the combination. 
Nāgasena concludes that it is a ‘generally understood term...on account of’ its parts. 
Therefore, the combination of parts gives rise to the term. As a result, the term is 
dependent on the combination of parts.
87
             
 Picturing a chariot, one can see that it moves spatially as a single object.  But the 
unity of the chariot is not very strong. The wheel is a wheel regardless of its attachment 
to a chariot. Moreover, a wheel remains distinct whether it is on a chariot, plane, or car.  
One can go through every individual part of the chariot with certainty that none of these 
parts individually is what one would call chariot.  If one was asked to point to a chariot 
one could point to the combination that is present. Therefore, why is a chariot not the 
combination of all its parts, as Nāgasena suggests? A chariot is made when certain parts 
are brought together. The clearest explanation, and one that fits into the overall 
argument of Milindapañha, is that simply bringing all these individual parts into the 
same place does not make a chariot. These parts have to be put in a specific order, to 
make a chariot function properly. Therefore, a chariot requires a complex ordering of 
parts. However, even with its complex ordering, a chariot is still an impermanent 
combination, as it is loosely held together, with the parts easily detachable.  It does not 
matter how well put together a thing is: using better bolts or welding equipment would 
not help because even in combination there is no chariot.  It is on account of the 
combination that we use the term ‘chariot’.  
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 To further the claim that a chariot is an organized combination of parts, one can 
examine what happens when the chariot stops working. Although an individual part is 
broken or damaged, by a figure of speech we say that ‘the chariot’ is broken. Yet, it is 
true that through the breaking of an individual part the combination is damaged.  For 
when one of these carefully ordered parts breaks, other parts may not be broken, but the 
combination overall fails to achieve its function. The next step will be to locate which 
part has broken and fix that one part. Therefore, because of this relation, it seems that 
one cannot fully distinguish the chariot from the parts.   
 Is a chariot, therefore, reduced to its parts?  Sorabji states that ‘it cannot be said 
that the chariot is nothing but its parts’, as the ‘structure and function of the chariot is 
something extremely important, which does not belong to the parts’ (2006: 285).  
Indeed there is no chariot to have possession of the parts.  Ascribing the ‘function of the 
chariot’ based on a fundamental movement of some sort, there is one error.88  The 
chariot itself is devoid of movement.  It requires something living to make it move, i.e. 
a horse.  There is also something more with regards to Sorabji’s use of the phrase 
‘belong to the parts’.  Nāgasena would deny that anything ‘belongs to’ the parts.  It is 
the unity of each individual part, each working towards its individual goal, that makes 
the chariot function.  Granted there is a distinction between the function of a chariot, 
and the functioning of individual parts.  The function of the chariot, whatever we call 
that, ‘does not belong to the parts’, but a functioning chariot is intricately dependent on 
those parts all fulfilling their individual goals.  The identity of a chariot appears 
dependent on parts, which, in turn, are dependent on an overall purpose each fulfilling 
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 Granted one may wish to postulate a function of a chariot not based on movement, i.e. a passive 
potentiality to be moved in some specifiable way.  
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their own goal. Therefore, a chariot is not the sum of its parts,
89
 as parts are all there is 
physically.  But the parts are greater together than individually.    
 Therefore, all that is left to conclude is whether Nāgasena is correct in 
postulating that ‘no person’ exists ‘outside’ the combination of parts.  Do these parts 
create a new whole, an independent object?  By the very nature of how one assembles a 
chariot, it remains composite. The chariot may appear to be a whole, but it is very easy 
to start taking individual parts away from that perceived whole until all that is left is a 
set of individual parts, i.e. the five Skandhas.  Furthermore, how many parts must one 
remove before the combination stops being a chariot; as many that are non-essential to 
functioning?  If the chariot was made to float and move through water with very few 
alterations, then could this chariot become a ‘boat’?  Does it matter what we call it?  For 
Nāgasena a chariot or a person is simply a designation dependent on functioning 
individual parts working together providing individual functions; they remain 
conventional names empty of substantial value.  A combination of parts does not make a 
chariot, but we term the combination ‘chariot’.  One concludes that Nāgasena is 
correct—‘I can discover no chariot’ that has something akin to a ‘permanent person’.  
The designation of a whole is not false, but a belief that the designation relates to a 
permanent combination is fictitious. There is no fixed chariot; but empirically there is a 
combination.  As Milinda concluded, the chariot is a mere name given to a collection of 
individual parts working as a whole.  Such a designation is dependent on ‘all’ of its 
individual parts, all in the correct order, and  all serving their correct function.  But there 
are only individual parts functioning together.  This is what one perceives a chariot to 
be. 
 Applying the Chariot Simile to a human being, the King can ‘discover no 
Nāgasena’.  Like the chariot, the individual is dependent on its parts.  It is in 
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dependence on ‘the thirty-two kinds of organic matter in a human body, and the five 
constituent elements of being [the five Skandhas], - that I come under the generally 
understood term, the designation in common use, of Nāgasena’ (II.1.28.1).  The 
designation Nāgasena is ‘dependent on’ each personality factor, that, like chariot parts, 
must be rightly set and functioning properly (Harvey, 1995: 36).  The five Skandhas are 
the constituent parts of a human; they are connected through causality (Kalupahana, 
1976: 39); they are ‘elementary and fleeting constituents, which succeed each other to 
form streams’ (Sorabji, 2006: 280); and they do not possess a self or soul (Ghose, 2007: 
261).  The combination is not static but gives rise to the different states in succession.  
Sorabji is correct that ‘the chariot is a construct that depends on its most basic 
constituents...so the self is a construct that depends on its most basic constituents’ 
(2006: 280).  But there is ‘no permanent person’ apprehended within or outside those 
parts.  Milindapañha is clear that there is dependence and causality, but no ātman, no 
immortal unchanging person, just the human animal (II.1.28.1):  
 Just as it is by the condition precedent of the co-existence of its various parts 
 that the word ‘chariot’ is used, just so is it that when the Skandhas are there we 
 talk of a ‘being’. 
Importantly, there is a ‘co-existence’ of individual parts: chariot or person.  It is this 
‘co-existence’ that makes a person dependent on individual parts.  Crucially though, we 
are the co-existing individual parts.  That is all there is.  And, for our identity, the 
arrangement makes all the difference (Sorabji, 2006: 285).  The failure is to assume that 
these terms denote permanent persons.  The ‘person’ is an aggregation dependent on the 
five Skandhas (Giles, 1993: 196).  We are a causal collection of experiences (Giles, 
1993: 197).  There is a difference between an ‘outside’ Metaphysical Self and a 
fluctuating empirical self (Harvey, 1995: 17); or what Perez-Remon terms the 
ontological metaphysical self and the existential empirical self (1980: 11).
90
  The 
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empirical self exists as a changing flow of mental and physical states (Harvey, 1995: 
33).  An identity is ‘personality as a flux of causally-related states’ (Harvey, 1995: 65); 
within the boundaries of the constituent parts.  Nothing exists ‘outside’ the combination 
of parts; or hidden within.  Therefore, a permanent Metaphysical Person is denied, but 
an empirical changeable identity is accepted existing as a human, i.e. the five Skandhas.  
Hence, there is no permanent person, only an identity dependent on the parts.     
4.1.2 The Soul 
 In Milindapañha a soul is discussed but its existence is denied.  Milinda has 
differing conceptions of soul within the dialogue.  The two concepts in Milindapañha 
are: the soul as ‘the inner breath’ (II.1.4.30) and the ‘living principle within’ the body 
(Abbhantare gîvo) (II.3.6.54).  A soul can be distinct from a body and seen as a viewer 
of external reality, like a person looking out of palace windows (II.3.6.54; III.7.15.87).
91
  
This self looks at the world through the senses like different windows in a room 
(Ganeri, 2007: 194).  The soul exists within a human but at the same time is removed.  
For this reason, soul in Indian thought is viewed as the permanent person that remains 
unchanged through changing parts.  Throughout the dialogue Milinda asks about the 
existence of a soul and Nāgasena repeatedly replies that a soul does not exist.92  Plato 
relies on the concept of soul for his ideas of consciousness and ethics.  Even though 
Locke does not explicitly deny the soul’s existence, he relegates it to being 
meaninglessness for identity.  Therefore, Nāgasena’s denial of a soul is closer to 
Locke’s account than to Plato’s.   
4.1.3 The Person 
 I use the Buddhist idea of a causally continuous, yet impermanent, 
consciousness as the alternative to Locke’s person who requires perfect memory recall 
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to ensure moral responsibility.  Siderits, Sorabji and Harvey retain the idea of a 
reductionist self as an empirical stream of mental and physical states in Buddhism 
(1997; 2006: 279; 1995: 33).  Alternatively, Giles differentiates between a reductionist 
and a no-self theory, stating that ‘the no-self theory is an eliminative rather than a 
reductive theory of personal identity’ (1993: 175).  One seeks to reduce the self to a 
stream of causally conditioned events; the other eliminates the notion of self.  Sorabji 
believes that the famous Buddhist interpreter Vasubandhu ‘seems to waver somewhat 
between reducing and eliminating the self’ (2006: 279).  The not-self theory is an-
ātman, Nagasena’s ‘no person’.  The reductionist theory of not-self will be used instead 
of the eliminative interpretation in this discussion because Plato has a very clear idea of 
self as soul.  Therefore, to eliminate the self entirely will not produce a fruitful 
comparative dialogue between the two texts, Greek and Indian.  The reductionist theory 
argues that ‘the existence of a person just is the occurrence of certain impersonal 
elements’, rejecting the idea ‘that a person is identical with a certain sum of impersonal 
elements’ (Siderits, 1997: 460).  Specifically, I will accept Harvey’s distinction between 
a metaphysical Self and an empirical self, the former denied and the latter endorsed 
(1995: 17).  Therefore, on my interpretation of Plato there is an empirical human 
individual and a causally connected conscious person, impermanent yet continuous.   
 What does the idea of ‘no person’ (Na puggalo upalabbhati) (II.1.25.1) mean for 
personhood and forensics?  As discussed in 4.1.1, Nāgasena is not the individual bodily 
features seen before the King.  Milinda therefore moves on to ask about the individual 
components of character (II.1.26.1):  
 Is it the outward form (Rūpa) then that is Nāgasena, or the sensations (Vedanā), 
 or the  ideas (Saññā), or the confections (Saṃkhāra), or the consciousness 
 (Vigññāṇa), that is Nāgasena?   
Nāgasena, as a permanent person, is not a combination of the five Skandhas: ‘is it all 
these Skandhas combined that are Nāgasena’?; the answer given by Nāgasena is ‘no’.  
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Is Nāgasena correct in positing ‘no permanent person’ in ‘a combination of the five 
Skandhas’?  Rūpa accounts for physical distinctions between individuals, with the 
possibility of distinct individuality.  But it is hard to see permanence in one’s outward 
form, except in a causally continuous way; yet continuity need not be permanent.  
Eventually, every Rūpa will cease and decay, leaving no permanence. 
 Although Rūpa individuates people rather well, it lacks permanence in the way 
Milinda hopes.  At first it appears that sensations (Vedanā) are overtly individual: no 
one else can feel the sensation arising in my body.  But still sensations are not 
permanent.  Sensations rise and fall, they differ from moment to moment and from 
situation to situation.   
 If sensations are not permanent, are ideas (Saññā) permanent?  Ideas develop 
through education and insight.  A human baby is not born with a set belief system or an 
intact foundation of ideas.
93
  One sees this empirically through a baby’s inquisitive 
nature.  A baby must learn, as an adult continues to learn.  The same development can 
be said regarding the ‘confections’ (Saṃkhāra): they are the constituent elements of 
character.  One never has a ‘permanent’ character from birth until death.  There is a 
causal line that is individual to the experience of growing older but that causal line is 
defined by change.   
 Another key aspect of the changing individual is consciousness (Vigññāṇa).  
This appears harder to grasp than the previous Skandhas.  Consciousness is not as 
heavily influenced by external environments as the previous four Skandhas.  
Consciousness may prescribe a form of personhood; indeed, Locke’s account does just 
that with memory: because I remember, these are my thoughts and not yours.  Death 
seems the best example of why consciousness may not be for Buddhists the best 
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explanation for a ‘permanent person’.  As far as modern science can postulate and the 
empirical evidence of our eyes show, one moment there is a conscious person and the 
next moment there is an inanimate body.  Consciousness can cease.  Furthermore, 
consciousness can deteriorate through life through conditions like dementia and 
amnesia.  Therefore, consciousness is a highly complex concept that cannot be 
explained assuredly; and any arguments pertaining to the permanence of consciousness 
must also suffer through the same complexity.  What matters for my study is that 
Buddhism is arguing against the idea of a stable fixed person, which Locke also does 
not endorse. The five Skandhas individually provide no basis for a permanent person.  
But why is a combination of all five Skandhas not a permanent person? 
 Nāgasena concludes that a chariot is ‘on account of its’ parts, and so too, 
identity is dependent on the parts; change the parts and the identity adapts accordingly.  
Why does Nāgasena not explicitly state that a chariot or a person is a combination of 
parts?  Sorabji questions why the argument that ‘the person might be the parts 
“combined” with physical form and other bundles’ was not finally endorsed (2006: 
285).  What motives might Nāgasena have?  The answer relates to what Nāgasena is 
attempting to prove and disprove. The discussion is concerned with Nāgasena 
explaining why ‘there is no permanent person involved in the matter’ (II.1.25.1). 
Therefore, when viewed in relation to a ‘permanent person’, it is clear why Nāgasena 
argues that a chariot or a person is not a permanent combination of parts.  There is a 
chariot, as there is a person, but nothing permanent; there is continuous, but not 
permanent, existence.  Nāgasena is arguing that there is ‘no permanent person’ within or 
outside the combination of parts.  And that is why Nāgasena’s concluding remarks echo 
the concept of a combination. It is simply that ‘on account of its’ parts a designation 
exists without a ‘permanent person’.  As a result, there is no fixed, unchanging chariot, 
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just a succession of individual parts continuously existing and each providing a function 
with a demarcating term.   
 The entity that is the sum of changeable parts must itself be changeable; for the 
sum cannot be permanent when it is created through change.  Therefore, there is no 
permanence through combination.  But that is not to say there is no individuality, 
changeable though it must be.
94
 Hence, it is important to understand what Nāgasena is 
arguing against, i.e., ātman.  Nāgasena promotes a philosophical concept of 
impermanence permeating through the world itself and persons.  The person in 
Buddhism is not a permanent essence.  But there is a continuous consciousness based on 
causality.   
4.1.4 Ancestral Relation – The Person 
 I will now show by using the ancestral relation how the term ‘person’ is a 
causally conditioned term in Buddhism, but one that retains its forensic nature.  I use 
three similes in the Buddhist text: Baby and Adult; Flame and Lamp; and Milk and 
Ghee, to explain how conscious persons are impermanent yet causally connected.  
Through these three examples it becomes clear that the Buddhist notion of a person—
continuous consciousness—can be applied to the ancestral relation presented as an 
extension to Locke’s theory of forensic persons.   
 How does the continuation through worldly impermanence work; are moments 
simply episodic, or is there a more dependent connection, like the Buddhist concept of 
momentary dharmas?  The notion of anicca includes momentary change: this change 
happens on the molecular level constantly.  I conclude that neither changing nor static 
things are important for Buddhists.  Instead what is important is the causal dependence 
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that maintains a thing through change.  The human world can be impermanent but 
cannot be random.     
A) Baby and Adult 
 Since Nāgasena denies the existence of a ‘permanent person’ and states the 
‘absence of any soul’, is a person the same or different throughout his life?  Milinda 
asks: ‘He who is born, Nāgasena, does he remain the same or become another?’ 
(II.2.1.40). Nāgasena responds that he is ‘Neither the same nor another’.  Ikeda uses the 
opposite and contradictory terms ‘neither identical nor non-identical’ (1977: 63), 
correlating with a denial of permanent identity but not of continuity, in view of the fact 
that Nāgasena believes in ‘no permanent person’, and the ‘absence of any soul’.  One 
expects Nāgasena to answer that one does not ‘remain the same’, as this conclusion 
would support his previous arguments.  However, Nāgasena recognises the causal line 
and the nature of the dependant arising.  When asked if the adult and the infant are the 
same person, Nāgasena responds in an unusual way.  The king was ‘once a baby, a 
tender thing, and small in size, lying flat on your back.  Was that the same as you who 
are now grown up?’.  To which the king answers ‘No.  That child was one, I am 
another’.  Milinda suggest that there have been two different persons; the child being 
one and now ‘another’.  Milinda supposes ‘that personal identity over time requires the 
continued existence of some one entity through the distinct stages in the life of a person’ 
(Siderits, 1997: 462); an ‘entity’ that the discussion has previously shown to be non-
existent.  Instead, Nāgasena promotes causal continuity (Kalupahana: 1976: 40).  Whilst 
there are obvious differences between infant and adult, Nāgasena wishes to emphasise 
the causal dependence between different stages of development.  The adult is dependent 
on the child; as the child is dependent on its parents before.  There is change over time. 
The king concludes that there has been enough change to warrant two distinct persons 
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along one sequential causal line; the baby then and the king now.  But Nāgasena’s 
response is different: 
 Is the mother of the baby a different person from the mother of the grown-up 
 man?  Is the person who goes to school one, and the same when he has finished 
 his schooling another?  Is it one who commits a crime, another who is punished 
 by having his hands or feet cut off? 
Milinda replies ‘Certainly not’.  Nāgasena has shown that, by Milinda’s reasoning, there 
would be ‘no mothers or fathers, no educated persons, and no one who deserves 
punishment for past crimes’ (Siderits, 1997: 462).  The discussion denies the existence 
of a new person moment to moment, a world of complete flux that would degrade 
personhood and moral responsibility to the point of absurdity.  According to Milinda’s 
initial ideas the person who goes to school is one and the person who leaves school is 
‘another’; but Nāgasena explains how the two are not independent of each other.  As 
Siderits notes, ‘those Skandhas making up the adult have as their causal antecedents the 
Skandhas that made up the infant’, providing ‘causal relations’ (1997: 462).  This is 
what I call the ancestral relation in the Milindapañha.  The connection is in the causal 
dependence, as one gives rise to another.  However, even that conclusion does not quite 
match Nāgasena’s: 
 I should say that I am the same person, now I am grown up, as I was when I was 
 a tender tiny baby, flat on my back.  For all these states are included in one by 
 means of this body.  
Nāgasena presents a spatial argument.  Throughout the time that has elapsed there has 
only ever been spatially one person; the parts may have changed but the designating 
term remains the same ‘person’.  Within this process it is possible to have many 
constructed self-images (Giles, 1993: 195).  A changing self is accepted (Harvey, 1995: 
42).  Moreover, there is only one continuous person; therefore, there can never be a 
baby and an adult person, as that would imply the end of one thing and the start of 
another.  Nāgasena is the ‘same person’ since there is ‘no person’ at either time; there 
are only changeable Skandhas.   
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 Neither the baby nor the adult have priority in terms of personhood.  Personhood 
is the changeable process typified by the expression ‘Neither the same nor another’ 
(II.2.1.40).  Change takes place along a causal line of ‘dependent origination’ 
(Pratītyasamutpāda), meaning that nothing arises except in dependence on certain 
conditions (Harvey, 1995: 5). The idea of dependent origination links well with the 
ancestral relation concept, meaning that Nāgasena, unlike Locke, does not suffer the 
same problem of Reid’s critique of Locke in the General and the young boy. Nāgasena 
concludes that ‘the continuity of a person or thing [is] maintained’ through change 
(II.2.1.40).  The continuation means that ‘neither as the same nor as another does a man 
go on’, but the two are dependent on each other.   
B) Flame and Lamp 
 The notion of dependent origination is akin to one light coming from a 
changeable flame (II.2.1.40).  Nāgasena asks the king whether a lamp that burns 
through the night remains the same throughout: 
 ‘Suppose a man, O king, were to light a lamp, would it burn the night through?’ 
 ‘Yes, it might do so.’  
 ‘Now, is it the same flame that burns in the first watch of the night, Sir, and in 
 the second?’  
 ‘No.’ 
 ‘Or the same that burns in the second and in the third?’ 
 ‘No.’ 
 ‘Then is there one lamp in the first watch, and another in the second, and another 
 in the third?’ 
 ‘No.  The light comes from the same lamp all the night through.’ 
Nāgasena and the king are referring to one night’s watch and the multiple stages of the 
one night.  Why is it not ‘the same flame that burns’?  There is no hint of it being 
extinguished; moreover, the illustration is based on the premise that one lamp can last 
an entire night.  The change is to do with the process of burning.  The flame is 
maintained by and dependent on burning oxygen and the substance of the candle or fuel 
in the lamp.  Moreover, ‘a flame is a collection of...incandescent hydro-carbon 
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molecules’, through which, ‘these entities [are] undergoing constant replacement’ 
(Siderits, 1997: 462).  The flame constantly changes because what is burning must 
constantly be renewed and destroyed.  At any given moment the flame is ‘numerically 
distinct from that which illuminates at any other moment’ (Siderits, 1997: 462).  The 
process gives the impression of one stable flame, but in reality the flame is constantly 
changing.  Therefore, there is ‘one lamp’ that the ‘light comes from...all the night 
through’, but the flame is constantly going through causally-conditioned change.  One 
may wish to conclude that there is never a flame, only a designation representing a 
combustible chemical process.  The flame is ‘on account of’ a chemical process that is 
constantly developing.  It is not an invisible chemical process, as one can see the flame, 
but the change appears invisible, for there appears to be only one flame.  The flame 
appears the same throughout the night.  It is not possible to discern when one flame 
ends or how another flame begins.  We do not say there were many distinct lights 
throughout the night (Siderits, 1997: 462-463).   
 Similarly, one does not say there were many persons throughout one life.  As 
with the lamp the causal connection of persons is complex.  There is the appearance of 
one fixed person being maintained, but in fact, there is only a causal line of dependent 
consciousness.  Nāgasena concludes: 
 Just so, O king, is the continuity of a person or thing maintained.  One comes 
 into being, another passes away; and the rebirth is, as it were, simultaneous.  
 Thus neither as the same nor as another does a man go on to the last phase of his 
 self-consciousness. 
One stage is dependent on the last.  The 4am flame has the 9pm flame as its causal 
antecedent (Siderits, 1997: 463).  The appearance seems permanent, but any 
permanence is an illusion through the changing process that remains constant and 
causally conditioned. 
C) Milk and Ghee 
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 The issue at the heart of the previous two examples concerns identity through 
time; the human that was a baby is now an adult; and the same flame burns through the 
night.  A further illustration elaborates on the issue of the progress of time (II.2.1.40-
41): 
 It [the process of time] is like milk, [41] which when once taken from the cow, 
 turns, after a lapse of time, first to curds, and then from curds to butter, and then 
 from butter to ghee.  Now would it be right to say that the milk was the same 
 thing as the curds, or the butter, or the ghee? 
The answer is neither the same nor another.  Moreover, ‘would it be right to say that the 
cow is the same as the ghee?  Is it not true that the latter comes from the former?  This 
illustration is perhaps easier to use than the previous flame analogy, for there is a clear 
and discernible process of change maintained through a causal line of dependence.  
There is a ‘lapse of time’, which is important, between the cow producing milk and the 
ghee forming.  The gradual lapse of time may mask the process of change, as it is not 
always possible to notice changes happening until there is a discernible difference.
95
   In 
the example, one can see that milk is not ghee, but during the process it is hard to 
indicate when milk turns into curds and is no longer milk.  Ghee is not milk, but neither 
is ghee independent of milk, as milk is not a cow, but comes from a cow.  One would 
not say all are the same as milk (McDermott, 1980: 167).  Change happens, but neither 
annihilation nor genesis takes place.
96
  It is as Milinda concludes: milk is not ‘the same 
thing as the curds, or the butter, or the ghee’ but ‘they are produced out of it’.  The 
impermanence of a person over time is likened by Nāgasena to a process of milk turning 
to butter.
97
  
 In conclusion milk and butter are not the same, but neither are they completely 
different.  Similarly, a baby is taken from a mother and ‘after a lapse of time’ becomes 
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 I use these terms to denote a complete cessation and a complete birth, i.e. into nothing, and from 
nothing.  
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 Perez-Remon interprets the analogy as un-Buddhist (1980: 14).  But Nāgasena employs it, and it is a 
useful analogy to depict change over time.   
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an adult.  It would be incorrect to ‘say that milk was the same thing as the curds, or the 
butter’.  However, ‘they are produced out of it’ (II.2.1.41).  The baby and adult are not 
unchanged, but neither are they completely different.  Also the flame that continually 
changes is neither the same nor different.  Identity is grounded in one causal line of 
sequential change.
98
 There are ‘enduring traces in the stream’ (Sorabji, 2006: 282), and 
in the same way, the ‘continuity of a person or a thing [is] maintained’ in an ancestral 
relation. 
4.1.5 Ancestral Relation - Forensic 
 Having seen that a person in Buddhism is a dependently originated line of 
change, akin to the process of a baby changing into an adult, a changeable flame, and 
milk turning into ghee, I now move onto the Buddhist ideas of moral accountability 
within its not-self framework.  If one is neither the same nor another, how does one 
retain moral accountability?  There is ‘special attention to reconciling the postulate of 
personal accountability with the Buddhist ‘no-self’ doctrine’ (Halbfass, 1998: vol 5. 
211).  Kalupahana recognises a possible paradox relating to moral responsibility and a 
denial of a permanent self, but believes that the paradox stems from misunderstandings 
(1976: 38).  Furthermore, Kalupahana believes that ‘no doctrine [is] more 
misunderstood and misinterpreted than this doctrine of nonsubstantiality’, this not-self 
(1976: 38).   
 Milinda wishes to understand the most important Buddhist concept of not-self 
(anattā) and its relation with moral accountability: ‘Who is it’ that ‘enjoys’, ‘lives a life 
of righteousness’, and ‘devotes himself to meditation?’ (II.1.25.1).  Milinda believes 
that if there is ‘no permanent person’ then ‘there is neither doer nor causer of good or 
evil deeds; there is neither fruit nor results of good or evil Karma’ (II.1.25.1).  The 
interplay of moral responsibility and not-self is set up by Milinda’s questions.  For 
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 McCabe states perfectly how the process of ‘growing older does not imply growing older than oneself’ 
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Milinda there cannot be action or consequence if there is no stable reference point for 
the action and consequence to attach itself to.  Conversely, Nāgasena will attempt to 
show why moral responsibility and the theory of not-self (anattā) are actually 
compatible.  Scholars either conclude that moral responsibility and not-self are not 
paradoxical (Kalupahana, 1976: 38); or they retain uncertainties regarding the lack of a 
‘doer’ with regards to reward and punishment (Sorabji, 2006: 285).  Indeed, for an 
eliminativist—where the self is denied—‘Prudential concern, hopes, fears and regrets, 
judgements of responsibility, merit, and praise and blame – all these are irrational’ 
(Siderits, 1997: 461).
99
  The fear of death in this case constitutes an attachment to an 
illusionary concept of self.  For Buddhists, a person is interested in an afterlife if they 
are attached to the present life (Kalupahana, 1976: 74).  
 The desire for continued life, the hope that it will be me now that survives, 
although natural or understandable, leads for Buddhists to further sorrow through 
rebirth.  Therefore, the Buddhist theory of not-self undercuts the desire for continued 
earthly existence and helps the cessation of sorrow.  The aim of anattā (not-self) is to 
‘reduce [the] fear of the loss of self at death, and to make us less selfish in ethical 
attitude and conduct’ now (Sorabji, 2006: 279).  Not-self promotes ethical 
responsibility, since the denial of a permanent person does not deny continuity 
(Kalupahana, 1976: 53) or, indeed, moral responsibility.   
 There is a hint of punishment in the idea of rebirth, although at no point does 
Nāgasena suggest that a being is explicitly punished for their previous actions.  The 
further illustrations Nāgasena employs, helping the king to understand the complex idea 
of rebirth based on action alone, are dependent on cause and effect (II.2.6.46):   
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 For clarity, it is my belief that the not-self doctrine and moral responsibility need not be paradoxical 
when interpreted as an empirical reductionist self though it remains a knotty concept. 
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 Suppose, O king, some man were to steal a mango from another man, and the 
 owner  of the mango were to seize him and bring him before the king, and 
 charge him with the crime.  And the thief were to say: “Your Majesty!  I have 
 not taken away this man’s mangoes.  Those that he put in the ground are 
 different from the ones I took.  I do not deserve to be punished.”  How then?  
 Would he be guilty? 
One man stole a mango from another man, stating that it was not the same mango that 
the owner had placed in the ground previously.  Evidently, the second mango is 
dependent on the first mango.  One has a mango and plants its seed in the ground, and 
by that seed another mango grows.  When the second mango was stolen, the thief 
‘would be guilty in respect of the last mango which resulted from the first’ (II.2.6.46), 
since the seed and the mango are causally connected through natural growth. In one 
sense the thief’s defence is correct, the seed planted and the fruit taken are not the same.  
But there is a causal connection that proves that the man is guilty of theft.  Just as for 
Locke, the person now and the person later are causally the same person through the 
causal connection of consciousness.  
 So far the argument is like the previous milk to butter simile: neither the mango 
nor the seed are completely the same nor are they completely separate.  However, 
Nāgasena develops the simile and argument further than the milk to butter simile by 
emphasising the causal connectedness between mango and seed through the 
employment of an ethical example, supporting causation; just as Locke bases his person 
on consciousness.  The causal connection between one state, the seed at t1, and the other 
state, the fruit at t2, affirms the guilt of the second man for stealing the first man’s fruit.  
For if a man plants a seed, that seed is connected with the resulting fruit.  In the same 
way, the deeds done by the person whilst embodied are like seeds planted that must one 
day bear fruit (III.5.9.73).  These deeds cannot be pointed out, as one cannot ‘point out 
the fruits which a tree has not yet produced’, but they ‘follow it [the person], like a 
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shadow that never leaves it’ (III.5.8.72).100  The ‘being who experiences the fruits of a 
deed in one life is neither the same as nor different from the being who performed that 
deed in a previous existence’ (McDermott, 1980: 166). So too, the guilt of a person 
resulting from the immorality of its previous embodied life requires Locke’s conscious 
connection, i.e. the same person. 
 Comparably, if a man lit a fire to keep himself warm and then went away, but 
that fire set another man’s field a light, the man who started the fire would still be 
responsible for the burning of the other man’s field, even though, as shown with the 
flame analogy, there is no one flame or fire.  The man would be guilty because it was 
‘the subsequent fire that resulted from the previous one’ (II.2.6.47).  Again, a man who 
used fire in a lamp to see but then causes an entire village to be burnt down, cannot in 
defence say that the ‘flame of the lamp...was one thing; the fire which burnt your village 
was another thing’ because ‘the one fire was produced from the other one’.  These 
illustrations are examples of how ‘the other is the result of the first’.  For Buddhism 
moral accountability is maintained through causally changing states (II.2.6.48).  Even 
with a not-self theory, Buddhism retains moral accountability through causation. 
 The third illustration used by Nāgasena to convey moral responsibility despite 
the Buddhist concept of anattā is the lighting of a lamp (III.5.5.71):   
 Suppose a man, were to light a lamp from another lamp, can it be said that the 
 one transmigrates from, or to, the other? 
‘Certainly not’ is Milinda’s reply.  Why does the flame of a lamp/candle not 
transmigrate?  One flame on a candle is used to light another candle.  A new flame is 
created that is dependent on the previous one; it is neither exactly the same nor 
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 Plato in Republic also explains how actions have specific consequences (615a4-b):  
 τὸ δ᾽ οὖν κεφάλαιον ἔφη τόδε εἶναι, ὅσα πώποτέ τινα ἠδίκησαν καὶ ὅσους ἕκαστοι, ὑπὲρ 
 ἁπάντων δίκην δεδωκέναι ἐν μέρει, ὑπὲρ ἑκάστου δεκάκις—τοῦτο δ᾽ εἶναι κατὰ 
 ἑκατονταετηρίδα [b] ἑκάστην, ὡς βίου ὄντος τοσούτου τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου—ἵνα δεκαπλάσιον τὸ 
 ἔκτεισμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος ἐκτίνοιεν, 
 
160 
 
completely different.  For Nāgasena the causal line connected to karma and rebirth is 
like energy passing between two candles (Ghose, 2007: 261).  Both the second and first 
flame can continue to exist but the latter is dependent on the former.  However, the 
second flame is also dependent on the new candle that has been lit.  This candle is not 
dependent on the first, as it is a spatially different candle.  But the second flame is 
dependent on the second candle body.  Therefore, the flame on the second candle is 
neither the same nor completely different from the first flame.  The flame does not 
transmigrate since the process does not require the extinguishing of the original flame.  
Rebirth is dependent origination characterised as neither completely different from nor 
the same as the first life.   
 For Buddhism, there is no fixed being or person transmigrated across separate 
bodies (III.5.7.72).  But given that there is a causally connected rebirth, an individual is 
not freed at death ‘from its evil deeds’.  The illustrations given and the following 
discussion can be compared to the earlier section at II.2.6.  The process of continuation 
across embodiments by an individual name-and-form is not transmigration but rebirth: 
 This name-and-form commits deeds, either pure or impure, and by that Karma 
 another name-and-form is reborn.  And therefore is it not set free from its evil 
 deeds. 
Karma is the causal origin of the consequent rebirth.  There is ‘no permanent person’ or 
ātman continuing; there is only action and consequence.  If there was no karma, there 
would be nothing reborn.  The causal line has many individual beings but none are the 
causal line nor have the causal line.  In Buddhist rebirth, deeds ‘committed by one 
name-and-form...follow it, like a shadow that never leaves it’ (III.5.8.72).  Even if one 
can never specify the individual ‘deeds that are done’, one can understand the potential 
for deeds to result in consequences as ‘long as the continuity of life is not cut off’.   
 Rebirth ceases when the root of rebirth has been extinguished.  Until that point 
one can discern that one will be reborn in future, just as a farmer knows that once one 
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has planted a ‘seed in the ground’, if ‘it were to rain well...a crop would be produced’ 
(III.5.9.73).  For no rebirth to take place one ‘has passed away by that kind of passing 
away in which nothing remains which could tend to the formation of another 
individual’, a passing away in which ‘no root remains for the formation of another 
individual’.  This is the cessation of karma, a ‘cutting off’.  Therefore, rebirth is 
discernible through actions and the consequences that ensue; but cessation as Nirvāṇa 
cannot be pointed out, as it is not possible ‘to point out any one flame that has gone out’ 
in a ‘great body of fire blazing’.  Nāgasena denies a permanent continuation from t1 to 
t2, but not the causal consciousness and moral accountability between t1 and t2.  Just as 
seeds become fruit, so deeds have future consequences.  Therefore, due to the causal 
continuation of morality, the changeable person is a forensic term even across death and 
rebirth. 
4.2 Solving moral accountability in Phaedo with Milindapañha 
 I shall now show that combining Locke’s consciousness as personhood and 
Milindapañha’s ancestral relation approach to forensics solves Phaedo’s problem of 
identity and moral accountability.  I shall argue that within the Platonic framework the 
soul is a forensic person establishing an I-history with changeable I-occurrences that do 
not require a fixed identity over time or memory of previous events to uphold moral 
accountability.  Rather a sequential ancestral relation is all that is required to defend 
Plato’s account of moral accountability through the judgment of souls after the death 
event. 
4.2.1 Impermanence  
 Buddhism shows how impermanence can be consistent with continuity and 
progression.  What comes later is dependent on what comes before; it is not the same, 
nor is it completely different.  However, Plato insists on an eternal soul as the carrier of 
consciousness; an entity that Nāgasena continually denies.  In this section I show how 
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Nāgasena’s examples of butter to ghee and baby to adult can be applied to Plato’s idea 
of soul in Phaedo.  This happens through the idea of being neither the same nor 
different.  Socrates the person is changeable.  When a body dies there is ‘no permanent 
person’ that remains fixed; a person changes but is still causally continuous, and so 
retains moral accountability.   
 The soul is changeable even after death according to Phaedo, showing that Plato 
has a concept of a soul travelling on one causal line of dependent origination.
101
  As a 
result, this creates one person—like Locke’s theory of consciousness—yet not needing 
Locke’s strict account of memory.  This conclusion comes by means of my comparative 
method with Milindapañha.  Through this method I answer Annas’, Inwood’s, Rowe’s, 
and Sorabji’s challenges of moral accountability by explaining that Plato recognises that 
different bodies constitute different humans but carry the same numerically identical 
soul.  Nāgasena argues against an ātman, a fixed eternal unchanging Self, and Plato 
does not disagree: Plato’s soul, although eternal, is not unchanging.  Indeed, Plato’s soul 
is a conscious person linked through its Cyclical journey between life and death and its 
fulfilment or otherwise of its rational potential.  Plato’s soul is a conscious person, 
distinct from the human animal, which is a combination of body and soul.  Nāgasena’s 
person is not a soul, but a continuous consciousness.  Due to the ancestral relation such 
as that of milk to ghee or a flame through the night we retain the same personhood 
through embodiments. Through comparison with Nāgasena’s Milk and Ghee simile I 
argue that Plato’s soul is a causally continuous person that does not require a fixed or 
static identity. The soul is a person for Plato, contrary to Nāgasena’s denial of such an 
entity.  Plato’s person continues to be conscious and to have a fundamental capability to 
recollect through embodiments and to exercise its reason to differing extents.  Plato thus 
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sees the new human or animal as a new combination of the same person with a different 
body.    
4.2.2 Moral Responsibility - Mango and Seed Again 
 I claim that Plato’s soul is a forensic term.  Although the souls of most beings 
after death do not receive a final judgement, nevertheless Plato’s reborn souls maintain 
across different lives a continuous causal line of moral accountability.  Buddhism 
provides an example of how a morally rectifying system can exist without requiring 
static personhood.  Bringing in the Buddhist text shows why a morality based on an 
ancestral relation within a framework of rebirth helps quell certain objections to Plato’s 
account of his moral agent, the immortal person/soul.  
 The question of causal connectedness and moral responsibility is posed by 
Annas, ‘Why should I be deterred from injustice by the thought that my soul will be 
reincarnated in a wolf?’ (1982: 129).102  Similarly, a problem for Inwood is that ‘I must 
be convinced that the soul to be rewarded or punished will be me’ (2009: 31).  
Principally, Annas’ and Inwood’s objections arise from seeing the human individual as 
the continuing soul; I should either feel responsibility for my soul, or be shown that I 
am my soul. But Plato is concerned with showing that the person is the rational soul.  
Now I shall show how that person is still morally accountable in Platonic terms 
regardless of its capacity to remember the personal experiences of its past lives.   
 In Nāgasena’s example of the Mango there is a seed and an ensuing fruit.  The 
fruit is not the seed.  But crucially the fruit is dependent on the seed.  Though 
interpreters may still find Plato’s argument for moral accountability unsatisfying, as, 
indeed, Socrates’ interlocutors often do, through Nāgasena’s examples I show that 
Plato’s ideas of an ancestral relation are valid.  The Milindapañha helps show how a 
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soul for Plato is causally and morally connected to successive states of consciousness.  
The comparison with Nāgasena’s Mango and Seed simile draws on the shared 
assumptions of ethical connection and continuity.  Importantly, I am not arguing that the 
seed and fruit is a good analogy for Plato’s human soul overall.  Rather, I am pointing 
out that the specific aspect of morality concerning the Platonic soul is illuminated by the 
seed and fruit simile because Plato emphasises conscious continuation of soul/person 
over and above the forensic need for the soul to remember its past lives.  The mango 
does not need to remember the seed to be shaped by it.   
 The causal connectedness of one man planting a seed, and another man stealing 
a fruit, explains why, for Plato, one must be just in the here-and-now.  The seed planted 
at one stage bears fruit at a later stage.  For Plato, the moral aspect rests in the causal 
connection of the soul’s continuing consciousness, the person.  Although seed and fruit 
are different in form, the latter is the natural descendent of the former.  Platonic justice 
is not concerned with the individual human animal.  For Plato, one must be just now, 
not in the hope of future rewards or punishments, but in view of the fact that justice is 
tied to something greater than one human animal, i.e. the future development of your 
forensic soul.  Therefore, those that still wish rewards for me in the future miss the 
larger point of Platonic forensics and persons: i.e. consciousness continues through 
change due to an ancestral relation based on the forensic nature of a Platonic Person, 
that is a soul.   
 It is the causal connection of consciousness in persons that, for Plato, and for 
Nāgasena in a different manner, upholds moral responsibility.  This is because as 
persons souls continue on one continuous causal line of dependent origination.  The 
example used by Nāgasena of the mango and the seed, answers, to an extent, the 
objections raised by Annas, Rowe, and Inwood concerning why one should be just now 
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if you are not the one being rewarded or punished later.  Although, there are 
fundamental differences between Plato and Nāgasena, nevertheless, generally ‘you’ are 
the same person before rebirth and now in human life through one continuous I-history.  
This I-history is made up of I-occurrences.  And the moral accountability is established 
by the continuation of the very same consciousness shaped by its experiences.  And to 
be morally accountable, this consciously continuing soul need not be static nor 
remember its past.  Because the person, the forensic concept, is a changeable line of 
continuous consciousness, the only ‘thing’ that can be punished is the person, as that is 
the basis of moral accountability.  Although Nāgasena ultimately denies the existence of 
a soul (anattā), while Plato’s person is identical with soul, in both occurrences there is 
only one I-history with changeable, yet dependent, I-occurrences.  Both Plato and 
Nāgasena show a commitment to a continuation of consciousness arising from 
dependent origination as grounding responsibility. 
 The Milindapañha comparison shows that the objections to the Platonic concept 
of moral continuity are objections to Plato’s concept of personhood, instead of 
objections about the causal continuity of a soul’s consciousness.  The distinction is 
extremely important.  Annas’ and Inwood’s dissatisfaction with the Platonic moral 
continuity does not mean that the concept is inconsistent or unsound.  For once the 
connection between a soul’s continuity of consciousness has been presented through the 
perspective of the ancestral relation, it is not possible to claim that Plato lacks an 
account of moral continuity through death and rebirth.
103
  The person equals the morally 
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 Indeed, the myths are a literal or allegorical representation of conscious souls bridging the gap of 
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to a seed and a fruit is not enough to convince everyone to be just now, because for many people the only 
way to stop men from being unjust is to have them ‘forcibly restrained’ from doing so by ‘the law’ (Rep. 
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continuous consciousness—Plato’s soul—and the ancestral relation solves the problem 
of memory in Locke.     
 Siderits explains the concept of continuity perfectly as it concerns Buddhist 
moral responsibility, and I wish to use Siderits’ words in a Platonic setting (Siderits, 
1997: 467): 
 Since the continued existence of a person in one life just consists in the 
 obtaining of appropriate causal connections among various physical and 
 psychological events, the continued existence of a person over several lives is 
 likewise possible in the absence of an enduring self, provided the right sorts of 
 causal connections obtain between lives. 
In Plato, ‘the right sorts of causal connections’ do ‘obtain between lives’ through the 
numerically identical soul.
104
  The pure soul’s experiences of the Forms shape its 
existence as a human and the soul ‘takes its education and nurture with it’ to the 
afterlife.  Nāgasena uses the terminology ‘neither the same nor another’ to categorise 
causal dependence of this kind between lives.  Milk and butter, baby and adult, mango 
and seed, all share the same causal line of dependent origination; one comes into 
existence from the other.  Nothing arises except in dependence on certain conditions 
(Harvey, 1995: 5).  For Plato, the continuation of the person is as ‘neither the same nor 
another’.  A new embodied existence for soul comes about in dependence on the 
previous embodied existence and is the natural moral descendent.  Phaedo’s souls 
become donkeys because of their previous existence (Phd. 82a).  It is the causal line of 
consciousness with the soul that sustains the existence of ‘neither the same nor another’ 
through death.   
 The process of causal dependence is complex.  The soul is distinct but the new 
human animal or other animal cannot remain exactly the same as the previous human 
animal; the person, however, can, and does remain the same through conscious 
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continuation.  Thus it is the person that is a forensic term, not the human.  A new 
combination of parts through a new body will lead to the formation of a new human 
animal or new animal.  For if a human soul becomes a ‘swan’, or, indeed, any ‘other 
perverse animals’ presented in Phaedo (82a-b), it is wrong to assume that the soul 
remains within a human animal.  Humans may need a soul, but a soul is not human.  
Yet, it is the same soul, the same person, and the same consciousness.  Therefore, as one 
life gives rise to the other in rebirths a morally rectifying causal line of ancestral 
relations is followed.  For Plato soul is the forensic consciousness, pertaining to one I-
history but made up of sequentially changeable but dependent I-occurrences.   
Conclusion 
 Plato’s problem of moral accountability is solved by combining Plato’s ideas of 
soul as person with the Buddhist ancestral relation within a Lockean framework, 
thereby fulfilling Claim 2 of the thesis.  For Plato the soul is the causal connection 
linking each successive life stage without being exclusively any single life stage.  
Granted, this conclusion is very different from Nāgasena’s conclusion, but, by 
examining Plato’s Phaedo alongside the Milindapañha I am able to show more clearly 
how moral continuity works for Plato.  Hence, the person is neither the same nor 
another; simply a changeable continuous consciousness of soul with moral 
accountability separate from the human.  For Plato the soul is dynamic, not fixed, as it 
changes through many different experiences and through the extent of its exercise of 
reason.  The person is a forensic term based on the ancestral relations argument 
expressed in Milindapañha’s simile of seed and fruit.   
 There are three points to clarify regarding human beings following Plato’s 
account: 1) a human composition ceases at death, as death is a separation of body and 
soul; 2) the cessation of the human being is not a complete annihilation, since the soul 
‘marches on’ as ‘neither the same nor another’, but still as a person; and 3) the soul 
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‘marching on’ continues to retain moral accountability through an ancestral relation 
with its past and future lives. 
 I began Chapter 2 with the claim made by Sorabji that soul as reason is one’s 
‘true self’.  Sorabji was correct to rhetorically question whether one identity could 
persist through completely different cultural and physical situations.  By using the 
Milindapañha I have shown persons—as souls—to be a continuous, yet changeable, 
consciousness.  I have also shown why preventing annihilation does not require a view 
of persons as unchanging.  Being human is characterised by mortality, and being a 
person is characterised by immortality, yet the person is still changeable.  The eternal 
continuation of a changeable soul and its moral accountability is based on the ancestral 
relation.  In Plato, one need not hold onto the need for a ‘me and me again’ approach to 
rebirth, i.e. needing to see the person in a fixed way for moral accountability.  
Annihilation and eternalism are both prevented by one continuous line of dependent 
origination rooted in a soul; Locke’s idea of the continuity of consciousness makes a 
person.  The mango and seed analogy helped to explain Plato’s concept of moral 
responsibility.  As the fruit is the descendent of the seed, so too is a soul the descendent 
of the embodied deeds, an ancestral relation exists independent of memory.  And the 
inheritance works out via the continuation of the person in a new animal form.     
 There is one final qualifier to make: Locke gets us part of the way to solving the 
problem of moral accountability in Phaedo, but Milindapañha was instrumental in 
getting past a limitation in Locke’s argument, i.e. the problem of memory in Locke’s 
idea of a forensic person.  I could have followed the Lockean tradition further, using 
Reid’s objection in more detail, focusing more on the analytical tradition of identity 
over time. But each individual tradition necessarily has its own points of limit and it 
may be that any specific tradition—i.e. Locke and the analytical tradition—deals with 
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only a specific set of questions.  The Milindapañha is useful in practical terms since it 
adds a working philosophical model of moral accountability based on an ancestral 
relation.  My use of this Indian tradition encompassing a range of overlapping 
questions, principally rebirth, provided a better opportunity to problem-solve as it 
moved from a theoretical to a practical application of the solution of the ancestral 
relation.  In this case, throughout Part One I have used two traditions together—Plato 
and Buddhism—to reach a conclusion that is specifically insightful.   
 To clarify my point about the limitation of Locke’s philosophical tradition 
further, using the Milindapañha has been useful because it had to deal with issues of 
moral accountability and continuity between embodiments specifically concerning 
rebirth, death, and identity.  Neither Locke and the predominantly Christian tradition 
nor his secular interpreters engage with rebirth in the same way as Plato and Buddhism 
do.  Therefore, the Milindapañha is useful in part because it, like Locke, denies a soul 
but, unlike Locke and our predominantly Christian or secular analytical traditions, it 
engages with a tradition of multiple embodiments through rebirth.  Because we do not 
share the tradition of multiple embodiments we, as readers, may be open to a blind-spot 
in our understanding of Plato’s Phaedo.  By placing Plato’s Phaedo in dialogue with 
Milindapañha I have shown how multiple embodiments means that we have to look 
beyond the human psyche alone to see what might be underlying it, i.e. the causal 
dependency between different lives.  Because of the embeddedness of certain ideas of 
psyche as self culturally in ancient Greece, Plato did not need to analyse the nature of 
self explicitly, or to the same extent as the Buddhist tradition.  Due to Buddhism’s 
radical denials of ātman it needed to be explicit because it challenged a specific 
tradition.  The interesting dialogue between these two separate traditions, set up through 
my methodology based on establishing Shared Concerns, has shown in Part One how 
Milindapañha provides a means of solving an important problem in Plato. 
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 In Part Two I will show that two further ancient texts, which likewise have 
Shared Concerns, can be read together to solve problems in one cultural text without the 
help of a later philosophical mediator.  I therefore now turn to my second test case, 
where Kaṭha Upanishad will be used to solve problems of death and identity in 
Empedocles’ poem.   
  
171 
 
Part Two: Empedocles’ Poem and Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
Introduction 
 I now turn to the second of my test cases, Empedocles’ poem and Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad. Part One saw the application of Claims 1 and 2 using Locke’s philosophical 
ideas as a framework.  Part Two shows the application of my Comparative 
Methodology with two cultural texts that have Shared Concerns leading to problem-
solving that does not make use of Locke as a philosophical framework.  The 
methodology teases out implicit notions within Empedocles, specifically, the 
philosophical concern regarding the relationship between identity and moral 
accountability across death.   
 To start with I examine each text individually due to the interpretational 
difficulty of the texts.  Chapter 5 examines Kaṭha Upaniṣad within the framework of its 
own cultural setting.  Chapter 6 examines Empedocles’ poem within the context of its 
own cultural setting.  Chapters 5 and 6 show that three key Shared Concerns exist 
between the two texts: death, identity, and moral accountability.  These Shared 
Concerns (Claim 1) are then used in Chapter 7 as an instrument for problem-solving 
(Claim 2), through the comparative application of the two texts. The key problem 
arising from this study is to what extent the daimon is morally conditioned, and does 
(self) understanding lead to a possible form of liberation from the Cosmic Cycle? 
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 Chapter 5: Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
Introduction 
 The aim of Chapter 5 is to familiarise the reader with Kaṭha Upaniṣad’s specific 
philosophical arguments placing the text within my Comparative Methodological 
structure.  As such, in Chapter 5 I am concerned with beginning to introduce Claim 1.  
Although Chapter 5 alone cannot show Shared Concerns with Empedocles, I am able to 
highlight three key ideas in Kaṭha Upaniṣad.  These three key ideas are as follows: the 
use of ‘roots’ and ‘tree’ as a philosophical image of an all-encompassing reality (6.1; 
discussed in my section 5.6); the ‘two selves’ theory that shows two kinds of entities, 
ātman as a rider and the human intellect as a charioteer and the relationship between the 
two (3.1-3.3; discussed in my section 5.3); and the concept of moral accountability in 
transmigration, where ‘what they have done’ and ‘what they have learned’ leads to 
liberation from transmigration (5.7; discussed in my section 5.5).      
 But I also wish to place these philosophical ideas within the framework of the 
text in general.  I follow the structure of Kaṭha Upaniṣad at this point, instead of 
imposing my comparative structure on the text.  At the beginning of Kaṭha Upaniṣad, 
the scene is set around the opening dramatic conversation about the uncertainty of death 
(1.20); followed by the discussion on the nature of Brahman and the search for 
knowledge (2.12); then an important image of the two selves is presented (3.1) which is 
combined with a simile of a chariot (3.3); due to the uncertainty regarding the structural 
integrity of the rest of the original text there is an analysis of the remaining sections 
with specific focus on how they relate to the earlier parts of the text (4.1 and 5.5);
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finally I end with a key image, ‘the eternal banyan tree’ (6.1).   
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 The last sections, especially 4-6, are more likely later additions, intended to compliment the dialogue 
between Yama and Naciketas (Olivelle, 1998: 231). 
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 The Kaṭha Upaniṣad is convoluted and problematic.  According to Olivelle, it 
does not form a coherent and unified whole (1998: 231).  The text itself is ‘challenging’ 
and ‘contains several difficult and unique terms whose meanings are far from clear’ 
(Olivelle, 1998: 231).  This is in part because the Kaṭha Upaniṣad’s story of Yama and 
Naciketas is a retelling from Ṛg-Veda 10.135 and the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa 3.11.8.1-6 
(Ganeri, 2007: 15).  The text belongs to the Kāṭhaka school of the Black Yajur-Veda 
(Olivelle, 1998: 231).  Dating the text closer than a few centuries is not possible; but 
this is true of all Upaniṣads (Olivelle, 1998: xxxvi).  Olivelle believes that the Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad is not one of the earliest, and is more likely post-Buddhist (after 5th century 
BCE), composed in the last few centuries BCE (1998: xxxvii).  But this date is not 
definite as other interpretations have been offered.  For example, Radhakrishnan dates 
the text to the 8
th
-7
th
 century BCE, which would make it pre-Buddhist (1953: 22).  West 
suggests that it is contemporaneous with early Buddhism (1971: 181).  One must 
remember that ideas written within a text can be considerably older than the actual date 
of that text.   
 My aim is to engage with the text, offering insights and explanations where 
appropriate, but not critical objections.  Given more time and space, a fuller critical 
account of the scholarly literature and interpretation surrounding Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
would be fruitful.  Here, however, I will remain an observer of the text, not a critic.  
Methodologically, this is appropriate given the focus on Kaṭha Upaniṣad as a tool for 
solving Empedoclean problems through Shared Concerns.   
 Concerning traditional interpretations, I have deliberately minimised the use of 
traditional scholarly interpretations, i.e. Saṅkara (8th century CE).  The motivation 
behind this approach is that traditional Indian interpretation is heavily influenced by a 
specific school of thought.  Individual commentators interpret specific lines favourably 
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relating to their school of thought.  For a scholar studying the history of Indian 
philosophical thought such dialogues and commentaries are worthwhile engaging in.  
However, given that this project focuses around a thought experiment and a 
methodology of problem-solving, it need not be weighed down by the vast scholarly 
interpretive tradition.  Moreover, by travelling interpretively light the focus remains on 
the text and not a school of thought.    
 As Olivelle noted, the text is challenging.  Therefore, the text would in itself be 
worthy of a thesis.  As a result, I am fully aware of the limitations of this chapter if 
taken in isolation.  But within the constraints of this project, a vigorous engagement 
with critical interpretations is not required.  Chapter 5 serves the larger purpose of the 
project.  Where possible I will use longer quotations in Chapters 5, allowing for 
succinct arguments in Chapter 7.  Repetition is a potential by-product of my 
Comparative Method. But I believe slight repetition is worth risking given the difficulty 
of the two individual texts.  
5.1 Kaṭha Upaniṣad 1: Setting the Scene  
 Section 1 introduces the dramatic scene between a father and his son, Naciketas.  
Faith is said to take hold of Naciketas while his father’s cows were being ‘presented as 
sacrificial gifts’ (1.2).106  Naciketas reflected on the unworthiness of the cows he and his 
father were sending to sacrifice (1.3): 
 They’ve drunk all their water, eaten all their fodder, 
 They have been milked dry, they are totally barren –  
 “Joyless” are those worlds called, 
 to which a man goes 
 who gives them as gifts. 
                                                 
106
 Translation Olivelle (1998), unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
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The ‘faith’ that ‘took hold’ of Naciketas is the fear that these sacrificial cows will lead 
to “Joyless” worlds, presumably after death.  The cows are barren, and as a result, are 
unworthy.  The cows have become useless to the father and son, having ‘drunk all their 
water, eaten all their fodder’ and given up all the milk they can.  Therefore, the father 
and son are not sacrificing anything meaningful.  As a result, the son expects nothing 
significant in return. 
 It is unclear why Naciketas asks, ‘Father, to whom will you give me?’ (1.4).  
Naciketas may believe he is to take the place of the ‘barren’ cows.  Another 
interpretation is that the father, by giving ‘away all his possession’ (1.1), intends to 
include his son among them (Radhakrishnan, 1953: 596).  By asking his father the same 
question three times, Naciketas elicits the response ‘I’ll give you to Death’ (1.4).  In 
anger at his young son’s intrusiveness the father says ‘go to Hell’ (Radhakrishnan, 
1953: 596).  So it is that Naciketas contemplates his obligation to go to Death as his 
father commands (1.5): 
 I go as the very first of many. 
 I go as the middlemost of many. 
 What’s it that Yama [Death] must do, 
 That he will do with me today?  
Death is a fundamental part of human existence, existing before Naciketas was born and 
after he has died.  There have been ‘those who have gone before us’ and there will be 
‘those who will come after us’ (1.6).  Rebirth through death is introduced at 1.6, and is 
presented as a cyclical continuation of vegetation: ‘mortal man ripens like grain, And 
like grain he is born again’ (1.6).  Death is not an end, a man is ‘born again’ like grain 
in the next harvest.  The cycle of grain represents ‘perpetual rebirth’ and ‘is not an 
escape from the wheel of becoming into a deathless eternity’ (Radhakrishnan 1953: 
597).  As Radhakrishnan explains, rebirth is not an ‘escape’ from death; neither is the 
176 
 
image of the cycle of grain an optimistic example for the individual.  The grain that 
grows, falls, and grows once more is not the same numerically.  Therefore, by analysing 
the grain image one concludes that men cannot survive through rebirth unchanged.  
Men are mortal within a cycle of birth and death (Nikhilananda, 1951: 119).  The Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad presents a strong understanding of the nature of mortal life early in the text. 
 The dramatic conclusion of the text requires the offering of three wishes to 
Naciketas.  To fulfil the offering of the wishes a host-guest relationship is described.  A 
‘Brahmin guest enters a house’ like a fire that must be appeased by water (1.7)  If a 
‘Brahmin guest enters a house’ but ‘resides without any food’ then that ‘foolish’ owner 
of the house risks his ‘Hopes and expectations, fellowship and goodwill, Children and 
livestock, rites and gifts’ (1.8).  Therefore, the text places a high demand on welcoming 
guests into one’s house.107  This is a custom of hospitality in India (Nikhilananda, 1951: 
119).  Naciketas arrives at the house of Death and stays for three nights ‘without any 
food’ (1.9).  To make sure Death has no ill consequences (1.8), he offers a wish for 
every night ‘you [Naciketas] stayed in my house...without food’ (1.9).  The dramatic 
device is clear; by using the custom of hospitality the writer is able to convey the 
dramatic concept of three wishes.   
 The first wish is simply to allay his father’s anxieties and anger about Naciketas 
going to Death (1.10).  There is a slight hint that Naciketas is also asking Death for his 
father to recognise him in his next embodied life: ‘That he greet me with joy, when by 
you I’m dismissed’ (1.10).  For if Naciketas has died and gone to Death’s house, then 
the way he leaves is through rebirth already mentioned (1.6).  Death agrees to 
Naciketas’ first wish (1.11). 
                                                 
107
 This is later understood due to the Oneness of all things with Brahman (4.11; 6.1).  If you do not show 
kindness to a guest, you are not showing kindness to your self.  Due to the fundamental Oneness of life, 
bad karma is the result of a house owner’s ignorance regarding hospitality.   
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 Naciketas’ second wish conveys the old sacrificial teachings of the Vedas; 
similar to the ritual sacrifice presented at the beginning of Kaṭha Upaniṣad.  Through 
ritual sacrifices one hopes to gain a better life after death, or as Naciketas is worried, 
avoid a less favourable after-life.  This is the Vedic sacrificial religion preceding the 
Upaniṣads.  Naciketas wishes to learn the fire ritual which will see him reborn in a 
heavenly state (1.12-13).  In this heavenly state there is ‘no fear of old age or you 
(Death)’.  The ‘world of heaven’ transcends ‘both hunger and thirst’, and is ‘beyond all 
sorrows’ (1.12).  Naciketas believes ‘People who are in heaven enjoy th’immortal state’ 
(1.13).  This is the view of ‘immortality’ held in the Vedas.  But the Vedic concept of 
immortality is now shown to be relative immortality by the Upaniṣadic third wish 
(Nikhilananda, 1951: 121). 
 Naciketas has been given the ritualistic knowledge allowing access to heaven; it 
therefore seems strange that Naciketas is still troubled by death in his third wish.  
Heaven is described as free from Death at 1.12.  But now the Kaṭha Upaniṣad deviates 
from and develops further the concepts set out by the Vedic religion.  Although the 
Upaniṣads are not breaking away from their Vedic predecessors entirely, wish three 
represents a fear that cannot be quelled by ritual practice alone.  Naciketas has acquired 
Vedic ritual knowledge, leading to a heavenly state, but he still has a doubt regarding 
existence after death (1.20): 
 There is this doubt about a man who is dead. 
 ‘He exists,’ say some; others, ‘He exists not.’ 
 I want to know this, so please teach me. 
 This is the third of my three wishes. 
Put simply, does a man continue to exist after death or not?  This yearning is tied to 
Naciketas’ second wish.  Radhakrishnan believes Naciketas has no doubt about his 
survival, having already likened mortality to grain (1.6); the problem is about the 
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condition of the liberated soul (Radhakrishnan, 1953: 603-604).  But Naciketas is 
worried about survival, i.e. the survival of the man.  Naciketas is not interested in some 
form of continuation, i.e. that of ‘grain’.  What use is the fire sacrifice if the man that 
attains the heavenly world after death is not the same man that instigated the fire 
sacrifice?  Naciketas needs to know that he continues through death.  Otherwise, Vedic 
ritual is irrelevant to the individual.   
 Unfortunately for Naciketas, it is a ‘subtle doctrine’ that is ‘hard to understand’, 
so hard that ‘even the gods of old had doubts’ (1.21).  Death begs Naciketas to pick 
another wish.  But Naciketas understands that he will never have a teacher like Death to 
explain it to him again.  Still, Death tempts Naciketas with all the earthly possessions 
imaginable to change his wish.  Death suggests becoming immortal through his 
offspring, or being the ruler of the earth, indeed, even live as long as he wishes (1.23).  
Death offers the enjoyment of desire at Naciketas’ will and command (1.24-25).  The 
offers are all things that humans supposedly covet, ‘but about death don’t ask me’ 
(1.25).
108
  Death is actively testing Naciketas (Nikhilananda, 1951: 127).  Before Death 
reveals the Truth, Naciketas must prove himself worthy.   
 The testing of Naciketas is a plot device preparing the unveiling of a new 
Upaniṣadic Truth.  The truth is expressed by Naciketas first: ‘With wealth you cannot 
make a man content; Will we get to keep wealth, when we have seen you [Death]’ 
(1.27).  As a result ‘even a full life is but a trifle’ (1.26).  Naciketas was offered all that 
he could ever dream of, but through insight he realised that mortal life and all that 
comes with it is transitory (Nikhilananda, 1951: 128).  These earthly lives are 
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 The temptations of Naciketas can be compared to the temptations of Buddha and Jesus 
(Radhakrishnan, 1953: 605).  All three temptation scenes are the renouncing of worldly achievements in 
favour of other-worldly truth.  All three can be interpreted as a test that must be passed.  Although, 
Buddha and Jesus were said to be tested by a devil figure who does not reveal any truth. 
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impermanent.  Sensual desire is fleeting and ephemeral in nature (Schiltz, 2006: 455).  
But Naciketas still needs to understand ‘what happens at the great transit’, what happens 
to a man after death? (1.29).  For no matter how many worldly possessions one has, 
they cannot stop decay and death (Nikhilananda, 1951: 129).  Section 2 takes up the 
challenge of ‘probing the mystery deep’ where Death reveals the truth regarding 
Brahma and Self. 
5.2 Kaṭha Upaniṣad 2: Brahma-Knowledge 
 Having tested Naciketas, Death reveals the truth about a man after death and 
during one’s life.  It is obvious why Naciketas had to be tested previously since a man 
must choose between desire and truth (2.2): 
 Both the good and the gratifying 
 present themselves to a man; 
 The wise assess them, note their difference;  
 and choose the good over the gratifying;  
 But the fool chooses the gratifying 
 Rather than what is beneficial. 
What should we pursue: a self-controlled life of wisdom or the satisfaction of desires 
(Schiltz, 2006: 452)?  Naciketas was offered the gratification of earthly pleasures, but 
instead he stayed true to his wish for knowledge (2.3).  Both the good and the gratifying 
have their relevant goals and ‘both bind a man’ (2.1).  The goals are Truth and illusion 
respectively.  As Schiltz correctly notes, ‘the problem is not with the duration of the 
desires but with their effects on the self’, desires are ephemeral, but also bad for us 
(2006: 455).  The concept of action binding itself to a man is noticeable in the law of 
karma.  One must see through the fruits of one’s labours.  By rejecting the earthly world 
Naciketas is bound for the eternal through his ‘yearning for knowledge’ (2.4).  Death 
contrasts Naciketas’ position with that of the ignorant lovers of worldly desire (2.5): 
 Wallowing in ignorance, but calling themselves wise, 
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 thinking themselves learned, the fools go around, 
 staggering about like a group of blind men, 
 led by a man who is himself blind. 
The contrast is clear between the wise and the ignorant fools, with the fools believing 
themselves to be wise.  Moreover, the latter are ignorant even of their own ignorance 
(Radhakrishnan, 1953: 609).  The ignorant life of pleasure is likened to the blind 
leading the blind (Schiltz, 2006: 459).  Sensual desire akin to the blind leading the blind 
is a powerful image.  Additionally, the phrase ‘fools go around’ does not restrict itself to 
earthly life.  Nikhilananda comments that ‘go round’ means the fools ‘assume different 
bodies’ after death (Nikhilananda, 1951: 132).  Therefore, the line also refers to the 
grander scale of rebirth.  The rebirth results directly from their ignorance (Nikhilananda, 
1951: 132).  A characteristic belief of these ignorant fools is that ‘This is the world; 
there is no other’ (2.6).  The failure is to make no distinction between the earthly world 
and the hidden reality that lies beneath it.  Ignorance means the ignorant man ‘falls into 
my (Death’s) power again and again’ (2.6).  For the ignorant it is an endless cycle of 
birth and death (Nikhilananda, 1951: 132).  Quintessentially, rebirth is sustained 
through ignorance. 
 Unfortunately, as Death has already mentioned (1.21), true knowledge is hard to 
comprehend and cannot be grasped by ‘argumentation’ (2.9).  For such knowledge is ‘a 
thing beyond the realm of reason’ (2.8).  The Truth about self transcends mental states, 
where intellectual reasoning is likely to mis-associate self with impure mind 
(Nikhilananda, 1951: 134).  Furthermore, knowledge can only be taught by someone 
who has direct personal experience of the doctrine.  The Truth is beyond reason as it is 
altogether beyond the human sphere of sense experience.   
 In verse 2.10 there is uncertainty regarding who is talking.  But regardless of 
whether Death or Naciketas utters the words, the sentiments are the same.  All earthly 
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pleasures are ‘transient’, and as a result ‘by fleeting things one cannot gain the 
perennial’ (2.10).  It is only ‘by things eternal I have gained the eternal’ (2.10).109  
Therefore, Naciketas has seen the worldly pleasures and rejected them.  He has also 
witnessed the Vedic fire sacrifice which leads to heaven, ‘And having seen, firmly 
rejected’ (2.11).  The Vedic sacrifices can only get one so far.  As the Vedic sacrifice is 
firmly established in the transient earthly world, it is only fitting that on an Upaniṣadic 
reading, transitory rituals have ephemeral outcomes. 
 The distinction between the earthly world of desire and the true reality that lies 
hidden behind the ignorant world has been noted.  But Death has not yet revealed the 
Truth, or indeed, how it relates to an individual after death.  Given that the true reality 
exists behind the ignorant world, one may expect that the search for Truth to be 
external.  In fact, the Truth is the search for Brahman and it is entirely internal (2.12): 
 The primeval one who is hard to perceive, 
 wrapped in mystery, hidden in the cave, 
 residing within th’impenetrable depth- 
  Regarding him as god, an insight 
 gained by inner contemplation, 
 both sorrow and joy the wise abandon. 
The ‘primeval one’ is ‘hard to perceive’ being ‘wrapped in mystery’, hidden behind the 
senses, the mind, and understanding (Radhakrishnan, 1953: 613).  One is to regard the 
‘primeval one’ as god (devam) after ‘insight gained by inner contemplation’ (2.12).  The 
‘primeval’ god is ‘hidden in the cave’ of the heart, which is hidden within a body as 
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 The fire sacrifice mentioned previously does not provide true eternal being.  Sacrifice gains one entry 
into heaven (Brahmaloka), but this is only relatively permanent (Radhakrishnan, 1953: 612).  As 
Radhakrishnan states, the ‘performer of the Naciketa fire will endure as long as the cosmos lasts but such 
endurance is not eternity, since the cosmos with all that it contains will be absorbed into the eternal at the 
end of the cosmic day’ (1953: 612).  Heaven, and by association the beings living in heaven, will be 
dissolved once the cosmic cycle is completed.  Therefore, an immortal life in heaven may seem desirable, 
but it is still one step down from eternity.  For eternity one must realise Self’s association with Brahman.  
In essence, one must realise the inter-connectedness of all life with the Ultimate Self Brahman. 
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previously expressed at 1.14.  This is comparable to how the Truth is hidden behind the 
external illusion of the sensual world.  Fundamentally, the ‘primeval’ god is hidden 
behind the phenomenal knowledge caused by the sensory world.  It is the ‘inmost reality 
which is the object of [Naciketas’] search’ (Radhakrishnan, 1953: 614).  The realisation 
goes beyond pairs of opposites and desires.  And internal realisation is through internal 
meditation.  One turns away from the external world to find the ‘primeval’ god that is 
‘hidden’ within you.   
 The internal ‘primeval’ god is described by Death as having no birth, no death, 
and remaining stable through different existences (2.18): 
 The wise one- 
 he is not born, he does not die; 
 he has not come from anywhere; 
 he has not become anyone. 
 He is unborn and eternal, primeval and everlasting. 
 And he is not killed, when the body is killed.    
The inner ‘wise’ ‘primeval’ ‘god’ is without cause and is changeless.  It is self-existent 
(Nikhilananda, 1951: 140).  The inner god is the fundamental principle, distinct from 
the bodily self (Schiltz, 2006: 459).  It is the inner reality that realises itself apart from 
names or form (Radhakrishnan, 1953: 616).  Although the inner ‘god’ inhabits the body, 
it remains distinct and separable.  As a result, the death of the body has no effect on the 
inner ‘god’.  The inner ‘god’ is separate from an external individual, as the ‘god’ ‘has 
not become anyone’ (2.18).  Furthermore, it is assumed here that no individual 
embodied person has an influence on the inner ‘god’.  The inner ‘god’ is ‘bodiless 
within bodies’ and ‘stable within unstable beings’ (2.22).  It is ‘immense’ and ‘all-
pervading’ existing in everything and as everything ultimately (2.22).  The ‘killer’ and 
the ‘killed’ both ‘fail to understand’ that ‘He neither kills, nor is he killed’ (2.19).  At 
this point a ‘wise man ceases to grieve’ having realised the true reality of an inner ‘god’.  
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Radhakrishnan believes Naciketas’ question is answered: the inner ‘god’ is eternal and 
death has no reference to it (1953: 617).  But Death has answered Naciketas’ question 
with reference to an ‘eternal’ inner ‘god’; not with reference to the individual that will 
die.   
 To grasp the concept of an inner ‘god’ one must ‘quit his evil ways’, be ‘calm or 
composed’, and possess a ‘tranquil mind’ (2.24).  One must turn away from the sensual 
world, as the ‘god’ is unknowable otherwise (Schiltz, 2006: 460).  The individual must 
renounce desire, and instead favour knowledge and the liberation knowledge brings 
(Nikhilananda, 1951: 144-5).  Furthermore, there is an ethical dimension presented.  
Although the process is internal meditation, one cannot be externally ‘evil’, as 
supposedly, ‘evil’ behaviour will contrast directly with the internal understanding one is 
trying to possess; that all life is One.  There is a presentation of moral psychology, that 
ethical behaviour is determined by an individual’s essential nature and function (Schiltz, 
2006: 462).  Until our ‘mind and heart are effectively purged, we can have no clear 
vision of God’ (Radhakrishnan, 1953: 620).  Therefore, the spiritual and the ethical are 
directly related (ibid.).  The text presents an ‘internalist justification of the best life’ 
(Schiltz, 2006: 462).  An ethical internal path of learning cares little for worldly society; 
the two top castes, ‘the Brahmin and the Kṣatriya’, are ‘both like a dish of boiled rice’ 
with death as a sauce.
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  For Death comes to all ignorant men regardless of their social 
standing.  
5.3 Kaṭha Upaniṣad 3: The Two Selves 
 Section 3 is philosophically the most important, and has received the most 
critical observations, especially from comparative scholars.
111
  However, section 3 also 
remains hard to interpret.  Yama (Death) is teaching Naciketas the nature of self 
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 These are the priestly and kingly class of Vedic society.  Although they are not as rigidly enforced as 
the later caste system, they do hold the top two positions of power. 
111
 Especially Schiltz (2006) and McEvilley (2002). 
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(Schiltz, 2006: 463).  There are two selves presented by Yama, through a comparison 
with a chariot.  The chariot comparison ‘stresses the inter-action and interdependence of 
the parts of the individual’ (Schiltz, 2006: 460).  But it is hard to infer how the original 
two selves depicted by Yama at 3.1 relate to the chariot illustration at 3.3.  Ultimately, 
the comparison culminates in a distinction between a charioteer and a rider, the former 
connected to the chariot, and the latter a removed passenger.  Nikhilananda suggests 
that the two selves are an individual soul and a Supreme Self, where the ‘Supreme Self 
is the detached Witness of the activities of the individual soul’ (1951: 146).  It remains 
to be seen whether Nikhilananda’s suggestion is correct.  But the connection and inter-
dependence of Brahman and ātman, the macro and the micro, is fundamental to the 
Upaniṣads (West, 1971: 105):  
 [T]he basic doctrine of all the Upanishads, [is] that Brahman, the changeless 
 life-soul of the world, is identical with Ātman, the individual self, in other 
 words,  our personal awareness of being alive is only a local and imperfect 
 observation of a universal reality.   
Therefore, it is the relationship between the individual and the universal that garners 
discussion through 3.1.  The passage is a key scholarly interpretive section for the 
different Indian schools of thought.  But as shown below, exact interpretation is 
extremely knotty (3.1):  
They are these two 
‘Shadow’ and ‘Light’, the 
two who have entered-the 
one into the cave of the 
heart, the other into the 
highest region beyond, both 
drinking the truth in the 
world of rites rightly 
performed (Olivelle, 1998: 
238). 
 
There are two selves that 
drink the fruit of Karma in 
the world of good deeds.  
Both are lodged in the 
secret place (of the heart), 
the chief seat of the 
Supreme.  The knowers of 
Brahman speak of them as 
shade and light 
(Radhakrishnan, 1953: 
621). 
Two there are who dwell 
within the body, in the 
buddhi, the supreme akasa 
of the heart, enjoying the 
sure rewards of their own 
actions.  The knowers of 
Brahman describe them as 
light and shade 
(Nikhilananda, 1951: 146). 
Section 3 opens with a description of two entities, ‘Shadow’ and ‘Light’, known only to 
the man who understands Brahman, the inner ‘primeval’ god.  Both ‘Shadow’ and 
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‘Light’ comprise different attributes respectively.  Olivelle suggests that ‘Shadow’ 
refers to the person in the heart, and ‘Light’ to the person in the firmament, with the 
intention to show the connection between the human heart and the highest heaven 
(1998: 379).  Yet exactly what ‘Shadow’ and ‘Light’ refer to is not explicitly rendered 
in 3.1.   
 In 3.2 there is a suggestion of movement from here to there.  The fire sacrifices 
are a ‘dike’ or a method for ‘those who wish to cross the danger’ to ‘the farther shore’ 
(3.2).  The ‘farther shore’ is ‘the imperishable, the highest brahman’ (3.2).  The highest 
Brahman correlates to the ‘Light’ in the ‘highest region beyond’.  Brahman at 3.2 
appears to be something more than previously stated by Death in section 2.  No longer 
is Brahman merely the inner ‘primeval’ god.  Now there is a two-pronged distinction, 
there is an inner god and one in the ‘highest region’.  Crucially, both are connected like 
shadow and light, one resides in ‘the cave of the heart’, as the inner ‘primeval’ god; and 
the other resides in ‘the highest region beyond’ (3.1).  The primeval god exists both 
internally and externally from the individual body.  Now, the primeval god and the 
‘highest brahman’ are intrinsically connected.   
 The inner and outer god are connected, as ‘Shadow’ is dependent on ‘Light’ and 
physical things.  Therefore, the inner god is dependent on the Light of the ‘highest 
brahman’, but there needs to be an interaction with something else as well.  The most 
one can tentatively interpret is that these two, as ‘Shadow’ and ‘Light,’ are not mutually 
exclusive.     
5.3.1 Kaṭha Upaniṣad 3.1: The Chariot Simile 
 Yama has presented two intricately connected selves, ‘Shadow’ and ‘Light’, the 
inner self in the ‘cave of the heart’ and the self as ‘highest brahman’ in the ‘highest 
region beyond’.  Death introduces the simile of the chariot to illustrate the distinction of 
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selves.  The chariot simile represents a psycho-physical vehicle with a passenger.  This 
is where ātman, the word for self can be seen clearly in the text.  Unfortunately, the text 
becomes even more convoluted with the introduction of additional technical terms.  
Furthermore, it is unclear what ātman relates to, ‘Shadow’ or ‘Light’.  But given that 
ātman usually refers to an internal self it is likely that ātman refers to the ‘Shadow’, 
one’s inner self.  Death correlates the component parts of a self with those of a chariot 
(3.3-4): 
 3.Know the self (ātman) as a rider in a chariot, 
 and the body, as simply the chariot. 
 Know the intellect as the charioteer, 
 and the mind, as simply the reins. 
 4.The senses, they say, are the horses, 
 and sense objects are the paths around them; 
 He (ātman) who is linked to the body, senses, and mind, 
 the wise proclaim as the one who enjoys. 
There are four essential points presented in 3.3: 1) the self as a rider; 2) the body as the 
physical chariot; 3) the intellect as a charioteer or driver; and 4) the mind as the reins or 
controls.  The rider and the charioteer must be in the same chariot, and it is the 
charioteer that has the means of control, i.e. the reins.  The reins/mind are attached to 
the horses/senses.  In this interpretation the self/rider is a detached witness, at least from 
the physical driving of the chariot, which is done by the intellect through the mind.     
 The text describes the internal process within the self: the charioteer/driver is the 
intellect; and the mind is the means of control, i.e. the reins.  In this interpretation, Light 
and Shadow correlate to the highest Brahman and the individual self in the body, a 
macrocosm and microcosm.  The illustration returns to the chariot and the demarcation 
of bodily characteristics: the bodily senses are the horses powering the physical chariot; 
and the paths on which they run are said to be the sense objects (3.4):   
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 The senses, they say, are the horses, 
 and sense objects are the paths around them; 
The mind holds the reins, being either in control or dragged along by the senses 
(Radhakrishnan, 1953: 623).  In reverse the illustration can be interpreted as follows: 
The horses run along paths 
Which pulls the chariot along, 
The reins are attached to the horses, 
The senses pursue sensual objects 
Which engages the body in the world, 
The mind discriminates between 
sensual desires, 
And the charioteer is holding the reins. 
The self should be known as a rider in a 
chariot  
And the intellect controls the mind. 
The self should be known as a rider in a 
chariot. 
Nikhilananda interprets line 3.3 as referring to an embodied soul, the individual (1951: 
148).  There appears to be a general interpretational distinction between two selves: an 
individual self and a Universal Self.  These are the Shadow and Light, the inner god and 
the ‘highest brahman’.  There are three prominent interpretations: Saṅkara sees the 
Universal Self as identical with an individual self in a non-dualistic interpretation (early 
8
th
 century CE); Ramanuja believes an individual self is eternally one with and also 
different from the Universal Self (11
th
 century CE); and Madhva sees the individual self 
as eternally different from the Universal Self (c.1238-1317 CE).  Nikhilananda, in line 
3.4, associates the ātman with the individual soul, reasoning that the Supreme Self 
(highest brahman) cannot be an enjoyer of the world (1951: 149).  However, in 3.1 
‘Shadow’ and ‘Light’ are said to be ‘both drinking the truth in a world of rites rightly 
performed’.  Nikhilananda distinguishes between the individual self and the Universal 
Self, stating without textual evidence that one enjoys in the body while the Universal 
Self does not.  Nikhilananda suggests that the chariot simile refers to the individual 
soul/self entirely.  The Eternal Self appears as the individual soul/self, until such an 
individual self realises its true nature as an Eternal Self (Nikhilananda, 1951: 149).  On 
Nikhilananda’s reading there is only an illusion of division: one witnesses the individual 
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self as a chariot, with various component parts, only until one realises Brahman; upon 
which all individuality ceases.   
 The debate outlined above concerns the reciprocal nature of the inner god 
‘Shadow’, and the ‘highest brahman’ ‘Light’.  Moreover, the debate appears to be 
characterised by how interpreters view the larger philosophical system and the 
philosophical nature of Brahman; how is it that the ātman relates to Brahman, or put 
another way, how does ‘Shadow’ correlate with ‘Light’?  What exactly is the 
relationship between the rider and the charioteer within the illustration?  Line 3.4 is 
problematic regarding the relationship (3.4): 
 He (ātman) who is linked to the body, senses, and mind, 
 the wise proclaim as the one who enjoys. 
It is ambiguous in 3.4 regarding who or what is being referred to.  Most likely, ātman 
represents the rider, the inner god of ‘Shadow’.  Nikhilananda terms ātman here, the 
individual soul (1951: 149).  But the relationship between the ātman and the charioteer 
is still complicated by the term ‘linked’.  The charioteer may lay claim to such 
enjoyment as it is he who is physically ‘linked’ to the chariot, the reins, and the horses.  
Yet the rider (ātman) is still said to be in the chariot as well.  Therefore, it is not 
implausible to interpret, on textual evidence alone, that both the rider and the charioteer 
could equally be the ‘one who enjoys’ (3.4).  But would this compromise the nature of 
ātman as a distanced rider?     
 If ātman is the ‘one who enjoys’, that would mean that there is a complex 
relationship between ātman and the human intellect, especially due to the intellect 
holding the reins.  What about the relationship between the inner ‘Shadow’ and the 
human intellect?  The separation of self (ātman) and intellect is one evident 
interpretation within the text, especially as the ‘Shadow’ is in ‘the cave of the heart’, 
which is perhaps a metaphor for a hidden self (Ganeri, 2007: 21).  Ganeri is correct to 
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postulate a hidden self; the text supports such a reading at 2.12 and 3.12.  The hidden 
self promotes a project of self-discovery (Ganeri, 2007: 22).  And there is no greater 
wish than self-knowledge (Nikhilananda, 1951: 127).  Therefore, it is the intellect as the 
charioteer that is key to the embodied individual (Schiltz, 2006: 460), at least until the 
individual realises the Truth.  Therefore, the interpretation that we as a human intellect 
have an unknown god-like rider (ātman) is intriguing.   
 The ignorant never have their mind under control, meaning their senses never 
obey them ‘as bad horses, a charioteer’ (3.5).  Thus, the ignorant man who ‘lacks 
understanding’ and who ‘is unmindful and always impure’ continually does ‘not reach 
that final step, but gets on the round of rebirth (saṃsāra)’ (3.7).112  However, ‘when a 
man has understanding’ and ‘his mind is ever controlled’, then his ‘senses do obey him, 
as good horses, a charioteer’ (3.6).  Understanding and a controlled mind lead to the 
realisation of ‘that final step, from which he is not reborn again’ (3.8).  Importantly, this 
‘final step’ does not mean a person ceases to exist (Nikhilananda, 1951: 150).  The 
duality is clearly expressed between the ignorant and the wise.  The wise have a union 
of intellect and soul (ātman) (Schiltz, 2006: 459).  There is a balance suggested in this 
passage achieved through training, not submission or repression of sensual desires.  The 
natural tendency of a horse is to run wild, therefore, it must be trained (Nikhilananda, 
1951: 149).
113
  It is one’s full possession of a controlled mind which an individual 
needs, more so than trained horses.  For within the simile it is the mind that is the tool 
(reins) used by the intellect to bring the bodily senses under control.  Both mind and 
body are dependent on the intellect for good direction (Schiltz, 2006: 460).  Therefore, a 
wandering mind is of no use to the intellect, or indeed, to the individual on their ascent 
                                                 
112
 The term saṃsāra appears for the first time in the early Upaniṣads (Olivelle, 1998: 370). 
113
 Although, to take the simile to its fullest conclusion, a horse must first be broken before it can be 
properly used.   
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towards ‘the end of the road, that highest step of Viṣṇu’ (3.9).114  The intellect must turn 
away from the external world towards the self at 3.5-9; whilst the intellect is focused on 
sensible objects one cannot grasp something insensible (Schiltz, 2006: 460).     
 The chariot can take its ‘rider to his destination only when it is well built, when 
the driver knows his way, and when the reins are strong, the horses firmly held, and the 
roads well chosen’ (Nikhilananda, 1951: 151).  Discrimination and inner calmness are 
the two most important elements of self-control endorsed in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
(Nikhilananda, 1951: 151).  Importantly, the intellect and the ātman must work as one.   
 There follows a list describing the order of progression to the Supreme (3.10-
11).  Senses lead to objects, then to mind, followed by intellect, and after that ‘the 
immense self’ (3.10).  The ‘immense self’ (ātma mahan), literally, the great self.115  
Such an ‘immense self’ is beyond the intellect, meaning that the intellect/charioteer is 
not ‘the immense self’.  It is hard to place the individual—the embodied self—within 
such a process.  There are the building blocks of human beings with the senses, sense 
objects, mind, and intellect; but how is one to interpret the ‘immense self’?  It seems 
that the ‘immense self’ is distinct from the human characteristics previously described.  
Such an interpretation accentuates the notion that the ‘immense self’ is ‘Higher than the 
intellect’.  One realises ‘the immense self’ once one has transcended ‘Higher than’ the 
bodily process.  The second echelon of the process moves from the ‘immense self’ to 
the ‘unmanifest’, followed by the ‘person’ or ‘spirit’, ‘Higher than the person there’s 
nothing at all’, and that is the goal (3.11).116  If the ‘unmanifest’ represents a Oneness 
behind the world of sense objects, then an unmanifested reality has individuation as its 
                                                 
114 The name Viṣṇu is used for the Eternal Supreme Self, Brahman (Radhakrishnan, 1953: 625).   
115
 Radhakrishnan acknowledges two interpretations of ātma mahan: referring to the world soul (Hiranya-
garbha); or the individual self (1953: 625).  Nikhilananda interprets the ātma mahan as Hiranya-garbha 
(1951:153).   
116
 The ‘unmanifest’ refers to Brahman, the ultimate cause of all causes (Nikhilananda, 1951: 153).  The 
‘person’, or better translated as ‘spirit’, denotes the Eternal within a body.  The realisation of the final 
goal is that all things are finally absorbed by Brahman, the Reality underlying all things (Nikhilananda, 
1951: 154).   
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ultimate projection.  Therefore, reality is ‘unmanifest’ and at the same time it is an 
individual One, and there is ‘nothing at all’ higher than the individual One.  As such, the 
‘immense self’ is a useful step on a transcending scale, but the further up the scale one 
progresses, the more one realises the illusion of distinct individuals; since there is only 
One ‘person’, and it is ‘Higher than the unmanifest’.  Verses 3.10-11 represent a ‘pass 
from outward nature to the one world-ground, avyakta [unmanifest], and from it to the 
spirit behind’ (Radhakrishnan, 1953: 626).  One must turn one’s attention from the 
external world of sense perception, towards the internal world of contemplating the One 
behind all external distinctions.   
 The One is ‘Hidden in all beings’, requiring ‘keen vision’ to see ‘this self’ 
(3.12).  Such a Self is hidden like the sun behind a patch of clouds (Nikhilananda, 1951: 
154).  It is important to note that it is the same divine Self that exists in all beings.
117
  It 
is ‘with eminent and sharp minds [intellect]’ that people ‘see him’ (3.12).  One uses the 
‘intelligent self’ to control ‘speech and mind’ (3.13); as the charioteer controls the 
senses and the reins in his grasp.  Then one turns the ‘intelligent self’ away from 
discrete individuality upon realisation of the ‘immense self’ (3.13).  Here the distinction 
between intellect and the ‘immense self’ is once more made clear.  The ‘tranquil self’ 
that controls the ‘immense self’ refers to the ‘person’ of 3.11.  The Eternal is free from 
any distinction or difference to others or itself (Nikhilananda, 1951: 155).  The ‘person’ 
‘has no sound or touch, no appearance, taste, or smell; It is without beginning or end, 
undecaying and eternal’ (3.15).  Furthermore, once a man has perceived the 
‘unmanifest’ followed by the ‘person’, then ‘He is freed from the jaws of death’ (3.15).  
He is freed from death because death affects only distinct bodily individuals.  For what 
is a person if not a distinct individual?  Upon the realisation that all is One there can be 
no death, or, indeed, individuality.  Therefore, one must ‘Arise! Awake!’ from the sleep 
                                                 
117
 It is only the ignorant body that accounts for diversity within the universe (Nikhilananda, 1951: 154).   
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of ignorance quickly as the path to Oneness is difficult like a ‘razor’s sharp edge is hard 
to cross’ (3.14).  But the path to freedom lies within every man, literally.  
 Section 3 portrays the two selves theory by means of a chariot simile.  There are 
two distinct attributes of the individual self and the Eternal Self; the former entangled in 
the world, the latter free from it (Nikhilananda, 1951: 146).  Possibly one exists in the 
‘cave of the heart’ and the other in the ‘highest region beyond’ (3.1).  However, in two 
different translations the two selves are both said to exist in the ‘secret place of the 
heart’ (Radhakrishnan, 1953: 621; Nikhilananda, 1951: 146).  Both selves are described 
as ‘drinking the truth’ of karmic action.  Though, Nikhilananda believes karmic fruit 
should only attach itself to the individual self, as the Eternal Self is ‘the detached 
Witness’ (1951: 146).  Such an interpretation goes against the literal rendering of the 
text.  What is clear, however, is that this section shows that meditation on the inner self 
will lead to Supreme knowledge due to the close connection between the Eternal Self 
and the individual self (Radhakrishnan, 1953: 621).  Both selves appear to be ‘drinking 
the truth’ and inter-related (3.1).  Even if the Supreme Self is a detached Witness, as 
Nikhilananda believes, the Eternal Self is still witnessing that individual self and the 
results of its karmic fruits.  Therefore, there is an attachment between Eternal and 
individual, even if the Eternal Self has no karmic fruits of its own.  After all, they 
inhabit the same body, the same chariot.  With the Eternal Self hidden, an individual 
human self is required to account for individualism.  That individual self, expressed in 
the chariot simile, is a connection between the ātman and the human intellect.      
5.4 Kaṭha Upaniṣad 4: Wise Men and Fools 
 Section 4 is where Radhakrishnan believes Kaṭha Upaniṣad ends, with the next 
six sections being later additions (1953: 629).  Whether this is true or not is only 
important if dating is a specific issue.  However, with this problem in mind it is only 
necessary to analyse extracts and individual verses, rather than whole sections as 
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previously done.  Extracting individual verses and lines enables one to correlate the 
outstanding material with what has been argued previously.  That way, if these final 
sections are a later addition, they are giving further support to the Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
doctrine, rather than the arguments resting on the later section’s validity. 
 Examining the common set of principles, one finds an emphasis once more on 
the inward sight as opposed to outward perception.  The wise man ‘turned his sight 
inward and saw the self within’ (4.1).  The ‘wise man in search of immortality’ is 
actually searching for the ‘Self-existent One’ (4.1); an inward journey into the very 
Reality of the human and the universe.  Such a ‘Self-existent One’ is not reliant on any 
external cause to account for its reality; as the phrase suggests it is ‘Self-existent’ and 
individually One.  Therefore, if it is One it is the cause of all other existence, as it 
‘pierced the apertures outward’ causing men to look out instead of in (4.1).  
 In contrast to the inward journey of the ‘wise man’, the ‘Fools’ pursue ‘outward 
desires’ (4.2).  The ‘Fools’ are constantly entering ‘the trap of death’ as a result of their 
pursuit of desire (4.2).  Once more it is the pursuit of bodily desire that keeps death re-
occurring.  The world of desire is unstable and in direct contrast with the stable world of 
the ‘Self-existent One’ that lies behind the sensory world.  As a result, ‘in unstable 
things here do not seek the stable’ (4.2).  The term ‘here’ denotes the sensory world, and 
the ‘unstable things’ are the sense objects pursued by our ‘outward desires’.  The Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad has already described how the One is ‘without beginning or end, undecaying 
and eternal...fixed and beyond the immense’ (3.15), it is that ‘stable’ unto which we 
seek.   
 A man experiences outward reality of ‘Appearance and taste, smell and sounds, 
touches and sexual acts’ and by that ‘which one experiences these, by the same one 
understands’ (4.3).  It is the same ‘one’ that experiences the outward reality and is the 
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inner Reality.  Upon such an understanding ‘what then is here left behind?’ (4.3).  If a 
man ‘understands’, then nothing remains ‘here’ in the sensory world worth caring for.  
One must understand that a man is ‘th’immense, all-pervading self’; at such a point ‘a 
wise man does not grieve’ (4.4).  The ‘immense, all-pervading self’ is the ‘living, 
honey-eating self’ (4.5).  An interpretation of such a verse is that the ‘immense’ self is 
an enjoyer of action.
118
  Again, such an ‘immense’ self is characterised as eternal 
through the description the ‘lord of what was and what will be’.     
 Diversity and ‘unstable things’ are part of the sensory world.  With ‘your mind 
alone you must understand’ through inner contemplation that ‘there is here no diversity 
at all’ (4.11).  Therefore, duality is illusionary.  This world and that world do not really 
exist.  Anyone who fails to comprehend the truth instead ‘see[ing] here ... diversity’, 
goes from ‘death to death’ (4.11).119  The text’s pronouncement that a ‘person 
[ātman/Self] the size of a thumb resides within the body’ is problematic (4.12).  If there 
is no diversity, how can there be a hidden Self the ‘size of a thumb’ within a body?  
Without diversity the thumb-sized Self would be hiding within its Self.  There appears a 
need for a division between, on the one hand, the thumb-sized Self and, on the other 
hand, what it is that the thumb-size Self is hiding in.  If all diversity is just mis-
association of sensory perception, within the phenomenal world there cannot be a 
thumb-sized Self.  Therefore, there is a problem concerning the relationship between the 
manifest phenomenal sensory world and the True reality.  The problem correlates 
directly to another issue; the relationship between the individual and Eternal Self.  This 
relationship is set out within the chariot simile, but is not successfully concluded. 
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 This can be applied retrospectively to the chariot simile, and the argument about which part of a man 
enjoys the fruits of karma (action). 
119
 It seems an appropriate question to ask why the multiform sensory world ever came into fruition?  If 
indeed, all is One, the phenomenal world can have come from no-where else.   
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5.5 Kaṭha Upaniṣad 5: Embodiment 
 In section 5, the distinct nature of self and bodily senses appears once more.  
The realisation of self leads to a separation from the body at the point of death.  When 
the ‘embodied self dwelling in the body comes unglued and is freed from the body – 
what then is here left behind?’ (5.4).  The ‘embodied self’ is ‘dwelling in the body’ but 
has no ties to that body; as the self is to become ‘unglued and is free from the body’ 
leaving nothing behind with the body at the point of death.  This is an important point to 
establish fully.  Death is only a physical occurrence for the body.  Furthermore, death is 
the process of ungluing the self from its embodiment.  But crucially, death has no effect 
on the embodied self, as nothing is left behind with the dead physical body.
120
  One can 
realise that an individual leaves the sensory body behind and understand that the world 
of sense desire is a fallacy.  The preceding verses (5.1-3) suggest that the ‘embodied 
self’ referred to in 5.4 is the Eternal Self;121 for, ‘On it all the worlds rest; beyond it no 
one can ever pass’ (5.8). 
 If death is a bodily event that frees the ‘embodied self’, then what brings life to 
the body?  Section 5 explicitly suggests that the source of life is the Eternal Self (5.5): 
 Not by the out-breath, not by the in-breath; 
 does any mortal live; 
 By another do people live, on which those two depend. 
The physical animation of the body, breathing in and out, is dependent on the Eternal 
Self.  The Self is the cause of vitality.  The suggestion in 5.5 is that the body does not 
have intrinsic life on its own, without the ‘embodied self’.   
 The Eternal Self is the source of life and the narrator describes ‘what happens to 
the self...when it encounters death’ (5.6-7): 
                                                 
120
 The phrasing is unusual, for if the realisation of Brahman is a realisation of all being One, how can 
there be a separation from anything?  
121
 Therefore, there is a problem relating to dualism and monism, regarding self and sensory objects.   
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 7.Some enter a womb by which 
 an embodied self obtains a body 
 Others pass into a stationary thing –  
 according to what they have done, 
 according to what they have learned. 
Here is the strongest description of the rebirth doctrine present in Kaṭha Upaniṣad.  It is 
clear that an ‘embodied self’ does not animate everything that it embodies, as it can 
exist in a ‘stationary thing’.  Furthermore, rebirth is directly correlated to ‘what they 
have done’ and ‘what they have learned’ (5.7).  It is one’s actions, memory, and 
understanding that pass on through rebirths. Therefore, it is this life now that explicitly 
correlates to the next life after.   
 What is truly remarkable, though, is how this One Eternal Self correlates to the 
individual that is created in a new rebirth (5.9): 
 As the single fire, entering living beings,  
 adapts its appearance to match that of each; 
 So the single self within every being,  
 adapts its appearance to match that of each, 
 yet remains quite distinct. 
There is a ‘single self within every being’ that ‘adapts its appearance to match that of 
each’ individual ‘living being’ (5.9).  Such an adaption correlates to 5.7 and the rebirth 
that is instigated from previous action, memory, and understanding.  The ‘single self’ 
must also ‘adapt its appearance’ to fit the new body it has obtained.   However, the 
‘single self’ ‘remains quite distinct’ from individual appearances (5.9).  There seems to 
be a subtle and fragile relationship presented between individual bodies and the ‘single 
self’. 122  At the same time the ‘single self within every being’ must be all encompassing 
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 Does the ‘single self within every being’ become the ‘embodied self’; meaning that the ‘single self’ 
remains distinct, but the ‘embodied self’ can change according to individual lives?  Or are the ‘single self’ 
and the ‘embodied self’ referring to the same self?  
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and also ‘distinct’ residing in an individual body.  It is a relationship stressed but also 
blurred in section 5.9-13.  On Brahman it is believed that ‘the whole world rests’; as all 
is One with Brahman (5.8).  Yet the ‘single self’ ‘is not stained by the suffering of the 
world’ (5.11).  As a result, distinct individuality is an illusion (5.12): 
 The one controller, the self within every being, 
 who makes manifold his single appearance; 
 The wise who perceive him as abiding within themselves, 
 they alone, not others, enjoy eternal happiness. 
The ‘single self’ is the ‘one controller’ of a living being.  Furthermore, it is this ‘single 
self’ that is responsible for individual diversity through making itself ‘manifold’ in the 
world.  However, Kaṭha Upaniṣad has previously stated (5.9-11) that the ‘single self’ 
remains ‘distinct’.  Therefore, the ‘wise who perceive’ the one ‘single self’ that is 
‘abiding within themselves’ realise that they are ‘eternal’.  At such a point individuation 
must cease to exist in any meaningful way.  The ‘single self’ is ‘changeless, among the 
changing, the intelligent, among intelligent beings’ (5.13).  But the ‘single self’ is also 
the one responsible for ‘dispens[ing] desires among the many’ (5.13).  Section 5 clearly 
states that the ‘single self’ is ‘distinct’ from change, but is at the same time ‘manifold’ 
within that ‘changing’ world.  The ‘single self’ ‘adapts its appearance’ making itself 
‘manifold’ and numerous, is the ‘one controller’, and ‘dispenses desires’; but it remains 
‘distinct’, One, and ‘not stained by the suffering of the world’.  It is simply the fault of 
the individual to associate themselves with the ‘manifold’ sensory adaptation, instead of 
the ‘distinct’ ‘single self within every being’.    
5.6 Kaṭha Upaniṣad 6: The Eternal Banyan Tree 
 An interesting comparative image is made between Brahman and ‘the eternal 
banyan tree’ that inverts the typical tree root image (6.1):   
 Its roots above, its branches below, 
 this is the eternal banyan tree. 
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 That alone is the Bright! That is brahman! 
  That alone is called the Immortal! 
 On it all the worlds rest; 
 beyond it no one can ever pass. 
 Brahman is said to have ‘Its roots above, its branches below’ (6.1).  The image of a tree 
is reversed; usually a tree’s roots are below and the branches above.  However, in this 
image the roots are above and the ‘branches below’.  Roots are a stable image for 
growth and stability; they provide the nutrients for the branches to grow.  Therefore, the 
roots are above existing in the eternal Brahman.  All things come from Brahman, ‘On it 
all the worlds rest, beyond it no one can ever pass’ (6.1).  Furthermore, the branches are 
below belonging to the corporeal world of embodiment.  There are individual branches 
that have distinct special existences, but there is still only one tree.  This can be applied 
to human individuals’ relationship to Brahman and the ‘single self’.  There are many 
appearances as there are many branches; but there is only one ‘single self’, one tree that 
holds all appearances together and gives all life.  
 There is an especially intriguing verse in section 6 regarding a representation of 
Brahman and the ‘single self’ that is hard to interpret and understand (6.5):  
 As in a mirror, so in the body; 
 As in a dream, so in the fathers’ world; 
 As in water a thing becomes somewhat visible,  
 so in the Gandharva world; 
 Somewhat as in shadows and light, 
 so in brahman’s world. 
A ‘mirror’ has a reflection; a ‘dream’ has a remembrance; and ‘water’ has an imprecise 
reflection.  Yet in ‘brahman’s world’ it is clearly ‘shadows and light’.  Such a portrayal 
can be compared to section 3.1’s opening remark about ‘the two who have entered’ 
being ‘Shadow’ and ‘Light’.  In that section one was in the ‘cave of the heart’ and the 
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other in ‘the highest region beyond’ (3.1).  These dual natures can be compared to the 
‘eternal banyan tree’ that has ‘roots above’ and ‘branches below’ (6.1).  There is the 
Reality and then there is the projection or manifestation.  Verse 6.5 is describing the 
different levels or types of projection. 
 A further connection is made to section 3 when the narrator asserts that the 
‘senses are firmly reined in’ (6.11).  Once this has happened, ‘From distractions a man 
is then free’ (6.11).  An individual is bound to this sensory world through desire.  It is 
only when the ‘desires lurking in one’s heart’ are ‘banished’ that one ‘becomes 
immortal’ (6.14).  Therefore, it is the very process of desiring that keeps death re-
occurring.  Such desires ‘bind one’s heart on earth’ until ‘the knots are all cut’ (6.15).  
One must ‘draw him [Self] out of the body with determination’ (6.17).  Such talk once 
more makes Self sound distinct from the earthly world.  The language is one of dualism, 
where the Self must be cut free from the bondage of the body and their desires.  This is 
different from the idea that Self is One, and that individuals place the emphasis 
incorrectly on individuality through sense perception.  But the difference could be 
explained through section 4 and beyond being later additions.         
Conclusion: Key Ideas 
 Having analysed Kaṭha Upaniṣad as an individual cultural text, I can now 
identify the three key ideas that will be used for the Comparative Method.  Firstly, I 
finished the chapter with ‘the eternal banyan tree’ (6.1; my section 5.6). The concept of 
‘roots’ and a ‘tree’ show the interconnectivity between the manifest world and 
Brahman.  The image specifically showed how beyond it—Brahman—nothing can 
pass.  This shows the interconnectivity between the manifest world and Brahman as 
well as the connection between ātman and Brahman.  Moreover, the eternal banyan tree 
shows the interconnectivity between the single, all-encompassing reality of Brahman 
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and its many projections.  This is an all-encompassing nature of reality as opposed to a 
changing, multiple world, expressed via the root image.    
  Secondly, Kaṭha Upaniṣad (3.1-3.3; my section 5.3) draws attention to two 
entities, ātman and charioteer.  The ātman is described as the ‘rider’, or the self that is 
removed, and the charioteer is the intellect, or the human mind. The key idea here is 
identity, specifically the identity of the ‘two selves’ of Kaṭha Upaniṣad.   Thirdly, I 
presented a cultural view in Kaṭha Upaniṣad where understanding leads to liberation 
from transmigration.  The key idea here is moral accountability.  According to Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad, what affects the liberation of the ātman is ‘what they have done’ and ‘what 
they have learned’ (5.7; my section 5.5).  The ‘fools go round’, led themselves by one 
‘who is himself blind’ (2.5).  The poignancy of the metaphor is apt.  Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
has an ethical dimension to transmigration and liberation, as what someone has done 
keeps an ātman within the cycle of transmigration.  This is Kaṭha Upaniṣad’s karmic 
element.  But it is understanding that above all else leads to liberation. 
 I now turn in Chapter 6 to my examination of Empedocles’ poem. First I shall 
show how Empedocles shares three specific concerns with these ideas from the Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad, in his discussions relating to death, identity, and moral accountability.    
Second, I shall show how the three Shared Concerns give rise to a specific problem of 
liberation in his poem in need of solution through three interrelated questions.  
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Chapter 6: Empedocles: The Shared Concerns 
Introduction 
 The overall aim of Part Two is to investigate discussions of death and identity in 
the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and Empedocles’ poem.  In this chapter I show how Empedocles 
and Kaṭha Upaniṣad have Shared Concerns (Claim 1) on: the all-encompassing nature 
of a single reality and its relation to the world of change, expressed through an image of 
roots; questions of identity and the existence of two selves or kinds; and moral 
accountability across death and rebirths.  
 I shall demonstrate how in Empedocles’ poem these questions of death and 
identity are present in his discussions of first the Cosmic Cycle as all-encompassing 
reality (6.1); second the composition of different substances relating to human identity, 
where two distinct selves or kinds emerge (6.2); and third the moral accountability of 
those substances across deaths and rebirths (6.3).
123
  Thus I shall defend Claim 1, that 
Shared Concerns exist between Empedocles’ poem and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad.  But in this 
chapter I shall also set up Claim 2. For while examining these key discussions in 
Empedocles’ poem, it will be shown that all three result in interpretative problems 
within Empedocles. This chapter will thus lay the ground for the Comparative 
Methodology to be applied in Chapter 7, where the ideas of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad will be 
used to solve specific problems in Empedocles in areas of Shared Concerns.  There is 
one main issue—liberation—emerging from the three Shared Concerns when taken 
together. 
                                                 
123
 The term composition here refers to the composition of human beings; I am not commenting on the 
composition of Empedocles’ writing. 
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6.1 Empedocles’ Cosmos    
 Empedocles introduces his four material substances, which are described as 
traditional theological gods (Fragment 7/6):
 124
   
 τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε· 
 Ζεὺς ἀργὴς Ἥρη τε φερέσβιος ἠδ’ ’Αϊδωνεύς, 
 Νῆστίς θ’ ἥ δακρύοις τέγγει κρούνωμα βρότειον.  
 Hear first the four roots of all things: 
 bright Zeus and life-bringing Hera and Aidoneus 
 and Nestis, whose tears are the source of mortal streams. 
In Wright’s commentary the term ῥιζώματα is described as ‘root clumps’, literally 
referring used ‘of trees’, or ‘ancestry’ and ‘offspring’ (1981: 164).  These ‘four roots’ 
are often expressed as elements; the constitutional make-up of ‘all things’.  However, 
Empedocles’ own terminology ‘roots’, instead of using the later term ‘element’, will be 
used here.  There is disagreement regarding the allocation of the roots to the divine 
gods, which stems from antiquity.  For the purposes of this discussion, the correct 
allocation of roots to gods is not necessary. Instead the importance is placed on the roots 
themselves, not their personification as divinities.  Importantly, however, the four roots 
correspond to earth, air, fire, and water as seen in the physical world.
125
  After the four 
roots, Empedocles introduces the motive forces Love and Strife.  It is here that 
Empedocles describes a reciprocal process of One from Many, and Many from One 
(8/17: lines 6-8):
 
 
 καὶ ταῦτ’ ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει, 
 ἄλλοτε μὲν φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα, 
 ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορεύμενα νείκεος ἔχθει. 
  And these things [four roots] never cease their continual exchange of position, at 
 one time all coming together into one through love, at another again being borne 
 away from each other by strife’s repulsion. 
                                                 
124
 For all fragments Wright’s translation is used. The numbering system I employ states Wright’s order 
of composition followed by that of Diels-Kranz.  Where the fragment is of sufficient length I will also 
provide the line numbers.   Where other translators are used alongside Wright, they are named. Where 
Inwood is used, these translations refer to Inwood, 1992. 
125
 According to Wright, the best tradition is the Theophrastean one: Zeus is fire, Hera is air, Aidoneus is 
earth, and Nestis is water (1981: 165).  
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   And these things never cease from constantly alternating, 
 at one time all coming together by love into one, 
 and at another time again all being borne apart separately by the hostility of  
 strife. (Inwood, 25/17: 6-8). 
The two motive forces instigate a continual process of reciprocal cosmic change, where 
Love brings the four roots into One and Strife once again separates the One into Many.  
Both One and Many are the extremes of the Cosmic Cycle, with human life existing in 
the middle.  On a cosmic level ‘birth’ is a change from one state to another; this creates 
no ‘abiding life’ for individual states (8/17: 9-11).  Nevertheless, since this process of 
cosmic change/‘birth’ is continual and eternal, the ‘roots’ exist ‘forever unaltered in the 
cycle’ of change (8/17: 12-13).  In essence, Empedocles ascribes uniformity and 
stability to a Cosmic Cycle where change is universally present, thus creating an 
equilibrium.  Change occurs within an unchanging framework and according to an 
unchanging pattern of change. It is change within the same. 
 The term ‘forever unaltered’ appears to contradict the existence of change.  
However, on closer examination Empedocles believes that it does the exact opposite.  
Empedocles ascribes ‘abiding life’ to the roots, as they remain ‘forever unaltered’ at 
their most fundamental numerical level.  Explicitly, the uniformity of the roots is 
present within the framework of eternal cosmic change (8/17: 12-13):  
 ᾗ δὲ διαλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει, 
 ταύτῃ δ’ αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον. 
  Insofar as they [the roots] never cease their continual exchange,  
 so far they are forever unaltered in the cycle.  
 but insofar as they never cease from constantly interchanging, 
in this respect they are always unchanged in a cycle. (Inwood, 25/17: 12-13).   
No one mixed qualitative state of the cycle has ‘abiding life’.  But the fundamental 
component parts—the roots—have ‘abiding life’.  Therefore, it is each mixed state’s 
correlation to the whole cycle of change, and the mixed roots, that provides continuity.  
The very nature of the Cosmic Cycle determines that each state will once again have 
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‘birth’ through continual mixing.  One will come from Many, and Many will come from 
One continually.  For Empedocles, change is qualitative; what changes has ‘no abiding 
life’ to begin with, i.e. the mixed states.  According to Empedocles, the roots mix and 
un-mix, creating different states at different times, but fundamentally the roots do not 
change their numerical characteristics, i.e. their individual ‘root-ness’.  Therefore, 
Empedocles believes stability exists within the cosmic change, provided by the 
individual four roots and the equilibrium of the cycle of reciprocity.
126
  
 The reciprocal process of the four roots becoming One and then Many is all 
there is (8/17: 30-31 and 34-35):  
 nothing comes to birth later in addition to these, and there is no passing away,  
 for if they were continuously perishing they would no longer exist.  
  
 No, these are the only real things, but as they run 
 through each other they become different objects at different times, yet they are 
 throughout forever the same. 
  (Wright, 8/17).   
  
 And in addition to them nothing comes into being nor ceases [to be]; 
 for if they constantly perished, they would no longer be.  
  
 But these very things are, and running through each other 
 They become different at different times and are always, perpetually alike. 
 (Inwood, 25/17). 
There can be nothing added to or taken away from the roots.  The four roots are all-
encompassing; there is nothing added or taken away from the Cosmic Cycle.  
Empedocles does not see change as the annihilation of one state and the genesis of 
another new state.  Change occurs dependent on what came before.  There is a 
continuation.  The four roots, and the process of continual change attached to them, are 
the only things that are; even when ‘they become different objects at different times’ 
they are ‘forever the same’ (8/17: 34-35).  In essence, Empedocles rejects the concept of 
complete change; nothing comes ‘into existence from that which is not’ and for that 
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 There is a fundamental problem in this theory: how do you explain that something that is capable of 
undergoing change remains, nonetheless, unchanged? Can this problem be solved? Or might this be a 
fatal flaw in the whole theory? 
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which ‘exists [four roots] to be completely destroyed cannot be fulfilled’ (9/12).  Beings 
are complex and contain a multiplicity of determinations. Those determinations are not 
all the same for the establishment of an identity. But the root, which is characterised by 
being, for example, pure water, is mixed with something else, then it changes radically, 
becoming something other than pure water. The problem for Empedocles, therefore, is 
not change in something that is intrinsically complex (i.e. the worldly compositions), 
but rather change in something that is simple (i.e. a root).  At the cosmic level there are 
uncertainties about the continued identity of a ‘root’ as it mixes.  But Empedocles pre-
empts the objection by describing the roots as eternal, fundamental, and elemental.  The 
roots were not born and will never perish.  The cycle is an all-encompassing reality with 
the four roots as the building blocks from which all else is mixed. 
 As with all else within the cycle mortals are a composition of the four roots, and 
therefore cannot have the same justification as the four roots for being eternal or 
elemental.  Attention must now turn to the composition of mortal beings and a specific 
problem that arises concerning the relation between humans and daimons. 
6.2 Composition and Identity of Substances 
 In this section I will show how Empedocles’ account of living creatures gives 
rise to two kinds of substances: humans (6.2.1), and daimons (6.2.2).  Mortal beings are 
compositions (13/9).  There is ‘only mixing, and separating of what has been mixed’ 
(12/8).  In section 6.1 I dealt with the physical component parts.  But what has not been 
explained is how the mixing and separating of the four roots relates to an individual 
person.  However, to begin talking about individuals, I first examine the constituent 
parts. 
The mixing process is what humans call ‘birth’ (12/8).  Therefore, human ‘birth’ 
represents a mixing of different component parts that already exist in some form.  
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Ultimately, there is nothing absolutely new created.  Compositions of mixing and un-
mixing abolish genesis and annihilation.  Human death is simply the compound 
separating and continuing to exist in different forms.  Physically, mortals are 
compositions that have birth through the mixing of already existent parts, with death 
being the separation of these existent parts.  The fundamental constitution of mortal 
beings is reliant on the ‘four roots of all things’.  Empedocles explicitly tells his reader 
(14/21: 9-14): 
 ἐκ τῶν πάνθ’ ὅσα τ’ ἦν ὅσα τ’ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται ὀπίσσω, 
 [10] δένδρεά τ’ ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες ἠδὲ γυναῖκες, 
 θῆρές τ’ οἰωνοί τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονες ἰχθῦς, 
 καί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιμῇσι φέριστοι. 
 αὐτὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ταῦτα, δι’ ἀλλήλων δὲ θέοντα 
 γίγνεται ἀλλοιωπά· †τόγον† διὰκρισις ἀμείβει. 
 From them [four roots] comes all that was and is and will be hereafter – trees 
 have sprung from them, and men and women, and animals and birds and water-
 nourished fish, and long-lived gods too, highest in honour. For these are the only 
 real things, and as they run through each other they assume different shapes, for 
 the mixing interchanges them. (Wright, 14/21: 9-14). 
 For these very things are, and running through each other 
 They become different in appearance. For the blending changes them. (Inwood, 
 26/21: 13-14). 
As a statement, fragment 14/21 is extremely powerful.  Instead of Wright’s translation 
the ‘only real things’ referring to the ‘four roots’ I use Inwood’s alternative ‘very’, 
translating αὐτὰ as ‘these very things are’.  The mortal compositions are ‘real’; they 
exist manifold in the world.  There is no distinction in Empedocles between an un-‘real’ 
material world and a ‘real’ immaterial world; or unreal compositions and a real world of 
roots.  However, the roots exist in their own right, everything else is compounded roots, 
though these compounds are not said to be ‘unreal’.  The roots are material and 
elemental to their later compounds.  Therefore, Wright’s translation ‘real’ could be 
misleading if taken to allude to a real/non-real duality which the text does not posit.   
 The distinction between the roots and their ensuing compounds is one of 
fundamental contrasted with non-fundamental substances.  Furthermore, it is only the 
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four roots that have existed before, during, and after human life has ended.
127
  
Therefore, the compositions of mortal beings are only temporary states of mixtures.  
These compositions are not a fundamental whole, since the separable roots are the only 
things that ‘are’.  And unlike the elemental roots that cannot be annihilated, the mixture 
can cease to exist once separation has taken place.  The mixture has no continued 
existence or reality removed from the relationship with the elemental constituent parts.  
Once separation takes place at an individual mixture’s death, that mixture no longer is 
but was; whereas, the roots fundamentally ‘are’.128  
 Empedocles specifies what constitutes mortality.  Mortal creatures are 
susceptible to dissolution (14/21: 9-12):   
 ἐκ τῶν πάνθ’ ὅσα τ’ ἦν ὅσα τ’ ἔστι καὶ ἔσται ὀπίσσω, 
 [10] δένδρεά τ’ ἐβλάστησε καὶ ἀνέρες ἠδὲ γυναῖκες, 
 θὴρές τ’ οἰωνοί τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονες ἰχθῦς, 
 καί τε θεοὶ δολιχαίωνες τιμῇσι φέριστοι. 
 From these all things that were, that are, and will be in the future 
 [10] have sprung: trees and men and women 
 and beasts and birds and water-nourished fish, 
 and long-lived gods first in their prerogatives. (Inwood, 26/21: 9-12). 
Men, women, plants and animals are included as one might reasonably expect.  
Astonishingly, Empedocles includes ‘gods’ in the list concerning mixtures (14/21: 12).  
Therefore, gods for Empedocles are no more elemental or fundamental than humans; 
they too must at some point separate like all mixtures.  It is discernible that Empedocles 
views gods as mixtures by the epithet he bestows on them: ‘long-lived gods’.  Gods are 
not eternal, they are ‘long-lived’.  For reasons that are not clear, gods have the ability to 
hold onto a current mixture for a longer time than humans and other mortal creatures.  
And yet, Empedocles still banishes gods from the realm of the eternal to that of the 
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 Interestingly, this statement holds true whether referring to an individual human composition or 
humankind as a species.  The ‘roots’ outlive us all. 
128
 However, once again, it is difficult to understand how the roots remain as they are even when they are 
mixed. 
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mortal.  It is clear, due to the Cosmic Cycle, that the elemental ‘four roots of all things’ 
are the only things that have eternal life. 
 Empedocles describes the process of mixing and separating of roots through a 
simile of a painting (15/23).  Painters ‘take in their hands pigments of various colors, 
and after fitting them in close combination...produce from them shapes resembling all 
things’ (15/23).  The ‘pigments of various colors’ represent the four roots.  And as the 
four roots combine to make mortal mixtures, so too do the ‘pigments’.  To secure the 
comparison between the ‘pigments’ and the roots, Empedocles uses the same list of 
terms from fragment 14/21: 10-14 in fragment 15/23: 5-8: 
 ἐκ τῶν εἴδεα πᾶσιν ἀλίγκια πορσύνουσι, 
 δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἠδὲ γυναῖκας, 
 θῆράς τ’ οἰωνούς τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονας ἰχθῦς, 
 καί τε θεοὺς δολιχαίωνας τιμῇσι φερίστους· 
 They produce from them shapes resembling all things, creating trees and men 
 and women, animals and birds and water-nourished fish, and long-lived gods 
 too, highest in honor.  
There seems no reason to assume that mixtures of roots are any more fundamental than 
the paintings that decorate temple walls (15/23).  In the case of representative paintings 
and mixtures of roots, both are fundamentally coupled to their elemental constituent 
parts.  So much so that changing one elemental part of the mixture changes the whole, 
fundamentally.  However, mixtures of roots, unlike the paint, are not necessarily 
‘shapes resembling all things’, as the mixtures of the roots are things; but both paintings 
and mixtures are created through the mixing of elemental constituent parts and produce 
representations of parts.  The mixtures are derivatives of the roots as paintings are 
derivatives of the pigments.  Fundamental stability is held only by the ‘four roots of all 
things’.  A painting of a god is as susceptible to perishing as a living god in the Cosmic 
sense.  Τhere are differences between a living god and a painting, but neither sustains 
their mixture for the entirety of the Cosmic Cycle.  Therefore, the painting and the god 
are both perishable. 
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 In addition to the four roots, Empedocles’ account shows how the formation of 
viable objects requires also a particular principle of formation: ratio. What are the 
principles of ratio for mortal creatures?  And how do the mixtures work to create a 
living, walking, and thinking creature?  Empedocles’ key idea is proportion.   
6.2.1 Human Substance 
 When describing how living creatures come into being, Empedocles accounts 
for the construction of individual limbs, and then the separate process of individual 
limbs combining to make a whole form.  A ratio for the construction of bones is 
provided (48/96).  One can infer that the ratio of the mixture is of high importance for 
creating parts and limbs.  Once a ratio has been established and limbs have been 
created, then limbs must be properly fitted together.  Fitting whole creatures is a process 
that requires a ratio, but in a different way to the fitting together of the individual limbs.  
The incorrect sequencing of limbs will result in a mixture that is flawed in 50/57: 
 ᾗ πολλαὶ μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν. 
 γυμνοὶ δ’ ἐπλάζοντο βραχίονες εὔνιδες ὤμων, 
 ὄμματα τ’ οἶ’ ἐπλανᾶτο πενητεύοντα μετώπων 
 Here many heads sprang up without necks,  
 bare arms were wandering without shoulders,  
 and eyes needing foreheads strayed singly. 
The building materials are the four roots, yet without the correct ratio successful mortal 
life will not come to fruition.  Additionally, as Wright states, it is not the roots ‘of which 
something is made that gives it its character, but the logos of their combination’ (1981: 
209).  The ‘logos of their combination’ may result in many wondrous mortal forms 
coming into existence before the most successful mixtures come to be (52/61; 53/62).   
 If a ratio of individual limbs is to be seen as a logos, what is it that gives whole 
mixtures order?  The sequencing of limbs requires another important factor: Love.  
Love is found in every mixture as Love ‘binds’ the material parts together (60/71).  
Mortal creatures have a combination of the ‘four roots’ and a constituent part of Love.  
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But equally a mortal creature’s constitutional make-up must also have an element of 
Strife.  For this prevents mortal creatures becoming indistinct Ones, which would 
happen through a complete possession by Love.  Strife is the motive force within 
mortals keeping the parts separate enough to be distinct, yet not absolutely 
disconnected.   Just as the ratio in bones, in whole creatures one sees a similar balance 
between Love and Strife. 
 So far the human being is a composition like all other material substances, 
formed from a mixture of the four roots and the forces of Love and Strife.  What is it 
that gives mortal creatures their perception and thought?  At the elemental level there is 
perception.  The roots and motive forces have a specific kind of ‘thought’ (77/109): 
 γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ’ ὕδωρ, 
 αἰθέρι δ’ αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀίδηλον, 
 στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ. 
 With earth we perceive earth, with water water,  
 with air divine air, with fire destructive fire,  
 with love love, and strife with baneful strife.    
The aspect of thought the roots allow is ‘like for like’ perception.129  This means that 
some level of perception is distributed throughout the entire natural world (Kahn, 1971: 
10).  Each root and motive force can perceive its counterpart in another.  Therefore, the 
ability to perceive is simply the result of our material constitution comprising the six 
principles of the four roots and Love and Strife (Trepanier, 2004: 160).  Hence, at a 
mortal creature’s most fundamental level of composition there is basic perception.  Such 
a conclusion is astounding, as it presupposes that mind and body are homogeneous 
(Kahn, 1971: 11).  Moving onto which part of a human specifically allows for thinking, 
and so differentiating between inanimate and animate beings, Empedocles introduces 
his ideas on blood.   
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 ‘Like for like’ is a phrase I employ to denote how with love one perceives love etc.  Because of our 
internal make-up we are able to perceive the same substances in other mixtures. 
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 A basic ‘like for like’ perception may be astonishing for a bush, when 
Empedocles states that he has previously been one (108/117).  But pertaining to human 
compositions, rational thought requires more sophistication than ‘like for like’ 
perception.  Empedocles expounds rational thought without requiring something distinct 
from the mortal material mixture.  The four roots and motive forces are the means by 
which compositions that can think do think, and also are able to ‘think and feel pleasure 
and pain’ (78/107).  Empedocles states that ‘All things are fitted together and 
constructed out of these, and by means of them they think and feel pleasure and pain’.  
So thought and perception are enabled by the composition of the four roots with Love 
and Strife. But the specific composition that is needed for thought is blood. Thought is 
found in the physiological mixture of every man (100/110: 10), and can be found 
around the heart because ‘for men, blood around the heart is thought’ (94/105). 
Perception, thought, and feelings manifest themselves through the combination of the 
‘four roots’ and the two motive forces.  And the difference between thought in 
inanimate and animate objects is blood.  Therefore by having blood, every mortal 
mixture has a share in thought (81/103; 100/110: 10).   
 Empedocles’ astounding idea frees his account from the requirement of a 
rational substance distinct from the body itself to initiate thought.  And through ‘like for 
like’, Empedocles has all he needs internally for basic perception, and this applies 
throughout all of mortal creation.   
 Having established the nature of the human composition, I turn now to a further 
kind of living, thinking substance in Empedocles: his daimon and consider how these 
two kinds of substances – human and daimon – are related.  
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6.2.2 Life-force and Daimon: Two Kinds of Substances 
 Empedocles’ physiological theories state that each mixture is a ratio or logos 
from the constituent parts of the four roots and the two motive forces.  With nothing 
else these mixtures have perception, sensation, thought, and intelligence.  With this 
constitution from the four roots alone, under the influences of Love and Strife, there is 
philosophically no need for a soul as an animating life-force (Barnes, 1979: 186; Kahn, 
1971: 8: Kirk, Raven, & Schofield, 1983: 322). This account seems complete and 
coherent until Empedocles introduces the idea of a daimon, for example in DK 115/ 
Wright 107.  What is a daimon?
130
  In a changeable and unsustainable mixture is there 
room to accommodate a daimon? And what is meant when Empedocles describes the 
ability to ‘lead from Hades the life-force of a dead man’ (ἄξεις δ’ ἐξ Ἀίδαο 
καταφθιμένου μένος ἀνδρός) (101/111: 9)?  Inwood translates μένος as ‘strength’ 
(Inwood 15/Wright 101/DK 111).  Does μένος refer simply to restoring the physical 
breathing of a dead man, as Wright suggests (1981: 262-3), or is μένος linked with a 
daimon?   Empedocles has made no mention of daimons in his mortal compositions and 
so the introduction of the idea of this further being is difficult to interpret, for example, 
does every mortal composition have a daimon?   
 These are challenging questions and there are many basic assumptions that must 
be challenged (Osborne, 1987: 33).  Further, Plato cannot be allowed to enter these 
discussions.  It is too easy to allow oneself to be drawn into statements such as: it is 
hard not to connect the daimon with the Platonic soul (Inwood, 1992: 53).
131
  
Comparisons between Empedocles and Plato would be welcome if they were not so 
often anachronisms.  I accept that the Platonic soul has similarities with Empedocles’ 
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 This problem of composition will be answered without referring to two separate Empedoclean books. 
131
 Empedocles’ philosophy does not require an entity such as a Platonic soul.  The very view that 
Empedocles requires a Platonic soul is paradoxical for the reason Platonic souls do not exist yet.  On this 
methodological point of comparison it should be Plato who is compared to Empedocles and not 
Empedocles likened to Plato. Empedocles has no need for a principle of movement within living creatures 
due to Love and Strife. 
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daimon.  And yet, if the Platonic soul is so similar to Empedocles’ daimon, why did 
Plato not use Empedocles’ term for the soul?  For if Plato wanted to express a 
philosophical concept similar or comparable to Empedocles’ daimon, Plato had a 
vocabulary already fully loaded with conceptual content, i.e. daimon.  Kingsley sets out 
the problem of anachronism in the Greek philosophical tradition so succinctly that I find 
it hard to use any words but his (1995: 18): 
[The] Desire to view western philosophy as a continuous tradition moving 
towards ever greater sophistication, self-consciousness, and understanding 
inevitably involves looking at early Greek philosophers through the eyes of later 
ones.   
There is a famous Buddhist Koan that suggests ‘if you meet the Buddha, kill him’.  
Thus, the fear of reading Plato backwards into Empedocles is so great, that if we meet 
Plato in this discussion, we should do as the Buddhist Koan suggests, and ‘kill’ him.132  
It is with great irony that Empedocles himself was acutely aware of how hard it is for 
humans to let go of established beliefs (103/114).  With all that said, let us delve into 
the Empedoclean world of daimons in order to explain how these two kinds of 
substances – human and daimon – are related. 
 Given what has been established so far, one should expect to find a thread of 
philosophical consistency regarding the daimon and the Cosmic Cycle.  One should not 
suppose that doctrines are incompatible or contradictory from the outset (Osborne, 
1987: 32).  After all, it is the same philosophical mind at work and there is no explicit 
evidence of Empedocles changing philosophical direction within his theory of the 
Cosmic Cycle. Of course, this evidence may be lost to us.  But no extant ancient 
commentator discussed Empedocles changing philosophical direction.    
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 The point of the Buddhist Koan is to free the human mind even from the attachment to the Buddha’s 
teachings.  I feel the Koan symbolically represents how attached ancient philosophy has become to Plato 
and not Empedocles. 
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 The daimon is a composition of the ‘four roots of all things’.  But how does a 
daimon fit into the composition of mortal beings, particularly humans?  It would seem 
that the composition of the daimon is placed into the constitution of ‘mortal forms’.  For 
when speaking of ‘daimons’ at 107/ 115, Empedocles switches to the singular and 
proclaims that such a creature is ‘born ... as all kinds of mortal forms, exchanging one 
hard way of life for another’ (107/115: 7-8).  And yet, the composition of the daimon is 
able to survive the decomposition of the individual ‘mortal’ constitution, i.e. the 
individual ‘mortal’ life, as is shown in 107/115 when Empedocles says that he is born 
‘throughout the time as all kinds of mortal forms’   This birth in different mortal forms 
over time is possible in part because Empedocles ascribes ‘life long-lasting’ to the 
daimon (107/115: 5); the daimon survives mortal decompositions for ‘three times 
countless years’ (107/115: 6).  Therefore, the daimon is able to maintain its 
individually-distinct composition for a very long time indeed; surviving the breakdown 
of many shorter mortal lives.  However, Empedocles has still not explained how the 
daimon fits with the mortal composition or what its  function is in a specifically  human 
life.  The daimon is mortal and subject to dissolution, as any possible claim of eternal 
survival is undercut by the four roots being the only eternal substances, alongside Love 
and Strife (Trepanier, 2004: 86).   When Love is completely dominant in the Cosmic 
Cycle all things will become One, and Strife’s dominance will create Many, unformed 
items; nothing individual apart from the four roots will survive the extremes.
133
  
Therefore, no matter how ‘long-lasting’ a composition is, it is not ‘long-lasting’ enough; 
the four roots, Love and Strife are the only eternal things.   
Given the ultimately mortal life of the daimon as a composite, it is incorrect to state that 
the daimon is set apart from the material elements (Graham, 1999: 172).  Graham has a 
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 One possible explanation is that, Empedocles’ daimon escapes the Cosmic Cycle.  The idea of escape 
is fashionable because it can be found in many different cultures that hold rebirth beliefs.  However, this 
is an interpretational problem that needs solving. 
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view that Empedocles does not fully distinguish the four roots and two motive forces 
from matter (1999: 164).  It seems strange, however, to expect Empedocles to 
distinguish his principles from matter when that is what they are.  Empedocles grounds 
thought into matter and so a distinction between thought and matter for Empedocles is 
paradoxical.  It is anachronistic to use Graham’s terminology of the daimon as an 
everlasting soul set apart from the material roots (1999: 172).  In contrast to Graham’s 
view, the daimon is firmly established within Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle and linked to 
the four roots, as shown explicitly in fragment 107/115 (9-12): 
 αἰθέριον μὲν γάρ σφε μένος πόντονδε διώκει, 
 [10] πόντος δ’ ἐς χθονὸς οὖδας ἀπέπτυσε, γαῖα δ’ ἐς αὐγάς 
 ἠελίου φαέθοντος, ὁ δ’ αἰθέρος ἔμβαλε δίναις· 
 ἄλλος δ’ ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται, στυγέουσι δὲ πάντες. 
 For the force of air pursues him [daimon] into sea, and sea spits him out onto 
 earth’s  surface, earth casts him into the rays of blazing sun, and sun into the 
 eddies of air; one takes him from another, and all abhor him.    
Intrinsically, the daimon is linked with the cycle of the four roots here (Osborne. 1987: 
24). There is a cyclical nature to the above lines; air releases the daimon eventually 
returning to being air once more.  .   
 The interpretation of a daimon’s composition does not require one to postulate 
the immaterial nature of a daimon as Kahn has done (1971: 14).  By placing a daimon 
into the four roots of all things through composition, one is securing the Cosmic Cycle.  
At no point does Empedocles distinguish between material and immaterial.  Mind and 
matter are one and the same through the mixing of the four roots.  Empedocles 
explicitly states τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἄκουε· ‘the four roots’ are those 
‘of all things’ (7/6); not merely of some things.  Kahn’s conclusion that there is no 
suggestion that the daimon is constituted by the four roots (1971: 13) seems incorrect.  
 Human perception, sense, thought and intelligence are present in a human 
constitution without explicit reference to a daimon.  The daimon has existed before it 
216 
 
takes ‘mortal forms’ and indeed it will survive through ‘many kinds of mortal forms’ as 
107/115 explicitly states.  In contrast the human constitution will change at the point of 
death since humans are not ‘long-lasting’.  Therefore, what is the relationship between 
the pre-existing daimon and the individual mortal form that it temporarily inhabits when 
it is born as a human?  At the point of death for the individual mortal form what is 
reborn with the daimon?  Is the daimon an individual identity that sustains that identity 
through several incarnations, i.e. are we the daimon?  Or does identity change and 
develop accordingly?  Can a daimon’s identity stay unchanged through incarnations?  I 
answer these questions by referring to the daimon and human as two different kinds of 
substance (Chapter 7).   
 In this section I have examined two kinds of living and thinking substances 
within Empedocles’ poem: humans (6.2.1), and daimons (6.2.2) and have demonstrated 
that the daimon is comparable to mortal forms, made up from the same four roots, even 
though it is a stronger composition, able to live for a much longer time.  But the 
question of how exactly the daimon relates to the human is not yet clear and will be 
explored in Chapter 7.  For now, the third key idea I wish to highlight in Empedocles’ 
thought is that of moral accountability and its role in the rebirth of mortal compositions, 
whether those are human or daimon.  
6.3 Moral Accountability      
 Within his theory of the Cosmic Cycle Empedocles offers an account of the 
births and deaths of mortal creatures as the formation and dissolution of their 
composition of the four roots.  In this section I will consider how Empedocles offers in 
addition a moral story, particularly relating to the life of the daimon, which raises 
questions of moral accountability.  As critics have observed, Empedocles has 
successfully embedded the individual microcosm of the individual life onto that of the 
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cosmic macrocosm.
134
  At the level of the macrocosm the four roots travel through the 
cycle as eternal essences. At the level of the individual mortal composition one can 
deduce that personal salvation would be unachievable.  And yet the poem sets out how 
in the microcosm the daimon ‘wanders’ through ‘all kinds of mortal forms’ (107/115: 6-
7), suggesting a personal survival.  The daimon’s particular composition gives it ‘life 
long-lasting’, and it can survive more than one mortal form.  Unlike the roots, however, 
a daimon is not self-sustainable eternally.  The daimon, like the human being, is a 
compound and is, therefore, liable to dissolution, unable to withstand the force of Strife, 
certainly when it is complete on a cosmic scale (Inwood, 1992: 53).  However, 
Empedocles need not rely on the cosmic, abstract force of Strife.  For Love and Strife 
have psychological and moral associations in the microcosm (Guthrie, 1950: 53) and 
therefore Strife can be enacted in individual, concrete actions at the level of living 
beings who can act and make moral choices.  Further, Strife is the motive force that 
drives the daimon through ‘mortal forms’.  Importantly, it is through a specific moral 
action that the motive force of Strife instigates a daimon’s journey (107/115): 
 ἔστιν ἀνάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν, 
 ἀίδιον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὅρκοις· 
 εὖτέ τις ἀμπλακίῃσι φόβῳ φίλα γυῖα †μιν† 
 †ὃς καὶ† ἐπίορκον ἁμαρτήσας ἐπομόσσῃ, 
 [5] δαίμονες οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο, 
 τρίς μιν μυρίας ὧρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι, 
 φυόμενον παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἴδεα θνητῶν 
 ἀργαλέας βιότοιο μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους.  
 αἰθέριον μὲν γάρ σφε μένος πόντονδε διώκει, 
 [10] πόντος δ’ ἐς χθονὸς οὖδας ἀπέπτυσε, γαῖα δ’ ἐς αὐγάς 
 ἠελίου φαέθοντος, ὁ δ’ αἰθέρος ἔμβαλε δίναις· 
 ἄλλος δ’ ἐξ ἄλλου δέχεται, στυγέουσι δὲ πάντες. 
 τῶν καὶ ὲγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης, 
 νείκεϊ μαινομένῳ πίσυνος. 
 There is a decree of necessity (ἀνάγκης), ratified long ago (παλαιόν) by gods 
 (θεῶν), eternal (ἀίδιον) and sealed by broad oaths, that whenever one in error, 
 from fear, (defiles) his own limbs, having by his error (ἁμαρτήσας) made false 
 the oath he swore (ἐπίορκον) – daimons to whom life long-lasting (μακραἰωνος) 
 is apportioned (λελάχασι) – he wanders from the blessed (μακάρων) ones for 
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 Cornford, 1957: 230; Kirk, Raven & Schofield, 1983: 348; Inwood, 1992: 57/8; Trepanier, 2004: 192.  
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 three times countless years, being born (φυόμενον) throughout the time (χρόνου) 
 as all kinds of mortal (θνητῶν) forms, exchanging one hard way (κελεύθους) of 
 life for another. 
 For the force of air pursues him into sea, and sea spits him out onto 
 earth’s surface, earth casts him into the rays of blazing sun, and sun into the 
 eddies of air; one takes him from another, and all abhor him. I too am now one 
 of these, an exile from the gods and a wanderer, having put my trust in raving 
 strife. 
This account of making false a sworn oath offers a moral explanation for the daimon’s 
wandering.  The ‘trust in raving strife’ that Empedocles describes is shown through the 
action of breaking an oath (107/115: 3).  Thus it is wrong action that instigates the 
motive force Strife, and the consequent cycle of rebirths, as the daimon is reborn in all 
kinds of mortal forms.  
 Cornford calls such reincarnation the ‘most primitive’ of ‘several cardinal 
doctrines of mysticism’ (1957: 161).  Unfortunately, Cornford’s evaluation is a 
hindrance rather than a helpful assessment.  It is necessary to have a detailed and 
dispassionate appraisal of what Empedoclean rebirth entails.  The problem concerns the 
continuity of existence and identity within an Empedoclean framework; specifically, 
what is it exactly that is reborn?   
 When considering this problem, discussions may be affected by preconceptions 
of characteristics one might find in rebirth theories, characteristics such as karma, and 
salvation or liberation.  For those who posit rebirth theories, characterised by a 
confidence that the same person is reborn into various different physical bodies over a 
prolonged period of time, reconciling continued personal identity through successive 
mortal lives is a notorious problem.  But rebirth need not mean individual continuation.  
Attempting to discover individual continuation within a rebirth theory that actually 
lacks this idea leads to problematic interpretations.  There is a profound difference in 
the three doctrines stated above—rebirth, karma, and salvation—when the term 
individual is added to each one.     
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  Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle is similar to rebirth or reincarnation theory.  The 
four roots travel through a process of One becoming Many and returning back to One 
throughout time.  The four roots migrate from one state to the next, taking many 
different forms as they travel.  Rebirth for Empedocles can be seen as a cosmic law.  In 
Empedocles’ Cosmic rebirth there are specific motive forces instigating the continuation 
of lives: the cosmic ‘karma’ or motive force comprising Love and Strife.  Love drives 
the four roots into One; and Strife drives them apart into Many.  Neither force has total 
dominion over the other; there is reciprocity through alternating supremacy.  In this 
Cosmic Cycle of reincarnation ultimate salvation is impossible, since that would require 
the Cosmic Cycle to stop by means of one motive force superseding the other.  And 
cosmic necessity prescribes that neither shall dominate permanently.  Therefore, on a 
cosmic scale, escape from the cycle is not possible; the cycle is all that there is.   
 But a problem arises with this account, a problem concerning moral 
accountability and liberation.  Before incarnation in human form, the daimon is said to 
defile ‘his own limbs’.  It seems therefore that the daimon prior to human incarnation is 
a sentient and material being since the act is committed to material ‘limbs’ (107/115: 3).   
 Therefore the daimon story introduces an ethical dimension to the idea of 
incarnation in human form.  Moral accountability suggests a need for continuation, at 
least of the thing that is morally accountable.  Does Empedocles have such an idea of a 
continuing thing?  In line with his account of the Cosmic Cycle of change Empedocles 
is explicitly clear that the death of mortal creatures is not annihilation (104/11).   
νήπιοι· οὐ γάρ σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι μέριμναι, 
 οἳ δὴ γίγνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐὸν ἐλπίζουσιν, 
 ἤ τι καταθνͅήσκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἁπάντῃ. 
 Fools, for their meditations are not far-reaching thoughts, men who suppose that 
 what formerly did not exist comes into existence, or that something dies and is 
 completely destroyed. 
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But saying that when ‘something dies’ it is not ‘completely destroyed’, does not imply a 
complete continuation.  It certainly is not an ‘emphatic affirmation of continuous 
existence’ for men before birth and after death, as Wright claims (1981: 268).  
Examining fragment 104/11 closely, all one can emphatically conclude is that the 
building blocks of life do not come from nothing, ex nihilo.  
 Rather, change requires something to exist prior to that change.  After a change 
what previously existed is not annihilated, just as something completely new has not 
come into being.  There is continuation through change; a causal link between the 
previous composition X and the post-change composition Y.  The ‘new’ Y shares 
certain characteristics with the ‘old’ X.  To say Y is completely independent of X is 
false, just as it is incorrect to say X has been ‘completely destroyed’.  That is very 
different from saying something dies and is ‘completely’ continuous.  Empedocles says 
at 104/11 that at death something is not ‘completely destroyed’ but what exactly that 
‘thing’ is, is not clear.  Within the context of the passage, the ‘thing’ appears far more 
likely to be a ‘root’, than a human individual.  Placing these  ideas at 107/115 and 
104/11 into broader Empedoclean thought from across the poem produces the following  
narrative of the four roots and their changing nature in the lives of the daimon and 
human: 
A) There are ‘Four roots of all things’; 
B) The composition of daimon results from ‘four roots’ mixing; 
C) The daimon after breaking his oath becomes part of a human  
 constitution; 
D) The human constitution dies, i.e. un-mixing and change takes place; 
E) The daimon goes into another mortal constitution; 
F) The daimon eventually decomposes into the ‘four roots’ once more. 
All compositions for Empedocles are liable to alter and change.  It is probable that 
through C) to E) a daimon changes.  For it comes into contact with different 
compositions with different levels of perception, sense, thought and intelligence.  Thus, 
a daimon will interact with the world differently according to what mortal form it finds 
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itself in.  Therefore, Empedocles’ proclamations about his own previous lives cannot 
claim that the constitutional human has existed throughout every previous mortal form 
numerically (108/117):  
 ἤδη γάρ ποτ’ ἐγὼ γενόμην κοῦρός τε κόρη τε   
 θάμνος τ’ οἰωνός τε καὶ ἐξαλος ἔλλοπος ἰχθύς.  
 I have been at some time boy and girl, bush, bird, and mute fish in the sea. 
Instead, the claim may be that the mortal constitution ‘Empedocles’ is the result of 
being ‘at some time boy and girl, bush, bird, and mute fish’.  There is a vast difference 
between the two claims. For the latter places the constitution of Empedocles on a causal 
line linked to previous incarnations, while the former concludes that Empedocles the 
human was still Empedocles as a ‘bush, bird, and mute fish’, regardless of the 
compositional vehicle used in each case to interact with the world.  But whichever of 
the two claims is preferred, each gives rise to a number of problems concerning moral 
accountability through rebirth.  Specifically, what is morally accountable and is 
liberation possible?  
 There are two possible conclusions one can draw: 1) Empedocles’ philosophy is 
inconsistent on moral accountability because there is no thing that retains moral 
accountability and escapes the Cosmic Cycle; 2) Empedocles’ philosophy is consistent 
because he believes individual salvation or escape from the Cosmic Cycle to be 
impossible.  My solution is the latter and in Chapter 7 I will show that Empedocles uses 
rebirth itself as an example of moral accountability in order to philosophically 
manoeuvre around the impossibility of personal survival within the Cosmic Cycle. 
Conclusion: Shared Concerns  
 I have examined three aspects of Empedocles’ thought.  Firstly I analysed the 
‘four roots’ within the reality of the all-encompassing Cosmic Cycle.  I then examined 
two kinds of substances (6.2): what are humans (6.2.1), and what are daimons (6.2.2). 
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Finally I looked at moral accountability (6.3).  In the conclusion for Chapter 5 I drew 
attention to three key ideas in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad.  I am now able to show how these 
key ideas are Shared Concerns between the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and Empedocles’ poem, 
thereby supporting Claim 1 for these texts from different cultural traditions.    
Firstly, the Kaṭha Upaniṣad’s concept of ‘roots’ and a ‘tree’ used in the image of 
the ‘eternal banyan tree’ supports the idea of an all-encompassing reality, Brahman (as 
discussed in Ch 5.6).  Like the Kaṭha Upaniṣad Empedocles’ poem is concerned with 
an all-encompassing reality, that of the Cosmic Cycle, and uses the language of ‘roots’ 
to express its nature.  Secondly, Kaṭha Upaniṣad’s ‘two selves’ theory, involving ātman 
and charioteer (as discussed in Ch. 5.3), raises issues of identity that can be seen as 
comparable with Empedocles’ discussion of the two kinds of composition in humans 
and daimons.  Thirdly, Kaṭha Upaniṣad’s concern with moral accountability across 
rebirths and different embodiments (as discussed in Ch. 5.5) is comparable to 
Empedocles’ concern with the ethical dimensions of the Cosmic Cycle as manifested in 
the lives and rebirths of daimons in different compositions.  
 With these three Shared Concerns established, I can now move on to my second 
main claim: that setting up a dialogue between the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and Empedocles’ 
poem allows problems in Empedocles to be solved; specifically, to what extent a 
daimon is morally accountable within the Cosmic Cycle, and whether a final liberation 
from the Cosmic Cycle is possible.  
 I do this by firstly showing how using the Kaṭha Upaniṣad’s ‘eternal banyan 
tree’ can illuminate Empedocles’ idea of the Cosmic Cycle and the root image more 
fully. Thus this builds on the main problem concerning liberation from the Cosmic 
Cycle.  Secondly, I use the Kaṭha Upaniṣad’s ‘two selves’ theory to establishing the 
identity of Empedocles’ two kinds of substances and so clarify how exactly the daimon 
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relates to the human being, thereby allowing one kind—daimon—to be potentially 
morally accountable whilst allowing the other kind—human—to be not morally 
accountable.  Finally, I compare the Kaṭha Upaniṣad’s account of right action 
(karma)—‘what they have done’—and right understanding—‘what they have 
learned’—and their correlation to liberation from rebirth, with Empedocles’ account of 
moral responsibility.  The specific problem raised and solved here is whether liberation 
from rebirth is possible within Empedoclean thought, and to what extent does 
Empedocles place importance on action and understanding as a form of punishment or 
liberation? 
Having examined Kaṭha Upaniṣad and Empedocles’ poem on their own terms, and 
highlighted these areas of Shared Concern relating to death and identity, I can now turn 
to my Claim 2 – that Shared Concerns between cultural texts can be used to offer 
solutions to problems in one of those texts.  The ultimate problem to be considered is 
whether Empedocles has a concept of liberation from the cycle of rebirth, as in the 
Kaṭha Upaniṣad, and how far he places importance on ethical action and right 
understanding as a form of punishment or liberation. 
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Chapter 7: Problem-Solving: Kaṭha Upaniṣad and Empedocles 
Introduction and the Problem 
 Chapters 5 and 6 have identified three Shared Concerns in Empedocles and 
Kaṭha Upaniṣad (Claim 1): a reality that is all-encompassing spoken of by means of 
root imagery; the presence of two selves in a complex view of human identity; and 
moral accountability across rebirths in a cycle of lives.  I now turn to what is achieved 
by examining these Shared Concerns together.  In Chapter 6 I set out the key problem to 
be examined in this chapter: whether Empedocles has a concept of liberation from the 
cycle of rebirth, as in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, and how far he places importance on ethical 
action and right understanding as a form of punishment and liberation. This is the 
question of moral accountability across rebirths in Empedocles. In this chapter I will 
solve this main problem by using the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and drawing on the other two 
subsidiary questions relating to the ‘roots’ of reality and the identification of two selves. 
First I will examine the identity of the four roots of all things through focusing on the 
root imagery as combined with the eternal Banyan tree to express ideas of all-
encompassing reality (7.1); second, I will clarify the relationship between an individual 
human and an individual daimon through understanding human and daimon as two 
different kinds comparable to Yama’s two selves of charioteer and rider (7.2); and 
finally I will consider the moral accountability of a daimon in relation to karma —
specifically the relationship between self-knowledge and an ethic of non-harm within a 
concept of liberation from rebirth (7.3).
135
  The themes of death and identity run through 
all discussions and the earlier studies of roots and two selves will build towards the final 
conclusion of 7.3 on moral accountability within Empedocles’ cycle.   
 Trepanier believes Empedocles ‘will continue to live on after his current 
incarnation’ (2004: 83), but that the Cosmic Cycle denies a ‘happily ever after’ (2004: 
128).  Graham suggests that humans have an ‘everlasting soul’ that ensures an escape 
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from the Cosmic Cycle given that the ‘everlasting soul’ is apart from the material 
elements (1999: 162 & 172).  Therefore, since the ‘everlasting soul’ is not made from 
the four roots in Graham’s interpretation, as a separate material entity it is able to 
transcend or escape the Cosmic Cycle.  Trepanier accepts a continuity of an individual 
self within the Cosmic Cycle, whilst Graham posits the existence of a substance that can 
escape the Cosmic Cycle.  In contrast Inwood suggests that daimons, being compounds, 
are dissoluble resulting in the extinction of personal identity (1992: 53).  Similarly, 
Kahn suggests that there is no individuality in transmigration (1971: 9).  However, 
Kahn does not say that there is no transmigration.  According to Kahn there is a ‘deified 
human soul’ that he characterises as deathless (1971: 8 and 10).  Kirk and Raven 
provide examples implying individual survival (1957: 477), and ones suggesting the 
opposite (1957: 480 and 467).   
 By using my Comparative Method I wish to offer a new interpretation of 
Empedocles’ position: that humans and daimons exist separately as two kinds within the 
Cosmic Cycle.  Kahn comes close to distinguishing between a human and a daimon, 
correctly stating that the modern conception of soul as a non-bodily conscious self is 
excluded from Empedocles’ cosmology (1971: 8-9).  In this regard, Empedoclean 
survival is never that of a full human being, but just that of ‘one single element of our 
empirical self, one whose isolated existence after death involves a complete break with 
the conditions of human life’ (Kahn, 1971: 9).  To clarify, I take Kahn’s ‘element’ to be 
the daimon.  If this is a valid interpretation, then on a numerical level the daimon 
compound is ‘long-lasting’ and the human compound breaks apart at death.  However, 
Kahn further distinguishes between an immortal divine soul and an empirical thought or 
consciousness (1971: 10; 14).  Therefore, I cannot agree with Kahn’s terminology and 
range of distinctions.  Nor should one accept Kahn’s conclusion that there is no 
suggestion that the daimon’s nature is constituted by the four roots, or as Kahn calls 
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them, ‘elements’ (1971: 13).  Therefore, even Kahn falls short of the new interpretation 
that humans and daimons exist separately as two kinds within the Cosmic Cycle.  But 
one can take from Kahn’s interpretation the need to distinguish the human compound 
from the daimon compound.  At the same time, however, one must reject Kahn’s 
decision to place the daimon’s material nature outside the four roots, which leads to his 
conclusion that the daimon’s nature is deathless (1971: 10).  Kahn’s divine, deathless 
soul is actually only a long-lasting material compound comprised of the four roots. 
 As seen in the scholarly work, the problem of liberation from the cycle of lives 
and its relationship to moral accountability is a complicated one.  It is not clear what 
role the daimon plays in mortal composition, or, indeed, if all mortal compositions have 
a daimon.  But if one asks, ‘what question is the daimon an answer to?’ one may 
tentatively postulate an answer.  The daimon appears to be an attempt by Empedocles to 
avoid the complete cessation of human beings at death.  After all, it can be inferred that 
the daimon is more akin to the gods and the divine in its kind of composition.  Fragment 
133/147 claims that with ‘other immortals’ daimons will ‘share hearth and table, having 
no part in human sorrows, unwearied’.  It seems that after wandering for many 
‘countless years’ daimons will ‘arise as gods, highest in honor’ (132/146).   Therefore, 
daimons appear to be more divine and ‘long-lasting’ in their compositional make-up of 
the four roots than the other earthly kind of creatures.  But is there liberation from 
Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle and, if so, what role does moral accountability play? 
 I now attempt to solve the key problem of whether there is liberation in 
Empedocles’ poem and, if so, whether moral accountability is part of it.  I do so by 
using Kaṭha Upaniṣad and examining  two sets of supporting issues before moving on 
to the main problem.  Firstly I examine the identity of the ‘roots’ as the fundamental 
component of the Cosmic Cycle (7.1), and address whether it is possible, even in 
principle, to escape the all-encompassing Cosmic Cycle.  Secondly I examine the two 
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kinds of substances most prevalent within Empedocles’ ideas on identity: the human 
and daimon (7.2).  My central questions here are: what are the individual identities of 
these substances and are they similar, interrelated, or completely distinct from each 
other?  Finally, I reach the main problem of whether Empedocles has a concept of 
liberation at all, where I examine the role of right action and right understanding in 
Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle and consider whether moral accountability has a place 
(7.3). 
7.1 The Four Roots and Eternal Banyan Tree 
The ‘four roots’ that mix and un-mix to create the world that surrounds us are a 
key feature of Empedocles’ ontology.  It is possible to think of these ‘roots’ as elements, 
a view that stems from a modern scientific understanding of the world.  The word 
element for a modern reader will suggest different connotations to the word root; this 
may become a problem if root is assimilated to element.  Therefore, I propose stripping 
Empedocles’ ‘root’ image of the modern scientific ‘element’ and instead examining it 
alongside another ancient ‘root’ image, that used in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad. Of course, 
these ‘root’ images will not be exactly the same, and I do not intend to replace one 
synthesis for another more ancient one.  Instead, I simply wish to view the 
Empedoclean image through the lens of a text that uses the ‘root’ image to describe an 
ontological truth in an evidently literary way.  Having set out the basic skeleton of the 
Cosmic Cycle in Chapter 6, the identity of the roots needs to be examined, and, more 
specifically, what it means to be a ‘root’, since this underlies the question of continued 
existence across rebirths in Empedocles.    
The root image of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad (cf. KU 6.1, discussed in Ch 5.6) is 
significantly different from Empedocles’ and the differences will be helpful.  In the 
Kaṭha Upaniṣad the image of a tree is reversed: the tree’s roots are above and the 
branches are below.  Normally the roots of a tree are foundational in the earth providing 
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stability and nutrients, thus allowing the tree to grow upwards.  But in the Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad the roots are above symbolising the divine, whilst the branches represent the 
sensible world below.  Empedocles does not use this distinction between the divine 
roots and the corporeal branches of the tree but focuses on the specific symbolism of 
roots.  He thus uses an image of stability and growth, suggesting the gathering nutrients, 
and that there is something attached to the roots.  It makes little sense to think of roots 
without also thinking of a tree or plant.  But this is not immediately obvious if one 
thinks of Empedocles’ roots as elements.  Indeed, thinking of roots as elements detracts 
from the image that Empedocles purposefully conveyed.  While Empedocles’ roots have 
a strong connection with scientific elements, modern scientific connotations prevent a 
full appreciation of Empedocles’ root imagery, which carries further ideas of stability, 
nourishment, and the growing tree.  It is hard to imagine roots mixing and un-mixing as 
tree roots, whereas, roots as elements, or abstract concepts, can mix and un-mix.  But 
still, the abstraction of elements detracts from the root image, and the material and 
organic nature it conveys.  Empedocles’ roots are not abstract concepts but are material 
things that mix to create life.  Therefore, the idea of roots being the source of stability 
and growth for a tree is highly relevant to Empedocles’ cosmic philosophy. For the 
roots give rise to material compounds through their mixing, and at the same time sustain 
the existence of material compounds.    
 There are further similarities between Empedocles’ roots and the eternal Banyan 
tree image of Kaṭha Upaniṣad 6.1.  The roots in Kaṭha Upaniṣad 6.1 represent 
‘Brahman’, the ‘Immortal’.  While Brahman has religious connotations, taking 6.1 in 
isolation, there are two comparisons worth noting.
136
  Firstly, in Kaṭha Upaniṣad it is 
Brahman and in Empedocles it is the four roots that are described as roots.  The 
statement ‘On it all the worlds rest’ is true for both Brahman and Empedocles’ four 
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roots.  In Kaṭha Upaniṣad this dependence on Brahman is explained through the 
relationship between a tree and its roots; and in Empedocles the world is equally 
dependent on the four roots, since it is created through their mixing.  Therefore, just as 
the world is dependent on Brahman so for Empedocles it is dependent on the four roots.  
In reality, it is not possible to separate the manifest world—the tree—from the 
fundamental roots as cleanly as in language.  The roots are as part of the tree as the tree 
is part of the roots.  There is a clear inter-dependence between root and tree; the tree 
gives a root a purpose, and the roots help sustain the tree.  The tree grows from the roots 
as the roots from the tree.  Therefore, while the world comes into existence from 
Brahman or the four roots, at the same time the world cannot be conceived as entirely 
separate or removed from them. The tree cannot live without the roots, and one cannot 
completely disconnect the roots and the tree.  The world is reliant on the four roots. 
 Since the statement, ‘On it all the worlds rest’ can be extended from Brahman to  
Empedocles’ four roots,  it is worth considering whether the following line is also 
comparable: ‘beyond it no one can ever pass’ (6.1).  In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad this is due 
to the nature of the root/tree relationship.  The tree is the world, the roots are Brahman 
and the relationship between the two is dependent.  But also, those are the parameters, 
and as a result there is nothing beyond or behind the root/tree relationship.  This further 
idea applied to Empedocles would carry ethical and soteriological ramifications.  There 
is nothing outside of the Cosmic Cycle and the world is indeed the four roots.
137
  The 
four roots do mix and un-mix and the roots ‘never cease their continual exchange’ 
within the cycle (8/17: 12-13).  Therefore, change happens within the Cosmic Cycle.  It 
is the change that creates human reality as it is understood.  Importantly, the change is a 
process; and the change takes place in reality.  For Empedocles change is not 
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 An obvious failing of the root image for both texts is the concept of a root’s function.  A root extracts 
sustenance from the ground which sustains the tree.  However, with a concept as ‘on it all the world 
rests’, the full imagery of a root cannot be fulfilled, i.e. there is nothing for the root to extract nutrients 
from. 
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illusionary.  Therefore, Empedocles has a cyclical changeable reality that is all-
encompassing: ‘these things never cease their continual exchange of position’ (8/17: 6) 
and, as with Brahman, the roots help to convey the idea of an all-encompassing, eternal 
reality. 
 However, Empedocles’ roots are very different from Brahman in certain key 
ways.  Brahman is not only eternal but also constant and stable.  The roots have stability 
through change, but they still mix and un-mix. And, although the roots are 
fundamentally eternal, at the height of Love’s power they become One together, and in 
Strife’s domination they become Many in separation.  Therefore, the comparisons I 
have used are underpinned by significant differences.  And none more so than a 
soteriological one: knowledge of Brahman within an individual is enough to offer 
liberation from continual death.  However, in his natural treatise Empedocles makes no 
statements concerning escape or release through knowledge of the four roots.
138
     
 The comparison of the two uses of ‘roots’ in the respective ontological 
discussions of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and Empedocles has therefore brought to light the 
idea that nothing can exist outside the Cosmic Cycle: just like the eternal banyan tree 
where it is said ‘On it all the worlds rest’ (6.1), so for Empedocles all material beings 
are made from a combination of the four roots, under the influence of Love, and Strife. 
Thinking of the four roots as organic, instead of ‘elements’, highlights the dependency 
between the roots and tree; or, the manifest world and the fundamental roots.  The four 
roots and the Cosmic Cycle, through my comparison appear all-encompassing.   
7.2 The relationship between a human individual and a daimon 
 For Empedocles nothing can exist outside the Cosmic Cycle and all things are 
made from the mixing of the four roots.  An individual compound of mixed roots has 
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perception and thought through its basic structure of four roots, with Love, and Strife 
(78/107, 94/105, and 100/110:10 “for know that all things have intelligence and a share 
of thought”).  Perception, therefore, exists throughout all compounds, not limited to 
humanity, due to all being made from the ‘four roots of all things’.  This is the essential 
nature of the Empedoclean universe and the account of human nature is entirely 
consistent with it. But how does a daimon fit into this picture? What role does 
Empedocles envision his daimon fulfilling?  Osborne correctly postulates that one 
should not suppose immediately that the two doctrines—the Cosmic Cycle and 
daimons—are incompatible or contradictory (1987: 32).  Following this approach, and 
using comparable ideas from the Kaṭha Upaniṣad I suggest that a daimon is a specific 
kind of compound of the four roots, that it is material, and is an integral part of the 
Cosmic Cycle.   
 Through an examination alongside the two selves theory of the  Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad, it is suggested that a human individual and a daimon are distinct kinds of 
substances, existing simultaneously within a body but not requiring—as Kahn 
worries—a psychologically ‘split personality’ (Kahn, 1971: 3).  My conclusion is that 
for Empedocles there are two selves/kinds, the individual mortal human compound and 
the individual mortal daimon compound.  Applying the ideas of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad to 
Empedocles also highlights that there are also significant differences in kind, 
differences that open up questions of moral accountability and the nature of liberation 
from a cycle of lives.    
 The comparison begins by comparing characteristics of the daimon to the 
‘primeval one’—Brahman—in Kaṭha Upaniṣad (2.12).  There are key similarities 
between Brahman and the daimon, that can be used and explained comparatively, but, 
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there are also explicit differences that must be clarified.
139
  A key passage on Brahman 
is Kaṭha Upaniṣad 2.12 (cf. Ch. 5.2): 
The primeval one who is hard to perceive, 
 wrapped in mystery, hidden in the cave, 
 residing within th’impenetrable depth- 
  Regarding him as god, an insight 
 gained by inner contemplation, 
 both sorrow and joy the wise abandon. 
The language in 2.12 describes the ‘primeval one’ as being ‘hard to perceive’ and 
‘wrapped in mystery’, which can be used in conjunction with a daimon.  Statements on 
Brahman elsewhere in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad can be seen as more akin to the eternal four 
roots, Love, and Strife, rather than a daimon.
140
  Like Brahman 2.18:  
 he is not born, he does not die; 
 he has not come from anywhere; 
 he has not become anyone. 
 He is unborn and eternal, primeval and everlasting. 
 And he is not killed, when the body is killed. 
Equally, the four roots are not ‘born’, do not ‘come from anywhere’ or from nothing, 
and they are ‘eternal...and everlasting’ (9/12; 11/16; 12/8).  Therefore it is imperative to 
understand that the daimon is comparable to Brahman in some respects but not in 
others.  The daimon is not Brahman nor ātman, just as the daimon is not the roots. 
Nevertheless, certain specific representations and expressions of Brahman can be used 
in a comparative way to help illuminate complex concepts in Empedocles concerning 
the distinction in kind between an individual human and a daimon.  My claim (Claim 2) 
is that the comparison helps one learn about the relationship between daimon and 
human compositions in Empedocles’ thought, which in turn illuminates the central 
problem of moral accountability and whether there is any liberation from the cycle. 
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 The roots can be compared with a daimon—macrocosm and microcosm—therefore, as Brahman 
relates to ātman, so too, Brahman will relate to a daimon. 
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 For the daimon, although comparable to the four roots, is not the four roots of all things. 
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 Verse 2.18 speaks of the nature of Brahman: lines 4 and 6 state that ‘he has not 
become anyone’ and ‘he is not killed, when the body is killed’. These ideas are 
intriguing when thought of as characteristics of Empedocles’ roots.  Line 4 has a 
specific counterpart in Empedocles’ fragments (8/17: 12-13).141  In these passages from 
their respective texts the fundamental identity of Brahman and the roots remain 
constant, even when they enter several individual bodies.  Brahman enters human 
individuals as ātman, the divine Self (2.20, 22, 23; 3.12, 15), and the roots mix and un-
mix to create the manifest world.  Furthermore, there is an even stronger comparison in 
fragment 8/17: 34-35.  When the roots ‘become different objects at different times’ they 
are ‘forever the same’.  In essence, Empedocles describes a process very similar to that 
of Brahman in Kaṭha Upaniṣad: ‘he has not become anyone’ (2.18: 4). 
  A further benefit from reading these texts in dialogue is that the Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad provides an insight into how the roots could change, yet remain distinct (5.9).  
Kaṭha Upaniṣad describes a complex interplay between the numerically distinct ‘fire’, 
the ‘single self’, and the qualitative distinctions prevalent within the world.  The 
distinction between the divine Self ātman and the individual human shows how 
Brahman ‘has not become anyone’ numerically, but only qualitatively adapts to each 
individual.  As the ātman, Brahman remains hidden within a human individual (2.20).  I 
will now show how similarly a daimon is hidden within the human compound.  
7.2.1 The Four Roots and the Daimon 
 How can a human be successfully distinguished from a daimon?  Empedocles 
presents the daimon in fragment 107/115. The fragment is crucial but fraught with 
difficulties (Wright, 1981: 271).  By splitting the fragment into two sections I can make 
my interpretation easier (107/115: 1-8).  The fragment does not end at line 8 but it is a 
natural point to stop for analysis.  A daimon is ‘being born (φυόμενον) throughout the 
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time as all kinds of mortal forms’.  A comparison with the four roots is suggested, 
hinging on what the term φυόμενον refers to and how it is to be understood.  Wright 
translates φυόμενον as ‘born’; but, Inwood prefers the term ‘growing’ (11/115: 7). The 
term φυόμενον cannot refer to the first life for the daimon because, as the fragment 
indicates, he has existed before this event. Further, how exactly one is to understand 
‘being born as a mortal form’ needs consideration. What sort of birth is this?    
 Referring to birth and death for a daimon during its ‘long-lasting’ life span 
requires a special understanding of the terms.  Thus Empedocles provides his own 
definition of the term ‘born’ in fragment 12/8, where birth and death are described as 
mixing and un-mixing.  Therefore, the term ‘being born’ according to Empedocles’ own 
terminology is a synonym for being mixed.  This equivalence between birth and mixing 
is significant in understanding a daimon’s role through the daimon/ roots comparison. 
The roots are not becoming the mortal forms, but are mixing to create the mortal forms.  
As Empedocles says, the four roots mix into mortal compounds, but they never become 
those compounds (8/17: 34-35).  In the same way the daimon is not literally becoming 
the mortal forms, but is being mixed into them.  But while the roots sustain all mortal 
compounds, those mortal forms do not seem to rely in any way on the daimon.  This is 
significantly different to Kaṭha Upaniṣad where the ātman is necessary for human life, 
as it is the divine element in the human constitution.  Again, the differences are 
fundamental: a daimon is not an ātman.  A daimon is a kind of substance that is ‘long-
lasting’, able to mix with, while remaining distinct from, other kinds of substances, as is 
seen when it finds itself mixing into shorter-lived mortal compounds. 
 Although I compare the macrocosmic four roots with the microcosmic daimon, 
the daimon remains distinct from the four roots.  Fragment 107/115 line 5 makes this 
distinction explicitly clear: δαίμονες οἵτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο; ‘daimons to 
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whom life long-lasting is apportioned’; or as Inwood translates, ‘[of] the daimons [that 
is] who have won long-lasting life’ (11/115: 5).  The term μακραίωνος, ‘long-lasting’, is 
not comparable to the roots or to Brahman/ātman which are both eternal.  Rather, ‘life 
long-lasting’ is similar to the term δολιχαίωνες used to describe the gods as ‘long-lived’ 
in fragments 14/21: 12 and 15/23: 6-8.  The language indicates that both gods and 
daimons fall short of the four roots’ eternal nature.  
 Having established the similarities and differences between the four roots and 
the daimon, we can now turn to the principal distinction and relationship requiring 
examination: between the individual human being and the daimon.     
7.2.2 The “Two selves/kinds” Theory: Self Realisation 
 What is the relationship between human and daimon for Empedocles?  Why has 
he set up a distinction in kind between an individual human and a daimon? The 
distinction is evident in the fact that an individual human has one birth and death in the 
cycle, whereas the daimon has many—as is seen at 107/115,  where a daimon is said to 
mix with ‘all kinds of mortal forms’ as it ‘wanders’ for ‘three times countless years’. 
But what is the purpose of this distinction? 
I reject the idea that a daimon is necessary to support the existence of a mortal 
form, or human compound and indeed see a distance between the daimon and the form 
it mixes with. Empedocles describes how the daimon wears ‘clothing in an unfamiliar 
garment of flesh’ (110/126).  The daimon, having ‘life long-lasting’, un-mixes from one 
individual human compound and mixes again with another individual human 
compound, ‘exchanging one hard way of life for another’.  There is thus a level of 
detachment or at least a notable distinction between the individual human compound 
and the daimon. The relationship seems to me comparable with that of Brahman and the 
body at Kaṭha Upaniṣad 2.18: ‘And he is not killed, when the body is killed’.  For just 
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like Brahman, the daimon is able to survive when the human composition ends, when 
for Empedocles it is un-mixed. In Chapter 6, I examined Empedocles’ description of the 
mixing and un-mixing of human compounds, showing how these kinds of substances 
had a specific material make-up.  Empedocles does not include a daimon in his 
articulation of the kind of compounds we term ‘normal’ mortal life and never states that 
a daimon is necessary for mortal compounds. Therefore, human or mortal compound 
and daimon can be seen as different kinds of entities and the connection between them 
as weak. 
 ‘Normal’ mortal compounds do not require a daimon, and a daimon does not 
require the ‘normal’ mortal compounds.  And yet Empedocles presents a situation 
where the two kinds, although distinct, come together through the mixing process. 
Empedocles states ‘I too am now...an exile’ (107/115: 13-14).  There is thus a 
distinction between a time when Empedocles was not, or did not realise that he was, ‘an 
exile’ and the present moment when he is aware of being ‘an exile’.  This distinction 
suggests a comparison with Empedocles’ fragment 95/132: 
 ὅλβιος ὃς θείων πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον, 
 δειλὸς δ’ ᾧ σκοτόεσσα θεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν.   
 Happy the man who has gained the wealth of divine understanding, wretched 
 he who cherishes an unenlightened opinion. 
Empedocles seems to have ‘gained the wealth of divine understanding’ which has 
resulted in his realisation that ‘I too am now...an exile’.  There is a contrast between 
Empedocles before and Empedocles after.  There is thus a categorical shift in 
Empedocles’ self-awareness142 and two different selves seem to open up: a pre-daimon 
self and a post-daimon self.  One sees evidence of the changing self-awareness in 
fragment 102/112: 4-5: 
 ἐγὼ δ’ ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος οὐκέτι θνητός 
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 But, as will be shown in 7.3, self-understanding must lead to actions; unlike, Kaṭha Upaniṣad where 
self-realisation of ātman is enough to offer liberation. 
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 [5] πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικα,   
 I tell you I travel up and down as an immortal god, mortal no 
 Longer, honored by all as it seems. 
 I, in your eyes a deathless (ἄμβροτος) god (θεὸς), no longer mortal (θνητός), 
 Go among all, honoured, just as I seem. (Inwood, 1/112:4-5). 
At one time Empedocles characterised himself as ‘mortal’—human in kind.  Now 
Empedocles distinguishes between his own two kinds—the ‘immortal god’ (daimon 
kind) and the mortal human (human kind).   The realisation is that there are two separate 
kinds of substances in the same mixed compound.  The human Empedocles thought the 
limits of his nature were human; but now the daimon Empedocles sees himself as a 
different kind.    
 My reading of Empedocles has been illuminated by the two-selves theory of the 
Kaṭha Upaniṣad. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad can be used to help solve the problem in 
Empedocles of how Empedocles the human can simultaneously be Empedocles the 
daimon.  Brahman can be used as a tool to interpret the self-realisation of Empedocles 
as Brahman is both the macrocosmic eternal banyan tree (6.1), and the internal 
‘primeval one who is hard to perceive’ ‘wrapped in mystery’ within a human being 
(2.12).
143
  The Kaṭha Upaniṣad explicitly describes the relationship between two 
selves/kinds: 1) Brahman and ātman; and 2) the human.  The former is likened to a rider 
and the latter to a charioteer (3.3).  These two selves/kinds refer to ‘the self as a rider’ 
(ātman), and the ‘intellect (buddhi) as the charioteer’ (3.3).  The ‘rider’ is the detached 
or hidden Self of Brahman characterised as ātman within an individual.  The ‘intellect’ 
represents the human.  The interplay between the two correlates to levels of ignorance 
and understanding (3.5-8).  The human self is linked to the body through the mind and 
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 However, there are fundamental differences: in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad Brahman and ātman can be 
described as the same kind of substance; indeed, ātman is a representation of Brahman in the mortal body.  
The self-realisation of ātman is at the very same instance a realisation of Brahman: the self-realisation of 
ātman as immortal in turn is the realisation that one is a drop in the ocean of Brahman, being as they are 
the same kind.  However, due to daimons being a specific kind of compound, different from the human 
kind, daimon cannot be an ātman. 
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senses, and acts as the driver.  Conversely, the divine Self—ātman—is a removed 
‘rider’, a passenger within the chariot or body.  Therefore, a human has an intelligent 
self and a divine ‘rider’.  These two selves co-inhabit the same body; one obvious, the 
other hidden.   
 This idea applied to Empedocles’ poem leads to an important new insight about 
the daimon.  Empedocles distinguishes between the two selves/kinds expressed in 
Kaṭha Upaniṣad 3.3, when announcing that ‘I am superior to many-times-dying mortal 
men’ (105/113).  There is a distinct contrast between the self-understanding of a daimon 
and that of an individual human unaware of a ‘life long-lasting’ daimon. Self 
knowledge is key for both texts, the hidden must become known.   
 The two selves theory of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad can therefore be applied to 
Empedocles’ two kinds: the human compound is comparable to the ‘intellect as the 
charioteer’; a daimon is comparable to ‘the self as a rider (ātman) in a chariot’.  The 
daimon is a ‘rider’ in the bodily chariot and is not ‘killed’ when the chariot ceases.  The 
daimon does not die with the body, as the daimon is not the same kind of compound as 
‘many-times-dying mortal men’.  Empedocles is ‘superior’ to ‘mortal men’ because he 
is ‘wise in such matters’ (106/15) and this leads to a self-identity focused on being ‘an 
exile’.  The self-understanding shifts Empedocles from actually being a ‘many-times-
dying mortal’ man (intellect) to being a ‘life long-lasting’ wandering exile, i.e. being a 
daimon (ātman).  It appears that, as in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, self-realisation for 
Empedocles has a positive effect.   
 The emphasis, in 3.3 and Empedocles, is that the ‘rider’ and daimon are hidden; 
or not normally recognisable (103/114; 95/132; 60/71).  The shift in self-understanding 
from ignorance to enlightenment is illuminated by the “two selves/kinds” theory where 
there is a hidden ‘rider’ and a human ‘charioteer’.  In the Kaṭha Upaniṣad there is no 
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contradiction in identity or a resulting assumption that this equates to a split personality 
and equally there seems no need to introduce these issues into Empedocles’ account.  
The charioteer can exist either in a pre-daimon state of self-understanding or a post-
daimon state of self-understanding.  One can associate one’s self with an ‘immortal 
god’ only if one understands the distinction between human and daimon.  Empedocles 
implores us to search for the divine ‘rider’.  This is the solution made possible through 
the Kaṭha Upaniṣad: Empedocles distinguishes between two kinds of compound—
‘normal’ mortal compounds and daimons—and understands that the hidden daimon 
requires self realisation.
144
  This conclusion is possible despite the fundamental 
difference between daimon and ātman.  A daimon certainly is not an ātman.  However, 
reading the two texts in dialogue and so comparing these two concepts brings to light 
the centrality of self realisation in both accounts.  
7.3 Ethicization: Hierarchy, Time, and Exile 
 What is the improvement for Empedocles after self-realisation and to what 
extent is Empedocles’ philosophy ethicized?  Once more Kaṭha Upaniṣad is the 
methodological tool used to solve the problem of moral accountability in Empedocles’ 
poem.  I solve this by showing that Empedocles, like Kaṭha Upaniṣad, emphasises right 
understanding leading to right action, but unlike Kaṭha Upaniṣad and the Indian notion 
of karma, Empedocles does not have a morally motivated hierarchy of lives dependent 
on moral accountability or a final liberation from the Cosmic Cycle.  
 In 7.3 I will show how Empedocles’ ethicization revolves around non-harm, 
based on right understanding and right action without a final liberation; thereby solving 
the problem of moral accountability in Empedocles by defining it and limiting it 
specifically within the constraints of Empedocles’ poem and the ideas he expresses 
therein.  In 7.3.1 (Hierarchy) using the framework of karma from Kaṭha Upaniṣad I 
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examine whether sequential lives could be viewed in a hierarchal way by suggesting a 
reward and punishment ethic akin to karmic rewards and punishments; this however is 
not finally endorsed, thereby showing Empedocles’ rebirth is not ethically motivated or 
morally hierarchical.  In 7.3.2 (Time as a Punishment) I examine the punishment for 
harmful actions, showing how it is one numerically identical daimon that traverses the 
various lives, through a banishment that has a set time.  And in 7.3.3 (Strife and Action 
and Liberation?) I look in more detail at the harmful action committed by the daimon. 
The daimon in 7.3.2 and 7.3.3 is shown to be the bearer of moral accountability through 
the consequences of their actions.  In 7.3.3.1 (Right Understanding) I examine the 
difference between Kaṭha Upaniṣad and Empedocles, the latter emphasising the need 
for more than the former’s reliance on right understanding for escape. In 7.3.3.2 (Love 
and Purification) I turn to the cessation of the daimon’s banishment; I analyse whether 
Love has a symmetrical role to Strife: harmful action led to the banishment, could non-
harmful action lead to purification and liberation?  The final conclusion is that, although 
right-understanding and right-action through love improves the daimon’s existence, i.e. 
their punishment stops, unlike the Kaṭha Upaniṣad Empedocles’ daimon is unable to 
find liberation from the Cosmic Cycle.  Therefore, Empedocles’ problem of moral 
accountability and liberation is solved through the Kaṭha Upaniṣad comparison by 
specifying exactly what is morally accountable and to what extent a daimon can 
improve its situation through Love, but also concluding that the Cosmic Cycle due to its 
all-encompassing nature does not allow for a daimon’s liberation. 
 After the un-mixing of Empedocles the human, the daimon—Empedocles the 
person (as he claims through self-realisation)—will continue, similar to the continuation 
of the daimon before Empedocles the individual was mixed.  As Wright states, there 
seems to be some common factor stopping complete dispersal at death (Wright, 1981: 
69), this common factor can now be seen as the daimon.   
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 Is Kahn, therefore, correct to state that Empedocles ‘is assured of imminent 
release’ (1971: 22)?  The question has to be qualified with ‘release’ from what exactly?  
It cannot be the Cosmic Cycle, due to my comparison with the eternal banyan tree and 
the conclusion that the Cosmic Cycle is all-encompassing.  Kahn himself states that 
individual human personality does not live on (1971: 9).  Therefore, is there anything to 
suggest that, to use Kahn’s terminology, there would be some form of assimilation into 
the divine for the daimon (1971: 9)?  But the daimon is a material entity.
145
  One would 
not expect to find a final cessation from the Cosmic Cycle, because Empedocles 
believes the Cosmic Cycle is eternal.  Perhaps the Cosmic Cycle reduces even personal 
liberation to nonsense.  Is personal survival outside the Cosmic Cycle in Empedocles’ 
work philosophically impossible?  Does, as Trepanier suggests, the eternal Cosmic 
Cycle deny the ‘happily ever after’ moment (2004: 128)?    
 Fragment 107/115 is the starting point.  The daimon ‘wanders from the blessed 
ones for three times countless years’ (107/115: 6).  Immediately, one detects a hierarchy 
of existence.  There exist the ‘blessed ones’ to which the daimon had been akin.  
Through wrong action, the daimon finds itself cast out, wandering apart from the 
‘blessed ones’.  This wandering after separation from the ‘blessed ones’ is being born 
‘as all kinds of mortal forms, exchanging one hard way of life for another’ (107/115: 7-
8).  There has been a devaluation of the daimon’s stock.  The daimon was once 
‘blessed’ and now it suffers during numerous ‘hard’ mortal lives.  It seems that ‘all 
kinds of mortal forms’ exist on a plane of existence that is lower and harder than the one 
the daimons have come from, i.e. with the ‘blessed’.  Yet this banishment is ratified in 
the constraints of time.  It appears that the daimon serves a set time of ‘three times 
countless years’.  This need not be taken literally, but Empedocles seems to anticipate a 
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 Granted there is a distinction between a short-lived human composition and a ‘long-lived’ material 
daimon composition.  But both are material.   
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point of return.  The time served is both punishment and reformative.  In fragment 
107/115 there is no mention that a daimon will not be accepted back after ‘three times 
countless years’, regardless of a daimon’s ‘moral’ behaviour.  The trust in bloodshed 
results in an action of bloodshed, which is a wrong action. 
  During this ‘exile from the gods’ the daimon goes through every root unable to 
find peace with any.  There seems to be a structure to their wandering.  They ‘wander’ 
in ‘exile’ for ‘three times countless years’ through the cosmic four roots.  Daimons have 
a privileged position, interacting with the elemental cosmic building blocks.  What stops 
a daimon finding ‘peace’ with each root is the daimon’s ‘trust in raving strife’.  It is 
Strife that keeps a daimon separate from the godly roots. 
7.3.1 Hierarchy   
 Is there a hierarchy of existence, one that requires a complex ordering of rewards 
and punishments correlating to one’s next life? If so, Empedocles would be offering an 
ethical dimension akin to karma.  But, as the Kaṭha Upaniṣad comparison shows, 
Empedocles lacks an idea similar to karma.  
 Is there any consistency with the rest of Empedocles’ fragments?  Empedocles 
offers reassurance that there is a cosmic hierarchy; describing himself as ‘superior to 
many-times-dying mortal men’ (105/113).  Through interpreting Empedocles’ 
fragments there appears to be a hierarchy to which the daimon relates.  Hierarchy is 
perhaps too strong a term.  There certainly is an order of existence for a daimon, as it 
‘wanders from the blessed ones’ (107/115).  A daimon who was previously part of the 
‘blessed ones’ is now banished and separated, no longer existing with them.  Therefore, 
a daimon prefers a ‘blessed’ life to that of a human.  But that need not mean human life 
is hierarchically lower or less preferable for humans.  All life has a place within 
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Empedocles’ Cosmic Cycle.  A daimon is unique being able to traverse many different 
types of mortal existence; human, animal, and ‘blessed’.   
 It is not explicit who these ‘blessed ones’ refer to.  The ‘blessed ones’ could be a 
reference to the ‘long-lived gods’, as Empedocles is an ‘exile from the gods’, (107/115: 
12).  The ‘blessed ones’ may be the goal for a daimon wandering within mortal 
creatures.  The goal is desirable for it lacks the cycle of transmigration.  The reason for 
this being desirable is because transmigration is the punishment for the daimon.  
Transmigration is a punishment implemented by taking the daimons from the ‘blessed 
ones’ to the human composition that is full of sorrow.  A daimon’s unethical action is 
causing bloodshed.  The daimon’s action leads to banishment and the punishment of 
transmigration within ‘all kinds of mortal forms’.  The result of humanity’s ‘slaughter’ 
(118/128) is remaining an ‘unhappy race’ (114/124).  As a result, ‘That is why, being 
distraught with bitter misfortunes, you will never lighten your hearts of grievous 
sorrows’ (123/145).  Here is the morality of Empedocles’ work.  But notice what 
Empedocles does and does not say.  Firstly, that if one continues killing one’s heart 
‘will never lighten’ from ‘grievous sorrows’.  Secondly, Empedocles does not say that 
‘you will never’ “escape” or “become free” until you stop killing.  Therefore, the 
outcome for Empedocles is different from Kaṭha Upaniṣad 3.8.  There is a mirroring of 
the daimon’s punishment with humanity’s sorrow through Strife’s action of causing 
bloodshed (114/124; 123/145).  The daimon who defiled his limbs is banished to an 
existence full of bloodshed and defilement of limbs; once again Empedocles promotes 
‘like for like’.  The daimon is sent to live an existence suitable to its actions.  Thus the 
daimon is held to be morally accountable and pays the price for evil actions.  
 But through their punishment does a daimon move up and down from the 
‘blessed ones’?  This view would require a more complex form of ethicization, 
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whereby, actions have a system of reward and punishment beyond what has already 
been described.  The system might be construed within a cycle of transmigration, where 
good lives are rewarded with a better birth next time and vice versa; which would 
constitute a developed idea similar to karma.  Could Empedocles’ transmigration be 
ethicized in such a way?  Such ethical rebirth would be closer to a more complex theory 
of karma.  I am using Kaṭha Upaniṣad here to see if Empedocles’ theory could be 
extended in this way i.e on a karmic model.  
 Empedocles appears to rank the forms of mortal life (131/127 & 132/146).  
There is a hierarchy in the animal world and one in the world of men, and above both 
those worlds ‘they arise as gods, highest in honor’ (132/146).  At a godly stage the 
daimons co-exist with ‘other immortals’ with which ‘they share hearth and table, having 
no part in human sorrows’ existing ‘unwearied’ (133/147). 
 Empedocles does believe in a quasi-hierarchy of mortal beings, with ‘long-
lasting’ gods at the top.  But this hierarchy is not based on ethics.  The daimons are cast 
out through wrong action and can return once more in ‘three times countless years’.  
The ‘ethical’ notion revolves around harm rather than improvement: there is a 
punishment for a harmful action; there is a description of a ‘Golden Age’ where non-
harm was practiced; and there is an ethical plea to cease harmful actions now.  Does a 
daimon travel up and down re-births due to their ethical actions? 
 The daimon exchanges ‘one hard way of life for another’, there is nothing 
explicit in fragment 107/115 to interpret a process of reward and punishment within the 
cycle of transmigration.  Transmigration is itself a punishment: a daimon has one ‘hard 
way of life’ followed by another.  Empedocles describes how a daimon cannot find 
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solace with the four roots as it travels through them (107/115: 9-12).  Strife keeps the 
daimon separate.
146
 
 There is little room for moral improvement, for ‘all abhor’ him in turn.  The four 
roots are not ethically hierarchical.   When Empedocles states that ‘before now I have 
been at some time boy and girl, bush, bird, and a mute fish in the sea’, there seems to be 
no evidence of incremental improvement through transmigration (108/117).  There 
appears no moral difference between animal and human life (Inwood, 1992: 61).  In 
fact, the lives previously lived appear akin to the four roots, perhaps these lives are 
characterisations of fragment 107/115: 8-13.
147
  It seems increasingly probable that how 
one should interpret a daimon wandering is as an expression of the cycle through the 
four roots (Osborne, 1987: 24).  There is no hierarchal ordered existence, nor any 
ethically motivated movement. 
 Importantly, the cycle of transmigration for the daimon is a punishment that 
lacks ethical rewards and punishments regarding the next life that could be compared to 
karma.  The daimon travels through the cycle of transmigration regardless of karmic 
effects on action.  Instead, Empedocles appears to be personifying a daimon’s 
relationship to the four roots.  The moral responsibility is only for the original action.  
The strife-full action described by Empedocles has moral consequences for a daimon 
but karma, as ethical ramifications for the next life, is absent within Empedocles.  So by 
using the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and the karmic framework I have been able to clarify this 
idea—Empedocles’ transmigration is an ethically motivated punishment but lacks an 
ethically motivated re-birth.  Instead, the morality is established through the ethical 
force of ‘necessity’ (107/115).  There is a hierarchy between the ‘blessed ones’ and 
humanity.  But a daimon travels through the four roots in turn with no ethical reward or 
punishment regarding the next life.   
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 This will be looked at in more detail in 7.3.3. 
147
 The obvious exception is an example of fire.   
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7.3.2 Time as a Punishment 
 To what extent is Empedocles’ philosophy ethicized?  Once more Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad is the methodological tool used to solve the problem of moral accountability 
in Empedocles’ poem.  My aim in this section is to explore Empedocles’ ideas on moral 
accountability by comparing Shared-Concerns with the Kaṭha Upaniṣad.  My solution 
to the problem in Empedocles is that as ātman retains an identical numerical identity, a 
daimon also remains numerically identical, thereby retaining moral accountability.  
 Empedocles describes the journey of the daimon as σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι 
περιστέλλουσα χιτῶνι ‘clothing (the daimon) in an unfamiliar [alien] garment of flesh’ 
many different times during the course of the exile (110/126).  Examples of punishment 
were used to distinguish qualitative change from numerical continuity in fragment 
107/115: 1-8.  But can the punishment be interpreted as justified?  As a daimon 
transmigrates through ‘all kinds of mortal forms’ it does not become numerically that 
individual compound.  The single daimon is the hub of moral accountability.  If a 
daimon numerically changes then moral accountability ceases on Empedocles’ terms.  
For example, a daimon is banished due to an ‘error’ for a set number of ‘three times 
countless years’.  As he ‘wanders’ he is ‘exchanging one hard way of life for another’.  
The nature of Empedoclean punishment requires a numerically identical daimon to be 
punished.  Fragment 107/115 describes a punishment which would make no sense if 
there was no fixed numerical individual punished through transmigration. As indicated 
above, the transmigration is the punishment, for it is not a natural process for daimons.     
 Punishments generally correlate with change, either corrective or punitive.  
Therefore, the implication is that the daimon will change.  If a daimon can change, then 
it suggests that a daimon can wish to return once more to where it came from.  Stated a 
different way, a numerically identical daimon can qualitatively change without 
becoming numerically different.  If the daimon became a different numerical identity as 
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it ‘wanders’, then the punishment seems diminished, if not completely corrupt.  One 
would be punishing a different numerical identity from the one that committed the 
punishable deed.   
 Therefore, one can talk about the daimon and the four roots being ‘within every 
being, adapt[ing] its appearance to match that of each, yet remain[ing] quite distinct’ 
(5.9).  However, the daimon is not like the ātman in the way that an ātman is ‘not 
born...does not die...has not come from anywhere’ (2.18).  The distinction is due to the 
daimon being a material mortal compound made from the mixing of the four roots, 
Love, and Strife.  A daimon is a kind of compound that retains its identity, but it is still 
mixed and un-mixed in the Cosmic Cycle. 
 One cannot definitively answer the question of how far a daimon is changeable.  
However, one can infer from fragment 107/115, and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad comparison, 
that complete change is not preferable.  Fragment 107/115 also suggests that some 
change is necessary, i.e. punishment as reformative.  The daimon has numerical identity 
and qualitative change; it is not subject to numerical change, even if it has some aspect 
of qualitative change.   
 I now turn to examine whether right understanding alone leads to liberation as 
for Kaṭha Upaniṣad’s ātman, or if Empedocles places more emphasis on right action.  
For example, is Empedocles’ assertion that he is now a god, superior to many times 
dying men more important than his actions, or, does the realisation itself lead 
Empedocles to behave in a more ethical way, by his own terms.  The latter places 
emphasis on actions, specifically the ethical importance of non-harm, over and above 
that of self-realisation. 
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7.3.3 Strife and Action and Liberation? 
 Transmigration is founded on the Cosmic Cycle and the ‘four roots’ as seen in 
fragment 107/115.  In this system, transmigration has a time restriction and sends the 
wandering daimon through the four roots in turn regardless of ‘ethical’ action.  Yet, is 
there an ‘ethical’ side to Empedocles’ doctrine? The daimon was sent into ‘exile’ 
because of wrong action based in Strife.  Therefore, if a daimon eradicates actions based 
on strife from  his incarnations, is there the possibility that the ‘four roots’ will no 
longer ‘abhor him’; and that the daimon may then return to the ‘blessed ones’ sooner 
than ‘three times countless years’? 
 The evidence for right action revolves around Empedocles’ belief in not spilling 
blood.  In fragment 107/115 the wrong action is the defilement of the daimon’s ‘own 
limbs’ through ‘fear’.  The defilement breaks the ‘broad oaths’ of the Cosmic Cycle and 
results in the ‘exile’ of the daimons.  Empedocles characterises these actions as ‘having 
put my trust in raving strife’.  Furthermore, the whole of the mortal race is characterised 
as a ‘poor unhappy race’, having been ‘born’ from ‘strifes and lamentations’ (114/124).  
There is a clear pessimistic view of mortal life developing; a view that seems highly 
dependent on the existence of Strife.   
 Empedocles describes a ‘sinful’ act of bloodshed leading to banishment as a 
punishment (107/115: 3-4): 
   εὖτέ τις ἀμπλακίῃσι φόβῳ φίλα γυῖα μιήνῃ 
 †ὃς καὶ† ἐπίορκον ἁμαρτήσας ἐπομώσει 
 whenever one, in his sins, stains his dear limbs with blood 
 ...[the text is corrupt here] by misdeed swears falsely. (Inwood, 11/115: 3-4). 
Unfortunately the text is corrupt in this fragment, and Wright and Inwood differ in what 
they establish as the Greek.  Empedocles states that an action ‘in error, from fear’, or as 
Inwood translates, ‘in his sin’, has ‘made false the oath he [daimon] swore’ (107/115: 3-
4).  The language in fragment 107/115 regarding a ‘decree of necessity...sealed by broad 
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oaths’ recalls fragment 23/30: the ‘time of exchange’ between Love and Strife that ‘has 
been defined by a broad oath’.  Therefore, the action made ‘in error’ by a daimon seems 
to be intrinsically linked with the cycle of Love and Strife.  The cycle of transmigration 
for a daimon was initiated by a ‘voluntary action’ (Osborne, 1987: 36).  The basic 
perception is like for like; we perceive ‘with love love, and strife with baneful strife’ 
(77/109).  
 The ethical action of the daimon is linked with Strife, especially, as the action 
itself refers to a defilement of ‘his own limbs’ and ‘trust in raving strife’ (107/115).  
There is an ethical dimension regarding the action of the daimon.  Unequivocally, 
Empedocles states that the ‘greatest defilement among men’ is ‘to bereave of life and 
eat noble limbs’ (118/128).  There is a connection between the daimon’s defilement of 
‘his own limbs’ and the ‘greatest defilement’ of killing and eating meat.  Importantly, 
the significance is on individual responsibility for actions (Wright, 1981: 65).  
  Obeyesekere believes that one cannot have temporary salvation, and he 
postulates that once a daimon has reached the gods once more it is ‘impossible’ for a 
‘daimon to be reborn on earth’, for if a daimon could relapse, then the ‘Empedoclean 
eschatology could not possess a doctrine of salvation.  But surely that is not the case?’ 
(2002: 232).  One can only wonder what Obeyesekere means by ending his 
Empedoclean chapter with a rhetorical question.  Of course, Obeyesekere is correct that 
‘ephemeral bliss is not salvation’ in a permanent way (2002: 232).  Therefore, one 
should be prudent and conclude that, although Empedocles has a concept of ephemeral 
salvation within the Cosmic Cycle, it is best not to use the term ‘salvation’ due to the 
connotations of the term in reincarnation eschatologies.  One should not, as 
Obeyesekere does, hold onto the need for salvation when the evidence is lacking or 
contradictory.   
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7.3.3.1 Right Understanding  
 The ethical nature of Kaṭha Upaniṣad is concerned with the law of karma, but 
relies heavily on self realisation.  Salvation from karma and the escape from the cycle of 
re-birth (saṃsāra) is the final goal: salvation (moksa) is the ‘final step, from which he is 
not reborn again’ (3.8).  Therefore, in Kaṭha Upaniṣad there is a clear and ‘final’ goal 
for the ‘self as a rider’ (3.3).  To reach that final step requires both an ethical aspect and 
the knowledge of Brahman (2.24; 5.7).  Similarly, the Empedoclean punishment is 
‘according to what they have done’ and ‘according to what they have learned’ (5.7).  
Verse 2.5 is perfect for a comparative examination (2.5): 
 Wallowing in ignorance, but calling themselves wise, 
 thinking themselves learned, the fools go around, 
 staggering about like a group of blind men, 
 led by a man who is himself blind. 
The idea of people ‘calling themselves wise’ who are actually ‘Wallowing in 
ignorance’, recalls Empedocles’ general view about the unenlightened: ‘wretched he 
who cherishes an unenlightened opinion about the gods’ (95/132).  Empedocles 
distinguishes between the enlightened mind and the ‘blind men’ who are ‘wretched’.  
Therefore, Empedocles’ poem, like the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, places emphasis on knowledge 
and understanding. But for Kaṭha Upaniṣad understanding is enough to lead to escape.  
Ignorance perpetuates the cycle of re-birth in Kaṭha Upaniṣad; literally the ‘fools go 
around’ and the wise escape.  But escape through right understanding alone cannot be 
applied to Empedocles.  For even though Empedocles has a similar view of required 
understanding, for Empedocles the Cosmic Cycle is driven by the ‘necessity’ of the two 
motive forces, Love and Strife.  As a result, Empedocles’ knowledge is not equated with 
salvation from the Cosmic Cycle as a whole, since this is eternal.  Yet there is a return 
to blessedness, since a daimon after coming from the ‘blessed ones’ into ‘mortal forms’,  
has the chance of returning to the ‘blessed ones’ after ‘three times countless years’ 
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(107/115).  There is a possible cessation of transmigration for the daimon, and that is 
linked to the morality of punishment.  A cessation is a positive outcome for a daimon, 
but one must not overstate it.  A daimon can find release from the cycle of 
transmigration, but there is no salvation from the all-encompassing Cosmic Cycle.  A 
daimon will un-mix like every mortal compound when the correct time comes. There 
can be no personal salvation from the Cosmic Cycle for material humans, daimons, or 
gods.  Therefore, Empedocles differs significantly from Kaṭha Upaniṣad where 
saṃsāra can be overcome through right understanding. 
 Next I use the Kaṭha Upaniṣad as a means to illuminate Empedocles’ ideas of 
right understanding leading to right action of non-harm through Love. 
7.3.3.3 Love and Non-harm 
 I present three reasons for a non-harm ethic: the daimon’s banishment; a 
‘Golden Age’ of non-harm; and an ethical plea to cease harmful actions.  As with other 
ethical issues in Empedocles, the Kaṭha Upaniṣad serves to illuminate his ideas on right 
understanding and right action of non-harm through Love.     
 Empedocles’ philosophy is highly symmetrical.  If strife produces bloodshed 
then there should be the opposite possibility.  Love does not disappear until Strife is 
completely in control, therefore, an example of Love is needed to complete the 
reciprocal image.  There is no explicit statement like ‘trust in raving strife’.  But there is 
a suggestion of ending one’s ‘trust in raving strife’.  Once the punishment has been 
completed there is nothing to suggest that a daimon will not rejoin the ‘blessed ones’ 
after its exile of ‘three times countless years’.  However, there is a possible 
interpretation suggesting a daimon could rejoin the ‘blessed ones’ sooner—through 
right understanding and right action.  This interpretation is derived from a comparison 
with Kaṭha Upaniṣad 5.7.   
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 The process of transmigration/rebirth in Kaṭha Upaniṣad is expressed by action 
and learning: ‘according to what they have done, according to what they have learned’.  
And these two directly correlate to one’s next life.  Empedocles likewise places 
emphasis on ‘what they have done’ and ‘what they have learned’—specifically 
concerning a daimon. 
 Regarding ‘what they have done’, a daimon put his ‘trust in raving strife’ and ‘in 
error, from fear’ defiled ‘his own limbs’; thereby breaking a ‘decree of 
necessity...eternal and sealed with broad oaths’ (107/115).  It is this action that 
instigates the cycle of transmigration, the punishment for a daimon.  Therefore, right 
action is central.  However, one requires the specific knowledge of what right action is 
before one can cultivate it.  The knowledge, Empedocles explains, refers to ‘the greatest 
defilement among men – to bereave of life and eat noble limbs’ (118/128).  The reason 
killing is the ‘greatest defilement’ is due to fragment 124/137 explaining how all 
material creatures are kin: 
 The father will lift up his dear son in a changed form, and, blind fool, 
 as he prays he will slay him...In the same way son seizes 
 father, and children their mother, and having bereaved them of life 
 devour the flesh of those they love. 
Interestingly, ‘blind fool’ is comparable to Kaṭha Upaniṣad 2.5: ‘a group of blind men, 
led by a man who is himself blind’.  Those that fail to realise the truth cannot see their 
way, they are ‘blind’ to the truth.  The truth for Empedocles is that all life is 
interconnected.  This belief stems from ‘the four roots of all things’ and Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad’s idea of Brahman.  Therefore, once one understands ‘what they have 
learned’, then one can implement right action based on that knowledge.  The right 
action is to ‘cease from the din of slaughter’ (122/136).  Empedocles’ right action of 
non-harm is based on his knowledge that all life is interconnected. 
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 The process described is from right understanding to right action.  It redresses 
the balance that was disrupted by a daimon’s wrong action of defilement.  Therefore, it 
may be possible for a daimon to practice right understanding and right action to help 
speed up the process of punishment, i.e. transmigration.  If a daimon understands and 
acts accordingly, then there seems little reason to carry on punishing him through 
transmigration; for the required outcome has been achieved.  However, this remains 
inferred conjecture.  
 What would the end of the punishment look like?  Empedocles states: at ‘the end 
they come among men on earth as prophets, minstrels, physicians, and leaders, and from 
these they arise as gods, highest in honor’ (132/146).  These are the best human lives 
available according to Empedocles. Obeyesekere believes 132/146 denotes a 
‘graduation of human reincarnations, culminating in the final and most desirable 
rebirth’ (2002: 227).  The conclusion seems strange given that Obeyesekere also states 
that ‘there is little in the extant fragments that suggests a clear-cut status hierarchy’ 
(2002: 226).  I maintain that despite Empedocles’ declaration that some human lives are 
better than others, there is no hierarchy of lives dependent on ethical rewards or 
punishments.  However, Empedocles clearly views certain human lives as more 
desirable, and indeed, he views his own life as superior.  These lives could relate, not to 
rewards and punishments in a hierarchical system but instead to knowledge, e.g. right 
understanding.  Each of the lives expressed has a link to intelligence: prophets know the 
future; minstrels sing of the past; physicians know how to heal people; and leaders bring 
people together.  It is knowledge of the future, past, health, and people that links these 
lives, not a hierarchical system of rewards or punishments. 
 To understand 132/146 more fully we need to know who ‘they’ are and what ‘at 
the end’ refers to (132/146).  Empedocles describes some thing ‘at the end’ of a process.  
254 
 
The most likely thing Empedocles refers to is the wandering daimon.  There are two 
interpretations for what the ‘end’ refers to: 1) at the end of the ‘three times countless 
years’ or; 2) whether the daimon has practised right understanding and right action and 
has been able to ‘arise as gods’ among the ‘blessed ones’ through Love’s purification.  
There are a number of scholars that believe 2) to be correct.  Trepanier believes 
Empedocles’ entire doctrine is a recipe for divinization, a path to salvation with the 
gods (2004: 112, 31).  Wright also believes in purification and salvation stating that this 
life will affect the daimon in the next (1981: 56).  On the other hand, Cornford can be 
tentatively aligned with 1), in that what he terms the ‘soul’ will reunite with God at the 
end of our world (1957: 239).  Interestingly, Osborne seems to align 1) and 2) in her 
assessment that ‘necessity’ and moral choice are important (1987: 33).  Furthermore, 
according to Osborne it is only the ‘daimons choosing to act in accordance with love’ 
that brings about the return of love in the Cosmic Cycle (1987: 40).   
 As Osborne suggests, it may be possible for the daimon to better its condition 
within this limited hierarchy/order that Empedocles presents.  Self realisation leads to 
action.  Rejoining the ‘blessed ones’ is based on an ethical understanding of like for like 
perception: we perceive ‘with love love, and strife with baneful strife’ (77/109).  The 
reciprocal like for like perception is based only on one’s own ethical choices.  Love is a 
positive and Strife is a negative within individual action. Therefore, because a daimon 
can perceive Love, it can act in a Loving way.  Empedocles combines like for like 
perception with an ethical counterpart: as one perceives, so one should act.  
 Fragments 116/122 and 117/123 depict several groups of opposites.  Therefore, 
wherever there is pessimism there is optimism.  Empedocles describes a time when 
man’s ‘altar was not drenched by the slaughter of bulls’ and men did not ‘bereave of life 
and eat noble limbs’ (118/128).  It seems Empedocles is describing a previous ‘Golden 
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Age’ of mankind, whether allegorically or historically.  In the ‘Golden Age’, all 
creatures ‘were tame and gentle to men, and bright was the flame of their friendship’ 
(119/130).  Empedocles is quite clearly contrasting the age he finds himself in with this 
blessed existence.  If Empedocles sees the rule of Strife in his time, then what he 
describes as the ‘Golden Age’ is the age of Love.  As a result, Empedocles mirrors the 
macrocosm of the Cosmic Cycle with the microcosm of mortal life.  Mortal creatures at 
one time existed as One under the rule of Love (119/130); and now they exist as Many 
under the action of Strife (107/115). 
 After describing the current and previous state of Strife and Love, Empedocles’ 
message is laconic (122/136): 
 οὐ παύσεσθε φόνοιο δυσηχέος; οὐκ ἐσορᾶτε 
 ἀλλήλους δάπτοντες ἀκηδείῃσι νόοιο; 
 Will you not cease from the din of slaughter?  Do you not see that you are 
 devouring one another because of your careless way of thinking? 
Empedocles’ ethical message revolves around a practice of not killing.  Empedocles 
pleads for individuals to mirror the Cosmic Cycle on an individual level.  Individuals 
must turn away from the rule of Strife which has divided all mortal creatures into Many, 
and must create a rule of Love within themselves, so that all moral creatures can live as 
One.  Empedocles implores loving behaviour on an individual level.  As Empedocles 
previously put his trust in raving Strife (107/115), now he places his trust in Love’s rule.  
Only by following Love can individuals ‘lighten your hearts of grievous sorrows’ 
(123/145).  
Conclusion        
 What, therefore, has been established by using Shared Concerns in Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad and Empedocles to Problem-Solve?  Firstly, in 7.1 I explained how the 
Cosmic Cycle for Empedocles is all-encompassing through a comparison with Kaṭha 
Upaniṣad’s eternal banyan tree.  This provided the basis for why liberation finally could 
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not be endorsed within Empedocles’ poem.  Secondly, concerning identity, using the 
Kaṭha Upaniṣad showed (7.2) that there is a need to distinguish between two kinds of 
substances which does not, however, result in a psychologically ‘split personality’ 
(Kahn, 1971: 3).  The distinction between an individual human and a daimon is 
illuminated by Kaṭha Upaniṣad 3.3.  The daimon is ‘a rider in a chariot’ and the 
individual human is the ‘intellect as the charioteer’.  The distinction is comparable to 
Kahn’s (1971: 10) and Obeyesekere’s (2002: 224) split between a daimon and a 
conscious mind.  However, the distinction should go further and postulate that the 
conscious mind is a human individual separable from a daimon.  In this view both a 
daimon and a human intellect are numerically distinct.  One sees the distinction within 
Empedocles who was mortal but upon realisation of the daimon is ‘mortal no longer’ 
(102/112).  
 While the daimon can return to the ‘blessed ones’ and return to a happy state 
away from the hard life of humanity, that is only limited salvation within an overarching 
process of the un-escapable Cosmic Cycle, while in the context of rebirth discussions 
salvation as a term predominantly refers to an escape from a cycle.  Therefore, through 
comparison with the Kaṭha Upaniṣad it is clear that the term salvation should not be 
used in conjunction with Empedocles, since salvation, within the context of a rebirth 
theory, implies a state of permanent escape.  This is a prominent difference between the 
Kaṭha Upaniṣad and Empedocles.  
 Thirdly, in section 7.3 I used the Kaṭha Upaniṣad to explore ideas of moral 
accountability in Empedocles and showed how applying the karmic framework 
illuminates the degrees of ethical understanding in Empedocles’ philosophy.  
Empedocles has a basic view of cause and effect.  But Empedocles’ philosophy lacks 
the fuller understanding of karma as part of a transmigration cycle, i.e. directly affecting 
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the next life.  The ethics of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and Empedocles rely heavily on ‘right 
actions’ and ‘right understanding’ (5.7).  For Empedocles one cannot have the former 
without the latter.  Empedocles also suggests that the daimon through Love’s right 
action hopes to return to the ‘blessed ones’ and live with the gods once more (132/146).  
But the daimon’s exile from and return to the ‘blessed ones’ exists within the all-
encompassing Cosmic Cycle.  As a result, Empedocles’ religious thought is not a 
soteriology based on the hope of personal salvation.  This is a major difference. For the 
Kaṭha Upaniṣad advocates eternal integration with the all-encompassing Brahman 
through self-realisation of ātman.  But in contrast, for Empedocles the all-encompassing 
Cosmic Cycle means that nothing can exist independent of it, and, therefore, that 
nothing finds release from it.   
 I have thus fulfilled my Claim 2 that Claim 1’s three Shared Concerns—the 
concept of ‘roots’ and a ‘tree’; the ‘two Selves’/kinds theory; and the concern with 
moral accountability across rebirths and different embodiments—has helped solve the 
problem of death and identity in Empedocles’ thought.   
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Conclusion 
 There are two aims for this conclusion.  Firstly, the originality of the 
Comparative Methodology is evaluated (1.1).  Secondly, the conclusions of Claims 1 
and 2 (1.2); what interpretational problems have been solved by examining Shared 
Concerns in one culture text with that of another cultural text?  Aim two is divided into 
1.2.1 and 1.2.2.  Respectively, these parts correlate to the thesis’ partition: Part One 
Phaedo and Milindapañha; and Part Two the Kaṭha Upaniṣad and Empedocles’ poem.  
In brief, Part One solved the interpretational problem of identity and moral 
accountability through Shared Concerns identified as the desire for the corporeal and 
purification in Phaedo and Milindapañha. Part Two solved the interpretational problem 
of liberation through examining Empedocles’ ideas of identity and moral accountability.  
I concluded that differentiating in kind between a human compound and a forensic 
daimon through the use of Shared Concerns with Kaṭha Upaniṣad solved the problem of 
liberation by limiting liberation to within the Cosmic Cycle and clarifying Empedocles’ 
concept of moral accountability.   
Originality Claims 
 To begin, a few concluding words concerning the thesis’ originality.  The 
Comparative Method takes an Indian cultural text, evaluates Shared Concerns about 
death and identity, and uses them to solve an interpretational problem in an ancient 
Greek cultural text.  As stated throughout, the method of comparison is not new.  In my 
introduction, Previous Comparative Scholarship on Plato and Empedocles, I highlight a 
number of excellent works within the comparative field.  For example, Dillon compares 
Plato’s Phaedo, a text about the death of Socrates, with the Buddhist text 
Mahāparinibbāna Sutta, similarly a text regarding the death of a great teacher, the 
Buddha (2000).  Superficially, my Comparative Method appears analogous to Dillon’s: 
Plato’s Phaedo compared with a Buddhist text.  A different Buddhist text, in a similar 
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comparison, is hardly grounds for striking originality.  However, the originality of my 
Comparative Method stems from the methodology and the problems solved.  To explain 
further, permit me to continue using Dillon as an example of credible comparative 
scholarly research.  Dillon takes a Greek extant text about the death of a teacher and 
compares it to an Indian extant text concerning the death of a teacher.  Immediately one 
recognises the concurrent theme of the two dialogues (one might call it a Shared 
Concern).  Dillon’s important and useful comparison originates from two similar texts, 
i.e. a treatise on the death of Socrates or the Buddha.  There is already a convergence in 
theme, which need not develop into similar philosophical concepts, but Dillon 
masterfully guides his reader through his fruitful comparison.  Here lies my originality: 
the use of Shared Concerns—in cultural texts not overtly obvious—to solve 
interpretational problems in one cultural text.  I emphasise Claim 2; Claim 1 being a 
useful mode.  The Comparative Methodology I employ is original due to the specifics 
and relationships of the claims.   
 The texts chosen for comparison in Part One were preferred for their problem-
solving potentials, and not on the basis of already existing similar conclusions.  Indeed, 
the conclusions to their Shared Concerns are starkly different: Plato posits that the soul 
is eternal, and Nagasena continually refutes the existence of a soul.  These are 
fundamentally different conclusions to a Shared Concern of death and identity.  
However, through the Shared Concerns and the different conclusions I have solved an 
interpretational problem in Plato’s Phaedo.   
 In Part Two, I offered a second case study as a test of my Comparative Method.  
Empedocles’ poem was shown to have Shared Concerns with the Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
through independent analysis of both texts.  And these were then used to demarcate 
between a human compound and a morally accountable daimon.  Kaṭha Upaniṣad has 
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previously been compared to Greek thought.  Both McEvilley (2002) and Schiltz (2006) 
compare the chariot simile of Kaṭha Upaniṣad with Plato’s Phaedrus, and the intriguing 
chariot composition expressed at 246a3-249d.  Though Plato’s use of the chariot 
comparison for a soul remains obscure and remarkably similar to Kaṭha Upaniṣad, and 
despite the limited scholarly attention of the two chariots—though Schiltz is far better 
than McEvilley—my thesis intentionally uses the Upaniṣad text with Empedocles, and 
not with Plato’s Phaedrus.  The comparison of the two chariot images has already been 
noted, and the method would be limited to the literary comparison, i.e. what is similar, 
what is different, is Plato using the image in a different way?   
 My Comparative Method succeeds in moving beyond the comparable 
similarities and differences, seeking to solve important interpretational problems within 
the Greek texts.  The aim of the methodology is not a comparison for the sake of 
comparison; simple compare and contrast.  Although the method does, at a basic level, 
confront similarities and divergences, what I aim for, at a further level, is the re-
interpretation of a Greek cultural text, with definite conclusions.  This thesis is not an 
uncomplicated check list, or a comparative sourcebook.  I use a specific Comparative 
Method—between east and west—to reach interpretational conclusion that have not 
been fully possible before.  Having stated the thesis’ originality, one must now turn to 
those important new conclusions.     
Project Conclusions   
Phaedo and Milindapañha 
 In Part One the problem of moral accountability in Phaedo was solved through 
the use of Milindapañha’s idea of ancestral relation.  Chapter 1 focused on the Shared 
Concerns of the two texts.  These are death’s appeal (1.3.1) due to the danger of craving 
the corporeal (1.3.2), and the use of water imagery to denote purification from or a 
continual return to bodily existence (1.3.3).  
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 Chapter 2 discussed the issue of moral accountability in Phaedo, setting out the 
problem in the text, what scholars have suggested, and my own interpretation of the 
problem.  Chapter 3 then tried to solve the problem by using Locke’s distinction 
between a human and a forensic person.  This distinction did prove useful in my 
interpretation of Phaedo, however it did not solve the original problem.  Locke’s 
forensic person was too focused on consciousness as memory.  Therefore, in Chapter 4 I 
brought the Milindapanha back into the discussion, showing how an ancestral relation 
akin to Buddhism’s dependent origination can clarify Phaedo’s concept of moral 
accountability.  Therefore, the originality of Part One is demarcating the soul as the 
forensic person within a morally dependent ancestral relationship.   
Empedocles and Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
 Empedocles is aware that a human intellect is different from, and does not 
require, a daimon.  In the extant fragments, there is no suggestion that a human intellect 
requires a daimon; that thought necessitates a daimon; or that being alive involves a 
daimon.  The fundamental distinction between human and daimon is significant 
throughout the extant fragments.  Furthermore, Empedocles never assures his reader 
that every human being has a daimon; one might believe the opposite to be true, that 
very few humans have a daimon.  Due to the knottiness of interpretation, I explicitly 
argued that human and daimon are distinguishable kinds of substances.  
 The method of analysing a human and daimon as two kinds was provided 
through the Kaṭha Upaniṣad’s chariot simile.  Kaṭha Upaniṣad presented a human 
psychology through distinguishable parts: rider, charioteer, reins, chariot, horses; self, 
intellect, mind, body, senses (3.3-4).  Through the comparative method I showed that 
Empedocles identifies a daimon as a detached rider within the bodily chariot, with the 
human intellect holding the reins of the body, as the charioteer.  With the human 
intellect ‘driving’, the daimon is forced to endure countless deaths in mortal form, 
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continually unable to alleviate its transmigrating condition; which according to 
Empedocles is a punishment for previous wrong actions.  I suggested that Empedocles 
posited an ethical theory based on knowledge and action.  This, however, is unlike the 
Indian notion of karma and the moment of understanding in itself does not set a daimon 
free—unlike in Kaṭha Upaniṣad.  Through right action and right understanding it may 
be possible for a daimon to return to the blessed before the fulfilment of the 
transmigration punishment.  But a daimon must separate eventually like all material 
compounds and therefore, there is no offer of a final liberation from the Cosmic Cycle. 
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